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3Abstract
The thesis is concerned to defend the compatibility of two 
plausible  claims about  the mind;  semantic  externalism and 
privileged access. It is further concerned to demonstrate one 
important  implication  of  the  conjunction  of  semantic 
externalism and privileged access, an implication which forces 
the rejection of the dichotomy between knowledge of one’s 
mind and knowledge of one’s world.
Chapter  one  is  a  presentation  of  semantic  externalism. 
Chapter  two  is  a  presentation  of  the  claim  of  privileged 
access.  The  claim  of  privileged  access  is  formulated  in 
response to the following question. How can a subject have 
privileged access to the contents of her thoughts given that 
her  thoughts  depend essentially  on  contingent  facts  about 
her world of which she could have empirical knowledge only?
Chapter three is concerned with the following implication, 
the consequent of which is prima facie absurd. If the contents 
of the mind depend essentially upon contingent facts about 
the world, knowledge of the semantic contents “within” can 
yield  knowledge  of  the  world  “without”.  Chapter  four  is  a 
defence  of  the  consequent.  It  is  argued  that  the  apparent 
absurdity of non-empirical knowledge of the world arises from 
a failure to embrace the full  force of semantic externalism. 
We can have privileged access to the world.
Chapter  five  is  an  examination  of  the  nature  of  de  re 
thought.  Whether  the  content  of  a  de re thought  is  to  be 
understood as object-dependent or as object-independent will 
determine the extent to which we can have privileged access 
to the world: that is, whether we can have privileged access 
to the objects of our de re thoughts as well as to general facts 
about our world.
Chapter six focuses on the implications of  the thesis  for 
external-world scepticism.
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7Semantic Externalism
No  man’s  intentional  mental  phenomena  are 
insular.  Every  man  is  a  piece  of  the  social 
continent, a part of the social main. (Burge, 1979, 
p. 87)
1.1 Introduction
The writings of Descartes gave voice to an assumption which 
has guided much philosophical enquiry since. The assumption 
is that of  methodological solipsism. Methodological solipsism 
has it that no psychological state presupposes the existence 
of any individual other than the subject to whom the state is 
ascribed. Thus a psychological state can remain fixed across 
various logically possible environments. In Descartes, one of 
the  ways  in  which  this  manifests  itself  is  as  the  logical 
possibility  that  for  any  psychological  state  P,  it  is  logically 
possible for a subject in a world consisting of nothing other 
than the non-physical subject to be in P. Nowadays, with the 
current dominance of one or another form of physicalism, the 
thought  is  expressed  differently.  The  assumption  manifests 
itself  rather  as  the  logical  possibility  that  for  any 
psychological state P, it is logically possible for a subject with 
no prior causal contact with an external physical environment 
to be in P. Supposed examples of such a subject would be that 
of an accidental replica, or a brain-in-a-vat.
At  first  sight,  relational  states  are  not,  on  this  view, 
psychological  states.  That  is,  such  states  as  being jealous, 
jealousy being a two-place relation, presuppose the existence 
of  an  object  as  well  as  a  subject,  and  hence  violate  the 
assumption of  methodological  solipsism.1 One could draw a 
distinction  between  “narrow”  psychological  states,  which 
1 There  is  a  popular  (perhaps  default)  view  according  to  which  all 
psychological states are relations to propositions. This view is compatible 
with the assumption of methodological solipsism as long as a proposition 
is not thought of as an individual.
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respect  the  assumption  of  methodological  solipsism,  and 
“broad”  or  “wide”  psychological  states,  which  do  not.  If 
relational states are to be construed as narrow psychological 
states,  they  would  have  to  be  construed  such  that  the 
supposed object of the relation falls within the bounds of the 
subject; the most obvious way to do this would be to take the 
object  of  the  relation  as  a  perception,  or  image.2 The 
assumption  would  then  encompass  relational  states.3 The 
assumption  of  methodological  solipsism  gives  rise  to  the 
possibility  of  radical  external-world  scepticism,  since  it  is 
consistent with belief in an external world that no such world 
exist.
The body of philosophers most fervently committed to the 
assumption of methodological solipsism are marked by their 
commitment to the project of  a scientific psychology.4 Their 
general  line  of  thought  runs  as  follows.  The  purpose  of  a 
scientific psychology is to formulate psychological laws: that 
is, laws under which the psychological states of subjects can 
be subsumed. Such laws must be apt for the explanation and 
prediction  of  the  actions  of  those  subjects.  If  scientific 
psychology is to be a viable project, it would be plausible to 
classify psychological states according to causal powers, and 
plausible that these causal powers in turn be classified in a 
way which is independent of the particular context in which 
the subject of the psychological state happens to be located. 
That is, content is to be individuated by causal powers, and 
causal powers are to be individuated narrowly.5 The meaning 
2 It would then be possible to account for phenomena such as “paranoid 
jealousy”, where one is jealous of a non-existent rival.
3 There is a further distinction between psychological states and  factive 
states, such as that of knowing that one is in England. Such factive states 
cannot be reconstrued in terms of relations to further mental items, since 
it is precisely their relation to external states of affairs which distinguishes 
them as the particular factive states they are. This is not to rule out the 
possibility of knowledge of internal items.
4 For the most ardent advocate of this view see Fodor (1980). See also 
Stich (1978).
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of  a  psychological  state  will  therefore  be  context-
independent.6
It would be wrong, however, to think that a commitment to 
the  assumption  of  methodological  solipsism follows  from a 
commitment to the project of a scientific psychology. The line 
of  thought  outlined  above  exemplifies  a  prior,  perhaps 
metaphysical commitment to methodological solipsism; prior 
that  is  to  any  engagement  with  the  discipline.  One  could 
argue that this gets things the wrong way round, and that the 
correct approach would rather be to examine theories from 
scientific psychology, and so determine whether there is  de 
facto a  commitment  to  methodological  solipsism.  This 
approach  is  evident  in  a  philosophical  debate  issuing  from 
David Marr’s  theory  of  vision.  Thus Tyler  Burge and Martin 
Davies  have  argued  that  Marr’s  theory  of  vision  delivers 
broad  perceptual  contents,  while  Gabriel  Segal  has  argued 
that the perceptual contents delivered are narrow.7
In his “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, Hilary Putnam poses a 
challenge to the assumptions underlying what he takes to be 
the traditional  theory of  meaning. The traditional  theory of 
meaning has it that the meaning of a word in a language is 
determined solely by the psychological state of  the subject 
who uses that word. This challenge in turn prompted Burge to 
mount a direct attack on the assumption of methodological 
5 According to this line of thought, two states will be classified as having 
the same causal powers if they cause the subject to move in the same 
way. This is, however, a complex issue. It is possible both for the bodily 
movements of two subjects to be identical while their actions are diverse, 
and for  the actions of  two subjects to be identical  while their  physical 
movements differ. 
6 For  an  attempt  to  combine  semantic  externalist  intuitions  with  the 
motives  driving  the  assumption  of  methodological  solipsism see Fodor 
(1994).
7 For Marr’s theory of vision see Marr (1982). For arguments against its 
being individualistic see Burge (1986b) and Davies (1991) and (1992). For 
arguments  in  favour  of  its  being  individualistic  see  Segal  (1989b)  and 
(1991).
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solipsism.8 Putnam’s  argument  concerns  linguistic  meaning, 
while  Burge’s  concerns  psychological  content.  According  to 
Putnam,  the  meanings  of  a  subject’s  words are  not 
determined  solely  by  facts  about  the  individual  subject. 
According to Burge, the meanings of a subject’s thoughts are 
no  more  determined  solely  by  facts  about  the  individual 
subject than the meanings of her words. The meaning of a 
psychological state is precisely  not  context-independent. My 
aim in this chapter is to set out the arguments presented by 
Putnam and Burge, and to draw attention to certain features 
which are of particular relevance for the thesis as a whole. 
The chapter is not intended primarily as an endorsement of 
the  claim that  context  is  constitutive  of  meaning,  whether 
linguistic or psychological. Rather, it is intended to serve as a 
preliminary statement of precisely what the claim amounts to. 
The concluding section presents an overview of the contents 
of  the  thesis,  and  explains  how  the  chapters  which  follow 
relate to each other.
1.2 Putnam’s argument
Putnam identifies two traditional claims about meaning and 
the mind: first, that knowing the meaning of a term is just a 
matter of being in a certain psychological state, and second, 
that  the  meaning  of  a  term  (its  intension)  determines  its 
extension.  Putnam  challenges  the  cotenability  of  these 
claims,  arguing  that  they  are  not  jointly  satisfied  by  any 
notion,  and  a fortiori not  by  a  theory  of  meaning.  Putnam 
argues,  by  means  of  the  (by  now all  too  familiar)  thought 
experiment set out below, that psychological state does not 
determine extension,  and hence that  one of  the traditional 
claims  must  be  rejected.  “Cut  the  pie  any  way  you  like, 
‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head.”9
This is how Putnam presents his argument for the claim 
that  psychological  state  does  not  determine  extension.  We 
are to suppose that somewhere in the galaxy there is a planet 
8 Burge (1979).
9 Putnam (1975b) p. 227, original emphasis.
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we shall call Twin Earth. Twin Earth is exactly like Earth in all 
but  a  few  respects.  People  on  Twin  Earth  even  speak  a 
language with the same syntax and at least mostly the same 
semantics as English, a language which could be regarded as 
a dialectical version of English. One of the respects in which 
Twin Earth differs from Earth is that the liquid people on Twin 
Earth  call  “water”  is  not  H2O but  a  different  liquid  whose 
chemical  formula,  being  very  long  and  complicated,  is 
abbreviated  simply  as  XYZ.  XYZ is  supposed  to  be 
indistinguishable  from  water  at  normal  temperatures  and 
pressures, and, further, to fill the same role on Twin Earth as 
H2O does on Earth. That is, it quenches thirst, fills the lakes 
and seas, and so on.
Putnam claims that if a spaceship from Earth were to visit 
Twin  Earth,  the  travellers  would  at  first  suppose  that  the 
water-like  stuff  they  encounter,  and  which  the  locals  call 
“water”,  is water,  and  hence  that  “water”  has  the  same 
meaning on Twin Earth as on Earth. However, Putnam claims, 
this supposition will  be corrected when it is discovered that 
the water-like stuff on Twin Earth is in fact XYZ. The case will 
be symmetrical for visitors from Twin Earth; they will at first 
suppose that their term “water” has the same meaning as the 
syntactically identical term in English, a supposition which will 
be corrected when they discover that “water” on Earth is H2O.
Note that there is no problem about the extension 
of  the  term  ‘water’.  The  word  simply  has  two 
different meanings ... : in the sense in which it is 
used on Twin Earth, the sense of waterTE, what we 
call ‘water’ simply isn’t water; while in the sense 
in which it is used on Earth, the sense of waterE, 
what the Twin Earthians call  ‘water’  simply isn’t 
water.  The  extension  of  ‘water’  in  the  sense  of 
waterE is the set of all wholes consisting of H2O 
molecules, or something like that; the extension 
of ‘water’ in the sense of waterTE is the set of all 
wholes consisting of XYZ molecules, or something 
like  that.  (Putnam,  1975b  p.  224,  original 
emphasis)
Putnam’s further claim is that the meaning of “water” both on 
Earth and on Twin Earth has remained constant over  time. 
11
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Considering  a  typical  speaker,  Oscar1,  from Earth  in  1750, 
and his counterpart, Oscar2, from Twin Earth, Putnam writes,
You  may  suppose  that  there  is  no  belief  that 
Oscar1 had about water that Oscar2 did not have 
about ‘water’. If you like, you may even suppose 
that Oscar1 and Oscar2 were exact duplicates in 
appearance,  feelings,  thoughts,  interior 
monologue,  etc.  Yet  the  extension  of  the  term 
‘water’ was just as much H2O on Earth in 1750 as 
in  1950;  and  the  extension  of  the  term ‘water’ 
was just as much XYZ on Twin Earth in 1750 as in 
1950.  Oscar1 and  Oscar2 understood  the  term 
‘water’ differently in 1750 although they were in 
the same psychological state, and although, ... , it 
would  have  taken  their  scientific  communities 
about fifty years to discover that they understood 
the term ‘water’ differently. Thus the extension of 
the  term  ‘water’  ...  is  not a  function  of  the 
psychological  state  of  the  speaker  by  itself. 
(Putnam, 1979 p. 224, original emphasis)
The  traditional  conception  that  meaning  what  one  does 
should be classified as a state of mind is thus brought under 
pressure. Oscar1 and Oscar2 are psychologically identical, and 
yet  their  counterpart  linguistic  terms  “water”  differ  in 
meaning. One of the traditional claims about meaning must 
be discarded: either knowing the meaning of  a term is not 
just a matter of being in a certain psychological state, or the 
meaning  (intension)  of  a  term  does  not  determine  its 
extension. Putnam opts to discard the former, and retain the 
latter. Knowing the meaning of a term according to Putnam 
then, is not just a matter of being in a certain psychological 
state “narrowly construed”.
Putnam’s  positive  proposal  is  that  a  theory  of  meaning 
should  be  seen  as  composite,  essentially  incorporating  the 
external  world  to  which  the  subject  bears  a  contingent 
relation. The meaning of a linguistic term is, according to this 
view,  constituted  by  the  set  composed  of  a  “narrow” 
psychological state together with an external relational fact. 
That  Putnam  accepts  some  notion  of  narrow  content  is 
12
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evident  in  his  assertion  that  Oscar1 and  Oscar2 may  be 
supposed to be duplicates in thought.10
Perhaps the easiest way to understand Putnam’s positive 
proposal  is  by  drawing  attention  to  a  parallel  with  an 
approach  to  indexical  terms  introduced  by  David  Kaplan.11 
Consider  the sentence “I  am thirsty”.  If  Oscar1 and Oscar2 
were  to  utter  that  sentence,  they  would  thereby  have 
expressed  different  propositions.  The  extension  of  an 
indexical  term depends upon the context of  utterance. The 
extension  of  the  indexical  term  “I”,  for  instance,  depends 
upon  the  identity  of  the  speaker;  the  extension  of  the 
indexical  term  “here”  depends  upon  the  location  of  the 
speaker. Nevertheless,  the utterances of  Oscar1 and Oscar2 
clearly have something in common. Kaplan calls this common 
element “character”.12 On this view, then, two terms are said 
to have the same character if they effect the same mapping 
of utterance plus context onto truth-conditions. For standard 
indexical terms, such as “I”, “here” and “now”, the extension 
is  clearly  not  a  function  solely  of  the narrow psychological 
state of  the subject.  Furthermore, as Putnam notes, such a 
theory  has  never  been  suggested  for  indexical  terms.13 If 
Putnam  is  right,  for  a  natural  kind  term  the  extension  is 
10 While I take Putnam’s commitment to some form of narrow content to 
be evident, he does appear to have some qualms about the assumption of 
methodological  solipsism. Given that his paper was programmatic, I do 
not think this is particularly surprising, but his ambivalence is confirmed 
in Putnam (1996).
11 Kaplan (1980).
12 Perry (1977) introduces the notion of psychological “role” which serves 
essentially the same purpose as Kaplan’s notion of character.
13 It should be remembered that the issue under consideration here is 
that of  linguistic indexical terms. For an argument to the effect that the 
meaning  of  a  psychological  indexical  is  a  function  solely  of  the 
psychological state of the subject see Evans (1981). There is some reason 
to  think  that  such  indexical  components  of  thought  can  be  neither 
eliminated in favour of, nor reduced to, non-indexical components. For a 
convincing explanation of this see Perry (1979).
13
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similarly  not  determined  by  the  psychological  state  of  the 
subject.
Putnam writes,
Our  theory  can  be  summarized  as  saying  that 
words  like  ‘water’  have  an  unnoticed  indexical 
component:  ‘water’  is  stuff  that  bears a certain 
similarity relation to the water around here. Water 
at  another  time  or  in  another  place  or  even  in 
another  possible  world  has  to  bear  the  relation 
[same-liquid] to  our ‘water’ in order to be water. 
(Putnam, 1975b p. 234, original emphasis)
This analogy between indexical expressions and natural kind 
terms  is  by  no  means  perfect.  The  following  disanalogy  is 
surely important. The extension of indexical type-expressions 
is  context-dependent, and yet indexical type-expressions are 
nevertheless  taken  to  have  a  constant  meaning.  Hence 
contextual factors do not enter into the meaning of indexical 
expressions.  The  indexical  expression  “I”  means  the  same 
when  uttered  by  Oscar1 and  Oscar2,  even  though  the 
extension of  each utterance differs.  With respect to natural 
kind terms, Putnam’s line appears to be the following.  The 
extension of a natural kind expression is context-dependent, 
and  therefore natural  kind type-expressions  do not  have a 
constant  meaning.  Contextual  factors  do enter  into  the 
meaning of natural kind terms.
Using  this  disanalogy  as  an  argument  against  Putnam’s 
claim  would,  however,  be  unfair  to  Putnam,  who  himself 
draws  attention  to  this  fact.14 Putnam’s  claim  is  that,  for 
indexical  type-expressions  and  for  natural  kind  type-
expressions  alike,  psychological  state  does  not  determine 
extension. In both cases we must choose one of two possible 
options, each of which correspond to the rejection of one or 
other of the two doctrines underlying the traditional theory of 
meaning  as  characterised  by  Putnam.  To  choose  the  first 
option would be to maintain that the type-expressions have 
the same meaning despite a possible difference in extension; 
thereby  giving  up  the  doctrine  that  meaning  determines 
14 Putnam (1975b) pp. 245-6.
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extension. To choose the second option would be to maintain 
that  difference  in  extension  is  ipso  facto difference  in 
meaning; which is inconsistent with the doctrine that knowing 
the  meaning  of  a  term  is  a  matter  of  being  in  a  certain 
psychological state. It is surely right to point out that the first 
option  embodies  the  standard  approach  to  indexicals, 
whereas  Putnam’s  preferred  option  with  respect  to  natural 
kind terms is the second.15 However, this does not damage the 
parallel  Putnam  wishes  to  draw.  The  parallel  holds  to  the 
extent  that  in  neither  case  does  psychological  state 
determine extension.16
The  adoption  of  such  a  composite  theory  of  meaning 
allows  that  the  investigation  of  the  mental  can  remain  a 
scientific  investigation  along  the  lines  proposed  by  for 
example Jerry Fodor and Stephen Stich. The proper concern of 
a scientific psychology, with its commitment to individuation 
by  causal  powers,  must,  according  to  them,  be  narrow 
psychological  facts,  and,  since  Putnam’s  positive  proposal 
admits the notion of narrow content, the project of a scientific 
psychology is left intact. Nevertheless, if Putnam’s proposal is 
accepted, the discipline has turned out to be concerned with 
items  which  are  other  than  originally  envisaged.  Scientific 
psychology  cannot  deal  directly  with  meaning,  since, 
15 Putnam also  draws a  parallel  between natural  kind  terms and rigid 
designators. This is perhaps a better analogy , since for rigid designators, 
difference  in  extension  makes  for  difference  in  meaning.  Burge’s 
contention (1982) is that Putnam’s assimilation of natural kind terms both 
to indexicals  and to rigid designators is actually inconsistent. This may 
well be right, but, again, only once one has committed oneself to the first 
possible option for indexicals. The parallel with indexicals is surely to be 
drawn prior to any such commitment. It might be thought that indexicals 
are indeed rigid designators. Consider the following line of thought. If Fred 
says “I am tall”, what he expresses is true in any world w if and only if 
Fred is tall in w. Thus his utterance of “I” rigidly designates himself. This 
assumes sameness of subject across different contexts.
16 For  further  discussion  of  natural  kind  terms  and  the  possibility  of 
treating them as having an indexical component see for example Zemach 
(1976), Mellor (1977), and Sterelny (1981).
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following Putnam’s line, linguistic meaning incorporates facts 
external to the subject. 
1.3  Burge’s  proposal:  semantic  externalism  and 
semantic internalism
Subsequent  to  Putnam’s  argument,  Burge  advocates  an 
alternative  more  radical  proposal.  Burge  accepts  Putnam’s 
primary claim that a difference in meaning can be due to a 
difference in  context alone, that the meaning of a linguistic 
term is not context-independent. However, he maintains that 
the  natural  consequence  of  this  observation  is  that  a 
difference  in  context  can  equally make  for  a  difference  in 
thought.  He  even  expresses  some  incredulity  as  to  “why 
Putnam did not draw a conclusion so close to the source of his 
main argument”17.  Rather  than holding onto the claim that, 
while  linguistically  different,  Oscar1 and Oscar2 are  alike in 
their thoughts, Burge rejects entirely the familiar conception 
of the mental. On this view, the counterparts are treated as 
differing  psychologically.  Even  though  what  is  in  the  head 
may be thought of as  causally relevant, it can no longer be 
regarded as being of constitutive relevance to the meaning of 
one’s  state  of  mind.18 On  the  Burgian  picture  there  is  no 
narrow  content;  all  content  is  broad.  The  environment 
permeates to the very heart of individual psychology.
17 Burge (1982) p. 103.
18 The  issue which concerns the individuation of  the causal  powers of 
psychological states is an interesting and contentious one. If Putnam is 
right,  it  might  seem that  the  same  narrow  psychological  states  could 
nevertheless  differ  in  their  causal  powers  in  virtue  of  being  had  by 
subjects  who  were  related  to  different  physical  environments. 
Psychological state P could cause Oscar1 to reach for H2O, and Oscar2 to 
reach for XYZ. If such subjects are in psychological states which differ in 
causal powers, they should presumably not be grouped together for the 
purposes of  psychological  explanation.  For  an  interesting  discussion  of 
these issues, and an argument denying any relevant difference in causal 
powers see Fodor (1987) and (1991).
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I will refer to those theories which hold onto some notion 
of  narrow  content  for  the  purposes  of  psychological 
explanation  semantic  internalist or  individualistic theories. 
Those  which  jettison  such  a  notion  will  be  referred  to  as 
semantic externalist or  anti-individualist theories.19 Semantic 
internalism and semantic externalism are theses concerned 
with the status of the contents of psychological states.
The most neutral way to explicate the complex notion of 
narrow content is in terms of a  supervenience claim, where 
this is to be understood as a determination relation, and not 
as  a  dependence  relation.20 Thus  content  that  supervenes 
locally  on  the  subject  is  termed  narrow  content.  How  to 
delineate the subvening base is a moot issue. Should it  be 
thought  of  as  the  brain,  the  brain  plus  central  nervous 
system, or something even wider? Certainly the base will not 
extend beyond the bodily confines of the individual.21 
Just how to characterise the notion of narrow content is the 
issue which gives substance to one of the most fundamental 
debates  within  semantic  internalism;  whether  it  should  be 
characterised  as  non-truth-conditional,  akin  to  Kaplan´s 
notion of character, or rather as everyday, truth-conditional 
19 I  will  throughout refer to such theories as  semantic internalism and 
externalism,  to  contrast  with  what  I  term  epistemic internalism  and 
externalism. For an account of the theories of epistemic internalism and 
epistemic  externalism see Lehrer  (1974),  Pollock  (1986),  and Chisholm 
(1989). See also Nozick (1981), and Goldman (1986).
20 The  importance  of  understanding  supervenience  in  this  context  in 
terms of a determination relation as opposed to a dependence relation 
can be illuminated by seeing how the notions come apart. It is plausible to 
hold  that  the  property  of  being  coloured  depends  upon  the  physical 
properties  of  objects,  and hence that there could be no change in the 
colour without a change in the physical, while maintaining that colour is 
response-dependent,  that  what  determines  that  an  object  is  red,  for 
instance,  is  nothing  other  than  our  reaction  to  it.  For  a  thorough 
investigation into the notion of supervenience see Kim (1993).
21 Perhaps the notion of  the individual  ought not in  this  context to be 
taken for granted. The extent of an individual’s psychological phenomena 
is, after all, precisely what is at issue.
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content. Understanding it as non-truth-conditional content is 
relatively easy, precisely because we have the Kaplan notion 
of character to which to appeal. However, there is a question 
as to whether narrow content understood in this way, as non-
truth-conditional, is really  content. Because of this question, 
some have tried to defend a form of truth-conditional narrow 
content,  arguing  as  follows.22 The  attribution  of  a  thought 
content  is  made  so  as  to  facilitate  the  explanation  and 
prediction  of  a  subject’s  actions.  A  correct  attribution  will 
therefore account for difference and sameness in behaviour. If 
we  consider  Oscar1 two  things  are  apparent.  First,  he  is 
unable to distinguish between H2O and XYZ, even after multi-
modal interaction. That is, both substances prompt identical 
forms  of  behaviour  narrowly  construed.  Second,  Oscar1’s 
behaviour is indiscriminable from Oscar2’s behaviour from an 
internalist  perspective.  According  to  this  line  of  thought,  it 
would be theoretically unmotivated to attribute a subject with 
a content which credits her with discriminatory powers she 
clearly  does not  possess.  It  would be similarly  theoretically 
unmotivated to attribute two behaviourally indistinguishable 
subjects with  different contents. Not only is there no  reason 
to  attribute  the  subjects  with  such  fine-grained  thought 
contents, it would be wrong to do so. Rather, in the case of 
Oscar1 and Oscar2 the subjects should be attributed a content 
which  has  in  its  extension  both H20  and  XYZ.  This is  the 
attribution  which  best  explains  Oscar1’s  behaviour  with 
respect both to water and twin water, and equally explains 
the behaviour of Oscar2. This is not, as some have suggested, 
to attribute Oscar1 or Oscar2 with disjunctive contents.23 Many 
of  our  terms  have  extensions  which  range  over  different 
types  of  object;  “animal”,  for  example.  That  a  category  of 
objects can be further subdivided provides no basis on which 
to attribute a subject who is unable to discriminate between 
the  subdivisions  within  the  broader  category  a  thought-
content which is specific to one of the subdivisions. While this 
22 For a thorough exposition of the view see Segal (1989a), (1989b) and 
(1991). See also Crane (1991).
23 See for example Davies (1991) and (1992), and Egan (1991).
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issue is an important one, the debate is internal to semantic 
internalism,  and  since  our  concern  here  is  with  semantic 
externalism,  we  shall  dwell  on  it  no  further.  To  reiterate, 
semantic  externalism  and  semantic  internalism  are  theses 
concerned  with  the  content  of  psychological  states.  The 
former admits some form of narrow content; the latter does 
not.
According to these definitions, it is clear that Putnam must 
be  classified  as  a  semantic internalist.  He  is,  after  all, 
committed to some form of narrow content. His contribution 
was not, therefore, the introduction of semantic externalism. 
Rather,  it  was  to  show  that  psychological  state  does  not 
determine  extension.  Semantic  externalism  came  with  the 
recognition, by Burge, of the implications of Putnam’s thesis 
for the philosophy of mind. Putnam has since confessed that 
although he appreciated the fact that denying that meanings 
are in the head must have consequences for the philosophy 
of mind, at the time of writing “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, he 
was unsure as to just what those consequences were. Putnam 
has  subsequently  acknowledged  that  the  notion  of  narrow 
content  ought  to  be  jettisoned,  showing  an  allegiance  to 
semantic externalism. He writes,
In Burge’s view, my attempt in “The Meaning of 
‘Meaning’” to hold a place open for  a notion of 
“narrow content” and for “narrow mental states” 
represented a confusion on my part, and I have 
come to believe that he is right. (Putnam, 1996 p. 
xxi)
My  primary  concern  will  be  with  semantic  externalism –  a 
thesis  about  the constitutive conditions for  the contents of 
one’s psychological states. To this extent I focus on the thesis 
presented  by  Burge,  the  argument  for  which  is  set  out  in 
section 1.4 below.
1.4 Burge’s argument
Putnam’s thesis as presented so far is a thesis about natural 
kind terms; terms which pick out natural kinds in the world, 
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demarcated as it would be by the best scientific taxonomy.24 
However, Putnam’s argument, as he states, is not restricted 
to natural  kind terms,  but works equally for  other types of 
words.  Examples  offered  by  Putnam  include  “elm”, 
“mackerel”, and “aluminium”. Again, these examples turn on 
the supposition that items which fall within the extension of a 
given term have a shared underlying structure, whether that 
be genetic, biological, or molecular. In not all cases will  the 
physical environment be the contextual factor which accounts 
for the divergence in meaning between the counterpart terms 
of  counterpart  subjects.  Burge’s  argument  places  greater 
emphasis on the claim that  social  context is constitutive of 
content, and not external to it;  on the role of the linguistic 
community.  The  extent  of  the  argument  is  therefore  best 
brought home by Burge.
The argument has an extremely wide application. 
...  We  could  have  used  an  artifact  term,  an 
ordinary  natural  kind  word,  a  color  adjective,  a 
social role term, a term for a historical style, an 
abstract  noun,  an  action  verb,  a  physical 
movement verb, or any of various other sorts of 
words. (Burge, 1979 p. 79)
Burge’s  argument,  referred  to  in  the  above  quote,  is 
presented as a three-step thought-experiment. He writes,
Suppose first that: 
A given person has a large number of  attitudes 
commonly  attributed  with  content  clauses 
containing  ‘arthritis’  in  oblique  occurrence.  For 
example,  he  thinks  (correctly)  that  he  has  had 
arthritis  for years,  that his arthritis  in his wrists 
and fingers is more painful than his arthritis in his 
ankles,  that  it  is  better  to  have  arthritis  than 
cancer  of  the  liver,  that  stiffening  joints  is  a 
symptom of arthritis, that certain sorts of aches 
are  characteristic  of  arthritis,  that  there  are 
various kinds of arthritis, and so forth. In short, he 
has a wide range of such attitudes. In addition to 
these unsurprising attitudes, he thinks falsely that 
24 The notion of a natural kind is not a clear one. See for instance Wilson 
(1982), with whose line of argument I am in broad agreement.
20
One: Semantic Externalism
he has  developed  arthritis  in  the  thigh.  (Burge, 
1979 p. 77)
On reporting his fear to his doctor, the patient is surprised to 
find  out  that  he  cannot  have  arthritis  in  his  thigh,  since 
arthritis is specifically an inflammation of joints. He accepts 
the doctor’s word, and relinquishes his belief. The second step 
of  the  thought-experiment  consists  of  a  counterfactual 
supposition. We are asked to conceive of a situation in which 
the patient proceeds from birth through the same course of 
physical events, up to and including the time at which he first 
reports his fear to his doctor. In the actual case, “arthritis” as 
used in  his  community  does  not  apply  to  ailments  outside 
joints. In the counterfactual case, however, we are to imagine 
that  “arthritis”  as  used  by  the  community  does apply  to 
ailments outside joints. Burge summarises the second step as 
follows.
The  person  might  have  had  the  same  physical 
history  and  non-intentional  mental  phenomena 
while  the  word  ‘arthritis’  was  conventionally 
applied,  and  defined  to  apply,  to  various 
rheumatoid  ailments,  including  the  one  in  the 
person’s  thigh,  as  well  as  to  arthritis.  (Burge, 
1979 p. 78)
The  final  step  is  given  as  an  interpretation  of  the 
counterfactual situation. Since differences in extension make 
for  differences  in  meaning,  the  word  “arthritis”  in  the 
counterfactual  community,  according  to  Burge,  does  not 
mean arthritis: it does not apply to only inflammation of the 
joints. The crucial pair of suppositions is as follows: a) that in 
the counterfactual case it would be incorrect to ascribe any 
content clause containing an oblique occurrence of the actual 
term “arthritis”; and b) that such differences in extension of 
counterpart expressions in that-clauses make for differences 
in the content of the psychological states thereby attributed. 
Burge  in  effect  argues  that  although  Putnam  is  right  to 
maintain that meanings are not in the head, any difference in 
context which makes for a difference in linguistic meaning will 
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in turn carry over into the realm of the mental, and make for 
a difference in psychological content.
It might be objected that Burge’s inference from a) to b) 
expresses a commitment to the following contentious claim: 
noun  phrases  that  embed  sentential  expressions  in 
mentalistic idioms provide the content of the mental state or 
event  in  question.  It  might  appear  that  without  the 
assumption of that claim, there would be no way to infer from 
the  difference  in  that-clauses  in  the  attributions  of 
propositional attitudes to Oscar1 and Oscar2 to the claim that 
the contents of their psychological states similarly differed.25 
However, I think it is reasonable to concede that “differences 
in  the  extension –  the  actual  denotation,  referent,  or 
application – of counterpart expressions in that-clauses will be 
semantically represented, and will  ...  make for difference in 
content.”26 Hence, if it would be incorrect in the counterfactual 
situation to ascribe any content clause containing an oblique 
occurrence of the term ‘arthritis’, it would be incorrect in the 
counterfactual situation to attribute any psychological states 
which had a content containing the notion of arthritis.
In the counterfactual situation, the patient lacks 
some – probably  all  – of the attitudes commonly 
attributed  with  content  clauses  containing 
‘arthritis’  in  oblique  occurrence.  He  lacks  the 
occurrent thoughts or beliefs that he has arthritis 
in the thigh, that he has had arthritis for years, 
that  stiffening joints  and  various  sorts  of  aches 
are  symptoms  of  arthritis,  that  his  father  had 
arthritis, and so on. (Burge, 1979 p. 78)
In conclusion,
The  upshot  of  these  reflections  is  that  the 
patient’s  mental  contents  differ  while  his  entire 
25 For an argument which claims just this see Loar (1988).
26 Burge (1979) p. 75. This is not to say that differences in that-clauses 
always make for a difference in the contents of the psychological states 
attributed. It should be allowed that Pierre and Peter say the same thing 
by  their  respective  utterances  of  “This  sentence  is  false”  and  “Cette 
phrase est fausse”.
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physical  and  non-intentional  mental  histories, 
considered in isolation from their  social  context, 
remain the same. (Burge, 1979 p. 79)
The traditional conception of psychological facts as facts that 
hold independently of  the subject’s relation to the external 
world is brought under pressure.
The argument trades upon the possibility of attributing a 
mental state or event whose content involves a notion that 
the subject understands only partially or incompletely. There 
is an interesting issue as to just how much understanding is 
required before we are willing to attribute a mental state or 
event  whose  content  contains  a  notion  that  the  subject 
partially  understands;  as  to  how  much  ignorance  an 
attribution  will  tolerate.  No  uniform  answer  will  be 
forthcoming.27 However, I agree with Burge that the cases in 
which we are willing to so attribute are common enough for 
this issue not to be to the point. As so often, context takes the 
lead, and the attribution will depend on the interests of the 
attributer and the audience. Seldom is an attribution made in 
isolation; attributions are made in bundles, with explanations 
and qualifications to bolster them.
In addition, the fact that the argument trades upon such a 
possibility  should  not  be  taken  to  restrict  the  thesis  of 
semantic  externalism  to  the  claim  that  social  context  is 
constitutive  only of  those  contents  which  involve  such  a 
partially understood notion. Rather, “even those propositional 
attitudes not infected by incomplete understanding depend 
for their content on social factors that are independent of the 
individual,  asocially  and non-intentionally  described”28.  It  is, 
after  all,  a  contingent matter  that a subject understands a 
given notion as well as she does.
The argument presented by Burge illustrates the following 
point.  The  traditional  conception  according  to  which 
psychological facts are facts which hold independently of the 
27 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, intended as a defence of 
the view that partial understanding is commonplace see Burge (1979) pp. 
92-103.
28 Burge (1979) pp. 84-5, original emphasis.
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subject’s relation to the external world fails to acknowledge 
the  essential,  constitutive  contribution  to  meaning  of  the 
social environment as  well  as  of  the  physical environment. 
Burge’s  focus  on  social  factors  emphasises  the  important 
point that the truth of semantic externalism does not depend 
on the plausibility of Twin Earth cases. Even were one adverse 
to  Twin  Earth  thought  experiments,  semantic  divergence is 
common enough between actual communities for the thesis 
of semantic externalism to get a hold.29
1.5 The acquisition of terms
Putnam’s aim is not to question whether or not one can have 
knowledge of one’s linguistic terms, but rather to argue that 
whatever knowledge a subject does have of her terms cannot 
be explained purely by appeal to the psychological state of 
that subject. Clearly, neither can such knowledge be a matter 
of knowing everything about the extension of that term. To 
say that the subject who could not distinguish water from XYZ 
did  not  know the  meaning  of  the  word  “water”  would  be, 
according to Putnam, to confuse lack of scientific knowledge 
with lack of linguistic competence.30
There is,  then, a question as to how, in accord with the 
new theory of meaning according to which meaning is partly 
determined by factors external to the subject, a subject can 
acquire a term: how she can come to understand it, to know 
what it means. With a term such as “water”, whose meaning 
is fixed partly by facts about the physical environment, the 
question is this: how can a subject get her mind around the 
nature  in  question,  though  ignorant  of  the  science  that 
demarcates it? With a term whose meaning is fixed partly by 
social factors, the question is rather: how can a subject know 
29 While it is true that Burge’s thesis of semantic externalism is argued for 
on the basis of a thought experiment, the thought experiment to which he 
appeals  does  not  involve  the  dubious  assumption  that  there  could  be 
duplicate  natural  kind  substances  which  appeared  and  functioned  in 
exactly the same way as actual natural kind substances.
30 Putnam (1996) p. xvi.
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what  a  term  “X”  means,  whilst  having  only  a  partial 
understanding  of  X  or  Xs?  Naturally  enough,  the  theory 
suggests an answer which is two-fold. In response to the first 
question, it is suggested that one would appeal to the ways in 
which  exemplifications  of  the  nature  have  figured  in  the 
subject’s  cognitive  and  practical  dealings  with  the  world. 
According to this view, in learning the word “water”, one is in 
effect  learning  that  the  word  refers  to  that stuff.  The 
reference  of  a  natural  kind  term  is,  perhaps,  fixed  by  an 
ostensive  indication  of  a  paradigm  instance.  It  is  clearly 
consistent to hold that indexicals frequently play a part in the 
introduction of natural kind terms, even though the natural 
kind terms themselves do not partake in the indexicality of 
their introducers.
It is important to emphasise that it is consistent with the 
initial assumption of methodological solipsism to hold that as 
a matter of fact we acquire terms and concepts in much the 
same way as is being advocated here; that is, by cognitive 
and  practical  dealings  with  the  world  we  inhabit  only 
contingently.  Even  faithful  individualists  can  hold  a  causal 
theory  of  language-acquisition.  However,  it  is  definitive  of 
semantic  internalism that  it  allow for  the  logical possibility 
that  a  subject  could  have  had  no  such  dealings  with  the 
world, and yet have just the same terms and concepts. For 
individualism, the constitutive focus is not on the nature of 
the actual world, as it is for semantic externalism.
For a term whose meaning is determined partly by social 
factors,  knowing  the  meaning  of  that  term  must  be 
understood rather as a matter of participating successfully in 
what Putnam calls the “linguistic division of labor”. In effect, 
this  is  nothing  more  than  an  appeal  to  experts  to  fix  the 
meanings of one’s terms. The intention of the subject is that 
the meaning of her term, and hence its extension, coincide 
with that of the experts.
Every linguistic community ... possesses at least 
some terms whose associated ‘criteria’ are known 
only to a subset of the speakers who acquire the 
terms,  and  whose  use  by  the  other  speakers 
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depends upon a structured cooperation between 
them and the  speakers  in  the relevant  subsets. 
(Putnam, 1975b, p. 228)
This  is  also known as linguistic  deference.31 Putnam’s  claim 
about the acquisition of a term is as follows.
Whenever  a  term  is  subject  to  the  division  of 
linguistic  labor,  the  ‘average’  speaker  who 
acquires it does not acquire anything that fixes its 
extension.  In  particular,  his  individual 
psychological  state  certainly does  not  fix  its 
extension; it is only the sociolinguistic state of the 
collective  linguistic  body  to  which  the  speaker 
belongs that fixes the extension. (Putnam, 1975b 
p. 229)
In  the  case  of  a  term  whose  meaning  depends  purely  on 
social  factors,  the  communal  standards  will  have  to  be 
conceived  as  realised in  the  detailed  practice  of  an  actual 
subcommunity whose members count as experts. In the case 
of natural kind terms, on the other hand, there need be no 
members  of  the  community  who  actually know  the  stuff’s 
chemical structure. All that is required is that there could be 
experts.
This then leads on to the question as to how the roles of 
the  physical  and  the  social  environment  in  individual 
psychology are to be understood to be related. I propose to 
place the emphasis on the role of the social community. Thus, 
I maintain that the physical environment has its constitutive 
significance for individual psychology only as mediated by the 
social  environment.32 While  I  agree  that  water  is  H2O,  and 
31 Contrary to the claims of  Putnam, Fodor has since remarked, “What 
philosophers call  ‘linguistic deference’ is  actually  the use of experts as 
instruments;  not  Marxist  division  of  labor  in  semantics  but  capitalist 
exploitation  in  epistemology”.  Fodor  (1994)  p.  36.  As  he  notes,  this 
doctrine has roots in Smart, who writes “... even a color-blind person can 
reasonably assert that something is red, though of course he needs to use 
another human being, not just himself, as his ‘color meter’”. Smart (1962) 
p. 172.
32 This concurs with Burge’s views. See for instance (1982) p. 102.
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hence that XYZ is not water, I do not agree that the external 
factors which make this so are purely facts about the physical 
environment.  To maintain that  the demonstrative  that stuff 
refers  to  H2O  independently  of  the  intentions  of  the 
community would be to maintain that our natural kind terms 
cut nature at its joints. I believe this assumption is incorrect. 
The way we group items, even that we do so by appeal to 
internal  structural  properties,  is  largely  dependent  on 
contingent facts about human psychology and the  de facto 
progression of science. What a subject means by a word is 
determined  by  the  correct  use  for  that  word  in  her 
community, and its correct use in her community is as a word 
for  that stuff: but the demonstrative gets its reference from 
the  intentions  of  the  social  community,  which  are  in  turn 
shaped by the relevant contingencies.
1.6 Is water really H2O?
Putnam has claimed that  “[the] extension of  ‘water’  in  the 
sense  of  waterE is  the  set  of  all  wholes  consisting  of  H2O 
molecules,  or  something  like  that”33.  Putnam’s  approach 
displays a commitment to an essentialist semantics of a kind 
found in Saul Kripke34, according to which the reference of a 
word  such  as  “water”  is  determined  by  internal  structural 
properties.  Such  an  essentialist  semantics  has  been 
challenged  by  Mark  Wilson,  Barbara  Malt  and  Noam 
Chomsky.35 Maintaining  that  water  is  H2O  requires  an 
explanation of the following two facts. First, substances which 
are largely H2O may be called something else; and second, 
what we call “water” is in the main not pure H2O. Examples in 
the first category would be tears and tea; examples in the 
second, almost everything we in fact call “water”.
Putnam’s  essentialism  is  less  radical  than  Kripke’s, 
according to which natural kind terms are non-descriptional, 
and  have  no  meaning  in  the  Fregean  sense.  Putnam,  in 
33 Putnam (1975b) p. 224.
34 Kripke (1972) and (1980).
35 Wilson (1982), Malt (1994), Chomsky (1995).
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addition  to  his  argument  that  psychological  state  does  not 
determine extension, proposed a theory for the description of 
word meaning which would include not only a specification of 
the extension of the given term (H2O for “water”), but also 
“syntactic  markers”  (“mass  noun;  concrete”),  “semantic 
markers”  (“natural  kind;  liquid”)  and  a  “stereotype” 
(“colorless;  transparent;  tasteless;  thirst-quenching;  etc.”).36 
This does not, however, amount to an explanation of the two 
relevant facts. 
The  following  explanation  has  been  offered  by  Barbara 
Abbott.37 The first  thing to note is  that  substances such as 
beer and lemonade are largely  water  precisely in  virtue of 
consisting largely of H2O molecules. To deny that water is H2O 
would be to deny this basic fact. What of the claim that such 
substances are  not  called “water”?  Abbott  explains  this  by 
appeal to a distinction between what something is called and 
what  it  is.  This  amounts  to  my  claim  above  that  the 
categories according to which we choose to classify items are 
in  general  chosen  because  of  contingent  facts  about  our 
interests.  However,  that  dogs  and  cats  are  classified  as 
“dogs” and “cats” does nothing to undermine the fact that 
they in fact all  fall  into the same category, “animal”. Thus, 
that  we do  not  refer  to  tears  as  “water”  simply  reflects  a 
special interest we have in distinguishing that type of water 
from other types of water. The issue is not whether we tend 
not to call tears “water”, but whether we deny that tears are 
water; that is, whether we say, “not water” of them, which, I 
take it, we do not.
What of the claim that what we call “water” is in the main 
not pure H2O? Abbott explains this by appeal to,
... a very general and natural type of vagueness 
in our use of linguistic expressions, and therefore 
one  which  need  not  and  should  not  be 
incorporated  separately  into  our  account  of  the 
meaning of each word and phrase. For example, 
when someone asks to borrow our car we are not 
36 Putnam (1975b) p. 269.
37 Abbott (1997).
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required to remove from the glove compartment 
the maps, box of Kleenex, registration, etc. - i.e. 
everything  that  is  not  part  of  the  car  strictly 
speaking. ... . It is true that Portia was able to get 
Shylock on this type of technicality, but had the 
legal advisor been anyone else, Antonio probably 
would have been a goner. (Abbott, 1997 p. 317)
While I am sympathetic to this line of reasoning, there is one 
important fact which has yet to be accounted for. There are 
substances such as “heavy water”,  which,  despite  the fact 
that  they  contain  no  H2O  molecules,  are  nevertheless 
classified as water.  It  is not clear that Abbott’s explanation 
can account for this fact. For this we must rely on the claim I 
made  above  that  the  physical  environment  has  its 
constitutive  significance  for  individual  psychology  only  as 
mediated  by  the  social  environment.  This  claim  can  be 
invoked  as  an  explanation  as  to  why  substances  such  as 
heavy water are classified as water.  The important point is 
that  water  is,  as  Putnam  put  it,  “the  set  of  all  wholes 
consisting of H2O molecules, or something like that”38.
1.7 Conclusion
The  physical  and  social  environment  do  not 
merely surround the subject, providing a context 
within  which  her  propositional  attitudes  can  be 
assessed. Contextual facts inextricably permeate 
the  field  of  psychological  investigation,  even 
when  what  is  under  study  is  the  psychological 
organisation  of  an  individual.  (Pettit  and 
McDowell, 1986 p. 14)
This is the claim of semantic externalism. My concern here 
has not so much been to defend the claim, as to present it. I 
am, however, in broad sympathy with it; particularly the claim 
that  social context  is  constitutive  of  content.  The  thesis  is 
presented as  an  investigation  into  certain  consequences of 
the claim. Specifically, my focus rests on the epistemological 
question of how, assuming the truth of semantic externalism, 
a  subject  can  be  said  to  know the  meanings  of  her 
38 Putnam (1975b) p. 224, emphasis added.
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psychological  terms in a direct and authoritative manner. If 
contextual  facts  “inextricably  permeate  the  field  of 
psychological investigation”, the possibility of direct access to 
one’s  psychological  states  is  brought  under pressure.  I  call 
those  who  aim  to  reconcile  semantic  externalism  with 
privileged access compatibilists, and those who believe them 
to be irreconcilable incompatibilists.39 I maintain that semantic 
externalism  is  consistent  with  privileged  access  to  one’s 
thoughts, and am therefore a compatibilist.
The structure of the thesis is as follows. The initial charge 
of  incompatibility  between  semantic  externalism  and 
privileged access is set  out  in  chapter  two. The arguments 
discussed  there  appeal  to  “travelling  cases”,  according  to 
which  subjects  are  switched  between  relevantly  differing 
environments  without  their  knowledge  (or  consent).  The 
arguments demand an explanation of two salient facts; that 
is, an answer to two questions. First, how can a subject have 
privileged access to the contents of her thoughts given that 
she would be ignorant of a change in her body of concepts, 
the  concepts  she  possessed,  were  she  to  be  switched 
between environments of the differences between which she 
would be equally unaware? Second, how can a subject have 
privileged  access  to  the  contents  of  her  current  thoughts, 
given that switching her to a new environment would result in 
her being wrong about the contents of those very same (now 
past) thoughts? This latter question demands an account of 
memory consistent with semantic externalism. I answer both 
questions, and argue that semantic externalism is consistent 
with  privileged  knowledge  of  the  meanings  of  one’s 
psychological  terms.  Further,  I  argue  that  such  access  to 
one’s psychological states is privileged and authoritative, and 
offer an account of the authority accorded.
In  chapter  three  I  consider  a  subsequent  argument,  the 
Argument  from Privileged Access,  intended to  discredit  the 
proposed  compatibility  of  semantic  externalism  and 
privileged access set out in chapter two. The argument takes 
the form of a  reductio ad absurdum, and runs as follows. If 
39 I first came across this terminology in Boghossian (1997).
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semantic externalism and privileged access were compatible, 
one would have the means by which to gain knowledge of 
substantive empirical  facts  by introspection and conceptual 
analysis alone. One cannot gain knowledge of empirical facts 
by  introspection  and  conceptual  analysis  alone.  Therefore, 
semantic externalism and privileged access are incompatible. 
I  accept and defend the claim that if  semantic externalism 
and  privileged  access  are  compatible,  one  will  have  the 
means by which to gain knowledge of substantive empirical 
facts by introspection and conceptual analysis alone.
In chapter four I argue that, contrary to appearances, this 
consequence should be embraced as a natural consequence 
of  semantic  externalism.  That  is,  I  deny  the  force  of  the 
Argument  from  Privileged  Access.  I  maintain  that  the 
consequence  appears  absurd  only  if  one  has  not  fully 
embraced  the  force  of  semantic  externalism.  To  accept 
semantic  externalism  is  to  reject  the  assumption  of 
methodological solipsism. Since the constitutive nature of the 
mind  is  not  as  we  thought,  it  should  be  no  surprise  that 
introspection isn’t either.40 
In  chapter  five,  I  address  the  issue  of  de  re  thought.  I 
consider two opposing theories, each of which is defined by 
its answer to the following question: is the content of a de re 
thought  to  be  understood  as  object-dependent  or  object-
independent?  If  the  content  of  a  de  re  thought  is  object-
dependent,  it  will  be  possible  to  gain  non-empirical 
knowledge of the existence of the particular object or objects 
upon  which  a  given  de  re thought  depends.  On this  view, 
there  will  be  no  relevant  asymmetry  between  de  dicto 
thoughts  and  de  re  thoughts.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
content  of  a  de  re  thought  is  object-independent,  no  such 
non-empirical  knowledge  will  be  available.  If  this  view  is 
correct, there  will be an asymmetry between the inferences 
which can be drawn from one’s supposed  de dicto thoughts 
40 Introspection is taken intuitively as being the means, if any, by which a 
subject has privileged access to the contents of her mind.
31
One: Semantic Externalism
and the inferences which can be drawn from one’s supposed 
de re thoughts.41
Finally, in chapter six, I focus directly on an anti-sceptical 
argument presented by Putnam.42 The argument aims to show 
that from the assumption of a causally-constrained theory of 
reference, such as semantic externalism, the proposition that 
I  am a brain-in-a-vat is self-refuting and necessarily false. I 
defend the argument, and relate it to the conclusions reached 
thus far.
As mentioned above,  while I  am broadly  sympathetic to 
semantic externalism, the thesis is not intended as a direct 
endorsement of it. The aim here is to show that the rejection 
of  the  assumption  of  methodological  solipsism  has  wide-
reaching  implications,  in  particular  for  the  notion  of 
introspection,  and for  the alleged distinction between mind 
and world.  If  the subject  is  not  the sole  determiner  of  her 
mind,  introspection  can  no  longer  be  seen  as  something 
purely internal to the subject. With these thoughts in mind, let 
us proceed.
41 Burge is at pains to emphasise that semantic externalism is a theory 
concerned with the oblique occurrence of terms in propositional attitude 
attributions, which carries over into psychological content ascription. He 
emphasises that it is orthogonal to any issue about de re belief, which he 
treats in a very different manner. For more on this see chapter five below.
42 Putnam (1981) chapter one.
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2.1 Introduction
Descartes’  writing  provides  a  classic  example  of  a  position 
which presupposes that  at  least some propositional  mental 
events can be known by the subject in a direct, authoritative, 
non-empirical  manner.  If  a  subject  knows  a  given 
propositional  mental  event  in  this  non-empirical  way,  I  will 
refer  to  that  subject  as  having  privileged  access to  that 
thought.43 I  take  it  to  be  an  intuitively  compelling 
presupposition that we do indeed have privileged access to at 
least some of our thoughts. However, the recent emergence 
of semantic externalism, according to which a subject’s set of 
possible  and  actual  thoughts  is  dependent  upon,  and 
restricted by, relations that subject bears to her environment, 
has  been  taken  to  threaten  this  intuitively  compelling 
presupposition.
In this  chapter I  will  discuss two arguments designed to 
bring out the alleged tension. I have grouped the arguments 
together  because  they  both  appeal  to  “travelling  cases”, 
according  to  which  a  hypothetical  subject  is  unknowingly 
switched between different environments. The environments 
are  assumed  to  differ  in  imperceptible  ways,  ways  which 
nevertheless suffice to cause a change in the concepts that 
subject possesses and hence in the thoughts it is possible for 
her to entertain. The differences between environments are 
semantically  relevant.  It  is  this  type  of  imperceptible 
switching  which  in  both  arguments  brings  out  the  alleged 
43 The term “thought” as I use it should not be understood as a Fregean 
thought.  Rather,  “thought”  should  be  understood  as  a  synonym  for 
“propositional mental event”. Hence, two subjects cannot have the same 
thought,  but  can  have  thoughts  with  the  same  content.  Similarly,  a 
subject cannot be said to have the same thought at different times, but 
can have two thoughts with the same content at different times. When a 
subject knows a propositional mental event, she knows the content of her 
thought.
Two: Travelling Cases
incompatibility between semantic externalism and privileged 
access. 
I will refer to the first argument as the  Content Sceptic’s 
Argument. It demands an answer to the following question: 
how can a subject have privileged access to the contents of 
her thoughts given that she would be ignorant of a change in 
her  body  of  concepts,  a  change  in  the  concepts  she 
possessed, were she to be switched between environments of 
the differences between which she would be correspondingly 
unaware? To answer this question is to provide an account of 
privileged  access  consistent  with  semantic  externalism.  I 
argue that on the semantic externalist view, privileged access 
is  correctly  understood as an  externalist  phenomenon,  and 
can not be accounted for in terms of evidence available to the 
subject.  The  most  natural  way  to  interpret  this  notion  of 
“evidence available to the subject” is  as  phenomenological 
evidence. I argue that however one thinks of phenomenology, 
that is, whether or not one thinks of it as locally supervenient, 
it cannot provide evidence for introspective knowledge. I then 
provide a positive account of privileged access.
I will refer to the second argument as the Argument from 
Memory. It demands an answer to the following question: how 
can a subject have privileged access to the contents of her 
current  thoughts  given  that,  were  she  to  be  imperceptibly 
switched  to  a  relevantly  different  environment,  she  would 
thereby  come  to  have  false  beliefs  about  the  contents  of 
those  very  same  (now  past)  thoughts?  An  answer  to  this 
latter  question  demands  an  account  of  memory  consistent 
with semantic externalism. I agree that semantic externalism 
opens  up  a  new form of  scepticism about  the  contents  of 
one’s past thoughts. However, I argue that this does nothing 
to jeopardise the privileged access one has to one’s current 
thoughts, even if the content of those thoughts purports to 
refer to a past event.
By  providing  an  answer  to  both  questions,  I  will  have 
shown that neither the  Content Sceptic’s Argument nor the 
Argument  from  Memory establishes  that  semantic 
externalism is incompatible with privileged access.
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2.2 Knowledge of one’s thoughts
I  maintain that  the following three claims correctly capture 
the  nature  of  the  relation  between  a  subject  and  at  least 
some of her propositional mental events.
1.  Self  Knowledge:  a  subject can have knowledge of  (at 
least some of) her thoughts.
2.  Privileged Access:  the knowledge a subject has of  (at 
least some of) her thoughts is non-empirical.44
3. First Person Authority: there is a presumption in favour 
of a subject’s claims to self knowledge.
Whether  or  not  true self-ascriptions  should be classified as 
knowledge will  be  discussed  in  section  2.8  below,  where  I 
formalise the privileged access thesis, and again in chapter 
four, where the issue becomes pivotal. For present purposes, 
since nothing immediate hinges on the issue, I will talk as if 
true  self-ascriptions  were  instances  of  knowledge.  For  the 
moment, then, the important claims are the second claim, the 
claim of privileged access, and the third claim, the claim of 
first person authority. 
What  of  the  claim  of  privileged  access?  There  is  an 
asymmetry between the knowledge a subject can have of her 
own thoughts, and the knowledge she can have of another’s 
thoughts.  Typically,  Susan  knows what  she  is  thinking in  a 
way  in  which  others  do  not.  To  find  out  what  Susan  is 
thinking, others will have to engage in some form of empirical 
investigation; they will have to watch her behaviour, or listen 
to  her  utterances.  No such observation  or  interpretation  is 
necessary if Susan wants to find out the content of at least 
44 In the characterisation of privileged access, I have chosen to use the 
term “non-empirical” as it seems the most neutral way to characterise the 
asymmetry  between  the  way  in  which  a  subject  can  know  her  own 
thoughts and the way in which she can know the thoughts of another. By 
non-empirical  knowledge,  I  simply  mean  knowledge  that  can  be  had 
without recourse to observation, or external perception.
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some of her thoughts. If she has a current belief that time is 
of the essence, say, she can know that she is thinking that 
time is of the essence without having to observe what she 
says or what she does. In fact, it is plausible to maintain that 
it is precisely because she has that particular belief that she 
says  what  she  does  and  acts  as  she  does.  A  subject’s 
knowledge  of  a  her  thought  is  arguably  not  a  conclusion 
based on an inference from empirical evidence. Wittgenstein 
expressed the asymmetry between the knowledge a subject 
can have of her own thoughts, and the knowledge she can 
have  of  another’s  thoughts  thus.  The  criteria  for  the 
attribution of a belief to another are her words and actions, 
whereas for a self-attribution there are no such criteria.45 This 
is the claim of privileged access.
What  of  the  claim  of  first  person  authority?  When  a 
speaker asserts that she has a belief, a desire, a fear or an 
intention, there is, typically, a certain presumption that she is 
correct, a presumption that does not attach to her ascriptions 
of  propositional  mental  events to others.  That  there is  this 
presumption is the claim of first person authority. If the claim 
of first person authority is to be accepted, an explanation of 
the  asymmetry  between  the  authority  accorded  to 
attributions of attitudes to our present selves and attributions 
of the same attitudes to other selves must be forthcoming. 
What accounts for the authority accorded first person present 
tense claims, and denied second or third person claims?46
Characterisations of first person authority often invoke the 
claim of  privileged access.  They point to the fact that self-
attributions are not normally made on the basis of evidence 
or  observation,  that  it  does  not  normally  make  sense  to 
45 Wittgenstein  (1953)  §377.  While  the  underlying  thought  here  is 
essentially the same, criteria and evidence should not be conflated. For 
the importance of the distinction see for example McDowell (1982).
46 It  is  important  to  note  that  first  person  authority  is  accorded  to  a 
subject’s  claims  about  her  present propositional  mental  events.  The 
relevance of this restriction is particularly evident in section  2.9  below, 
where I discuss a form of scepticism concerning a subject’s claims about 
her past propositional mental events.
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question  why  a  person  attributes  herself  with  the 
propositional  mental  events  she  does.  However,  an 
explanation of the asymmetry central to first person authority 
cannot  be  given  purely  by  pointing  to  this  distinction 
concerning the existence or absence of an evidential basis for 
the  ascription  of  propositional  mental  events.  I  agree  with 
Donald Davidson when he says that first person authority is 
not explained by the fact that self-attributions are not based 
on evidence, since, “claims that are not based on evidence do 
not  in  general  carry  more  authority  than  claims  that  are 
based on evidence,  nor are they more apt to be correct”47. 
What would be required in addition is an account of why in 
this  particular  case,  the case of  attributions of  thoughts to 
one’s  present  self,  the  lack  of  evidence  supported  the 
correctness of the attribution claim; and if this could be given, 
the initial appeal to the lack of evidence as an explanation of 
the asymmetry would be rendered redundant.48
It is at this point worth reflecting briefly on the writings of 
Gilbert Ryle49.  Ryle, famously, denies the claim of privileged 
access. That is,  he maintains that the knowledge a subject 
has of  her  own thoughts  is  of  a  piece with  the knowledge 
another has of  her  thoughts.  Self-attributions are based on 
behavioural evidence, evidence which is equally available to 
others  as  it  is  to  the  subject.  Even  while  Ryle  denies  the 
privileged access claim, he nevertheless maintains the claim 
of first person authority. Any account of first person authority 
he offers could not, therefore, commit the mistake mentioned 
above in connection with Davidson. Ryle can make no appeal 
to  the  claim  that  self-attributions  evidence-independent  in 
47 Davidson (1984a) p. 103.
48 Davidson has provided an account of first person authority which does 
not invoke the privileged access claim. According to Davidson, if we do 
not  assume  a  subject  knows  her  thoughts,  then  we  cannot  begin  the 
process of radical interpretation. See Davidson (1984a). This explains why 
the presumption is needed, but it is not clear that this in itself provides a 
justification  for  it.  For  more on  the notion  of  radical  interpretation see 
Davidson (1973), (1974) and (1976).
49 See Ryle (1949).
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providing an account of first person authority, since it is his 
contention  that  self-attributions  are based  on  empirical 
evidence.  Ryle’s  positive  account  of  first  person  authority 
appeals rather to the fact that a subject spends more time in 
her  own  company  than  anyone  else  does,  and  hence  has 
more  evidence  –  empirical  evidence  –  on  which  to  base 
predictions about her behaviour.
I  am  sympathetic  to  the  view  that  much  of  our  self 
knowledge  is  not  achieved  directly,  but  relies  on  evidence 
similar  to  that  required  for  knowledge  of  the  thoughts  of 
others.  I  agree,  then,  that  there  are  instances  of  self 
knowledge which cannot be characterised by the privileged 
access claim. In addition, I agree that there is much that we 
do not know, or that we misconstrue, about our own minds. 
However,  Ryle’s  thesis  is  too  strong.  There  is  a  class  of 
propositional mental events, albeit a severely restricted class, 
to which we do have privileged access, and about which we 
are  authoritative.  That  there  are  many  exceptions  does 
nothing to jeopardise the truth of this claim.50
In section  2.8 I formalise the privileged access claim and 
offer  an  account  of  first  person  authority.  The  account 
emerges from an examination of  the two arguments  which 
provide the focus for the present chapter. Before turning to 
these,  however,  I  would  like  to  make  explicit  an  initial 
qualification to the account of privileged access. 
2.3 Comparative content and bare content
Kevin Falvey and Joseph Owens draw a distinction between 
two different kinds of privileged access:
KC:  An  individual  knows  the  contents  of  his  occurrent 
thoughts and beliefs authoritatively and directly (that is, 
without  relying  on  inferences  from  observation  of  his 
50 In fact, I think that the class of propositional mental events to which we 
do have privileged access is more restricted than is often thought. The 
account  of  privileged  access  offered  in  section  2.7 below  reflects  the 
limited  sense in  which  I  am willing  to  endorse  the claim of  privileged 
access.
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environment).  Call  this  kind  of  knowledge  introspective 
knowledge of content. (Falvey and Owens, 1994 p. 107)
KCC: With respect to any two of his thoughts or beliefs, an 
individual  can  know authoritatively  and  directly  (that  is, 
without  relying  on  inferences  from  his  observed 
environment) whether or not they have the same content. 
Call  this  kind  of  knowledge  introspective  knowledge  of 
comparative content. (Falvey and Owens, 1994 p. 109-10)51
KC deals with occurrent  thoughts only,  whereas  KCC deals 
with both occurrent and non-occurrent thoughts.
Falvey and Owens argue that the incompatibility between 
semantic  externalism  and  privileged  access  obtains  only 
when privileged access is understood in the latter sense – as 
introspective knowledge of comparative content. They argue 
that  there is  no such incompatibility  if  one has the former 
meaning in mind. According to Falvey and Owens this is as it 
should be, since there are reasons independent of semantic 
externalism for thinking that KCC is false.
The tension  between  knowledge of  comparative  content 
and  semantic  externalism  is  illustrated  by  the  following 
scenario. Consider Susan, who, we are to suppose, has been 
switched  back  and  forth  between  Earth  and  Twin  Earth 
without her knowledge. Suppose that once she is linguistically 
embedded on Earth she is asked whether, when she utters 
the  sentence  “water  is  a  liquid”,  she  expresses  the  same 
thought-content she would have expressed by uttering that 
sentence, syntactically individuated52, one year ago. What will 
she answer?
She will  presumably say yes,  but  if  she was on 
Twin Earth last  year,  then she will  be mistaken. 
And  nothing  that  is  available  to  her  through 
introspection alone will reveal her mistake to her. 
She will not learn the truth until she investigates 
51 The terms KC and KCC are mine.
52 To  assume that Susan utters a  token of  the same type of  sentence 
semantically  individuated would be to beg the question.  Tokens of  the 
same type of sentence semantically individuated would of course express 
thoughts with the same content.
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her  environment.  If  externalism  is  true,  the 
principle embodied in [KCC] is false. (Falvey and 
Owens, 1994 p. 111-2)
Their example involves a dispute between Benson Mates53 and 
Alonzo Church54 about  whether  the  following two sentences 
mean the same thing.
a)  Nobody doubts  that  whoever  believes  that  Mary  is  a 
physician believes that Mary is a physician.
b)  Nobody doubts  that  whoever  believes  that  Mary  is  a 
physician believes that Mary is a doctor.
Mates  believes  they  express  different  thoughts;  Church 
disagrees.  And  this  even  though  each  believes  that  the 
thought  he  expresses  when  he  utters  either  of  these 
sentences is the thought expressed by the sentence in the 
public language, English. Still,  “[one] of them is wrong, but 
whoever it is, it is implausible in the extreme to suppose that 
his  error  is  due  to  introspective  failure.”55 The  grounds  on 
which the decision is  made cannot  be purely  introspective, 
Falvey and Owens argue. Rather, the information needed to 
determine whether the two thoughts are the same will come 
via  an  empirical  investigation  into  the  external  world,  the 
nature of  our linguistic practice, the semantic theories that 
best represent that practice, and so on.
So  far  as  we  can  tell  there  is  nothing  in 
commonsense  psychology  to  suggest  that 
introspection  alone  provides  all  we  need  to 
ground judgements of sameness and difference in 
the contents  of  our  propositional  mental  states. 
Even if one knows what one is thinking at a given 
time, and knows what one is thinking at a later 
time,  it  may  be  necessary  to  know  something 
about  one’s  environment  in  order  to  know 
whether these two thought contents are identical. 
(Falvey and Owens, 1994 p. 113)
53 Mates (1952).
54 Church (1954).
55 Falvey and Owens (1994) p. 113.
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In  accord  with  this  analysis,  I  maintain  that  the  claim  of 
privileged access is correctly understood as a claim about a 
subject’s knowledge of the content of an occurrent thought 
only. It cannot be extended to cover instances of knowledge 
of  difference  or  sameness  of  the  content  of  different 
thoughts. As will become clear in due course, what is wrong 
with KCC is that it requires privileged access to the content of 
non-occurrent thoughts. This will  be further developed over 
the next two sections.
Bearing this in mind, let us turn to the first argument for 
the  incompatibility  between  semantic  externalism  and 
privileged  access,  the  Content  Sceptic’s  Argument.  The 
argument aims to prove that there is no class of thoughts to 
which a subject has privileged access.
2.4 The Content Sceptic’s Argument
The Content Sceptic’s Argument can be extrapolated from the 
following passage from Falvey and Owens.56
[I]s  it  a  consequence  of  [semantic]  externalism 
that  when  Susan  thinks  the  thought  she  would 
express  using the words ‘water  is  a  liquid’,  she 
does  not  know directly  and  authoritatively  that 
she  is  thinking  that  water  is  a  liquid?  It  might 
seem  that  the  answer  is  yes,  by  virtue  of  the 
following reasoning.  In  order  for  Susan to  know 
that she thinks the thought that water is a liquid, 
she would have to know that her thought involves 
the concept water rather than the concept twater. 
But,  by  hypothesis,  there  is  nothing  in  her 
experiential  history  that  provides  her  with  the 
conceptual  resources  necessary  to  discriminate 
between these two concepts, and hence she has 
no  introspectively  available  evidence  that  her 
present  thought  invokes the one concept rather 
than  the  other.  Therefore,  she  cannot  know  by 
introspection alone that she is thinking that water 
is  a  liquid.  She  will  have  to  examine  her 
56 Henceforth, XYZ will be referred to as “twin water”, or simply “twater”. 
Correspondingly, the relevant concept had by people on Twin Earth will be 
referred to simply as twater .
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environment in order to know the content of her 
thought. (Falvey and Owens, 1994 pp. 113-4)
Burge expresses the same sceptical worry as follows.
How can one individuate one’s thoughts when one 
has not, by empirical methods, discriminated the 
empirical  conditions  that  determine  those 
thoughts  from  empirical  conditions  that  would 
determine other thoughts? (Burge, 1988 p. 653)
The argument purports to show that if semantic externalism 
is  true,  Susan  must  undertake  some  form  of  empirical 
investigation in order to know what thought she expresses by 
the words “water is a liquid”. That is, since things would seem 
the  same  to  Susan  on  Earth  as  on  Twin  Earth,  she  must 
conduct  some  form  of  empirical  investigation  into  the 
structure of the liquid before her if she is to know the content 
of  her  current  thought.  This  ensures  that  Susan  does  not 
know (with privilege or otherwise) the content of her current 
thought.  She is  on  this  occasion denied self  knowledge.  In 
addition,  the fact that gaining knowledge of  the content of 
her  thought  would require  empirical  investigation,  is  a  fact 
which denies Susan privileged access to the content of that 
thought. 
Since  it  is  plausible  to  maintain  that  if  the  argument  is 
correct there is no thought to which the argument would not 
apply,  we  appear  to  be  forced  to  give  up  the  claim  of 
privileged  access.  In  addition,  if  self  knowledge  invariably 
depends upon an empirical investigation of the environment, 
someone else may well be in a better position than Susan to 
know  the  content  of  any  of  her  given  thoughts,  which 
contradicts the claim of first person authority: there are no 
grounds  on  which  to  base  a  presumption  in  favour  of  a 
subject’s claims to self knowledge.57
57 I am not here assuming that the denial of privileged access entails the 
denial  of  first  person  authority.  As  noted  in  section  2.2 above,  Ryle 
maintains  the  latter  while  denying  the  former.  However,  there  is  an 
important  difference  between  Ryle’s  thesis  and  the  Content  Sceptic’s 
Argument.  Ryle  could  consistently  maintain  the  claim  of  first  person 
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Extrapolating, we get the following form of argument, the 
Content Sceptic’s Argument.
(pi) If Susan knows she’s thinking that water is a liquid, her 
evidence is such that it would rule out the possibility that 
she is thinking that twater is a liquid.
(pii) Susan’s evidence is not such that it would rule out the 
possibility that she is thinking that twater is a liquid.
(c)  Therefore,  Susan  doesn’t  know  she’s  thinking  that 
water is a liquid.58
If  we  are  to  maintain  that  semantic  externalism  and 
privileged access are compatible, we must find fault with this 
line of reasoning. So what is wrong with the Content Sceptic’s 
Argument? The  Content Sceptic’s Argument appeals to two 
related facts. First, a subject would be unable to distinguish 
water  from  various  other  superficially  identical  yet 
structurally distinct substances, such as twin water. Second, a 
subject  would  be  unable  to  distinguish  the  concept  water, 
which  refers  to  water,  from  various  other  hypothetical 
concepts,  such  as  twater,  which  would  refer  to  such 
superficially  identical  yet  structurally  distinct  substances. 
These  two  related  facts  are  by  themselves  insufficient  to 
demonstrate  an  incompatibility  between  semantic 
externalism and privileged access. The semantic externalist 
authority even while denying privileged access, since according to Ryle 
the empirical facts known by the subject would never be fewer than the 
empirical facts known by others. This is because the relevant empirical 
evidence was on the Rylean view behavioural and verbal. In the present 
case, however, it is possible that the subject have less empirical evidence 
than others for the correct attribution of  a thought to herself.  With the 
adoption of semantic externalism, the relevant evidence is no longer just 
behavioural  and  verbal;  rather,  the  evidence  concerns  the  underlying 
structure of substances in the world, structure which cannot be inferred 
from  the  superficial  qualities  of  those  substances,  and  the  linguistic 
practices of the community.
58 This is similar to the way in which Brueckner expresses the argument in 
his (1990).
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can happily accept them. The ability to distinguish between a 
water concept and a twater concept would be required for the 
kind  of  knowledge  captured  by  KCC,  knowledge  of 
comparative content, but, as noted above, the fact that one 
does  not  have  knowledge  of  comparative  content  is 
insufficient  to undermine the claim of  privileged access.  To 
bring out  the  alleged  incompatibility,  the  proponent  of  the 
Content  Sceptic’s  Argument needs  to  appeal  to  a  further 
assumption. The requisite assumption is that knowledge that 
one’s thought involves the concept water requires knowledge 
that one’s thought does not involve the concept twater. That 
is, the  Content Sceptic’s Argument requires the assumption 
that knowledge of the content of a thought requires the ruling 
out  of  various  possible  alternative  thought-contents.  In  the 
next section I will present a challenge to this assumption.
2.5 Relevant alternatives
In the previous section I remarked that the Content Sceptic’s 
Argument invokes  the  following  assumption.  Introspective 
knowledge  of  a  given  thought  requires  that  the  possibility 
that  the  subject  be  entertaining  a  relevantly  alternative 
thought be ruled out. The underlying assumption here is that 
knowledge  in  general  requires  the  ruling  out  of  various 
relevant alternatives.59 A relevant alternative is one the mere 
possibility  of  which is  enough to  defeat  an actual  claim to 
knowledge. This is a familiar assumption within the context of 
perceptual  knowledge.60 Consider,  for  instance,  Alvin 
59 On the notion of relevant alternatives see for example Dretske (1970), 
and Goldman (1976).
60 I  do  not here intend that introspective knowledge be  assimilated to 
perceptual knowledge. The analogy is instructive in so far as it brings out 
a  difference  which  is  crucial  to  the  fault  in  the  Content  Sceptic’s 
Argument.  For  criticisms  of  the  perceptual  model  of  introspective 
knowledge  see  for  example  Shoemaker  (1985)  and  (1988),  Davidson 
(1987),  and  Burge  (1988)  and  (1996).  For  an  interesting  account  of 
introspective knowledge as analogous to bodily perception see Armstrong 
(1968) especially pp. 323-38.
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Goldman’s example of Henry.61 Henry is driving through the 
countryside, pointing out barns to his son. Does Henry know, 
on pointing to a particular barn, that it is a barn to which he is 
pointing?  The  answer,  according  to  Goldman,  will  depend 
upon the existence or absence of relevant alternatives which 
could serve to discredit Henry’s claim to knowledge. If Henry 
is in an area where the fields are replete with papier-mâché 
barns, even though Henry is in fact pointing to a real barn, we 
would not attribute Henry with knowledge that it is a barn to 
which he is pointing, because that he is pointing to a papier-
mâché barn is in this situation a relevant alternative.62
Our  inclination  to  deny  Henry  knowledge  that  he  is 
pointing  to  a  barn  is  captured,  according  to  Falvey  and 
Owens, by the following principle of relevant alternatives.
(RA) If (i) q is a relevant alternative to p, and
(ii) S’s belief that p is based on evidence that is 
compatible with its being the case that q, then 
S  does  not  know that  p.  (Falvey and Owens, 
1994 p. 116)
The notion of a relevant alternative is explicated as follows: q 
is  a  relevant  alternative  to  p if  q is  a  logically  possible 
proposition  incompatible  with  p,  and  the  possibility  that  q 
obtains is relevant in the context.63 
Take  p to  be  Henry’s  pointing  to  a  barn.  Take  q to  be 
Henry’s pointing to a papier-mâché barn. Henry’s belief that 
he  is  pointing  to  a  barn  is  based  solely  on  the  visual 
appearance of the object to which he is pointing. His evidence 
for  the  belief  that  he  is  pointing  to  a  barn  is  therefore 
compatible  with  his  pointing  to  a  papier-mâché  barn.  In 
addition,  in  the  situation  described  above,  q is  a  relevant 
61 Goldman (1976).
62 If, on the other hand, Henry were in an area where there were nothing 
but  real  barns,  his  pointing  to  a  papier-mâché  barn  would  not  be  a 
relevant alternative, and his claim to knowledge would not be defeated.
63 Falvey and Owens (1994) p. 116.
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alternative to  p.  Hence, according to  (RA),  Henry does not 
know that he is pointing to a barn.64
The reason that Henry’s claim to knowledge is undermined 
by his  failing to possess evidence ruling out  the possibility 
that the object to which he is pointing is a papier-mâché barn 
is that, given the high frequency of papier-mâché barns in the 
area,  Henry  could  easily  be  deceived  into  thinking  that  a 
papier-mâché barn was a genuine barn. Crucially, if the object 
were a papier-mâché barn, Henry would still  believe that it 
was a genuine barn.65 Such reflections lead Falvey and Owens 
to claim that the plausibility of (RA) is grounded in the “more 
basic principle” (RA’).
(RA’) If (i) q is a relevant alternative to p, and
(ii) S’s justification for his belief that p is such 
that, if  q were true, then S would still believe 
that  p,  then S does not know that  p.  (Falvey 
and Owens, 1994 p. 116)
It is this principle which they believe “best captures the 
importance of relevant alternatives in refuting putative claims 
to knowledge”66.
Now think back to Susan. Susan, it  will  be remembered, 
believes she is entertaining the thought that water is a liquid. 
To begin with, let us suppose that Susan occasionally travels 
back  and  forth  between  Earth  and  Twin  Earth.  On  this 
supposition,  that  Susan  be  entertaining  the  thought  that 
twater  is  a  liquid  becomes  a  relevant  alternative  to  her 
entertaining the thought that water is a liquid. The pertinent 
64 It might be objected that the formulation of  (RA) depends upon the 
controversial assumption that perceptual knowledge is evidential, where 
the evidential base for a perceptual belief is, for instance, a sense-datum. 
However,  I take it  that  (RA) does not embody any such strong thesis. 
Rather, it serves to pick up on the fact that Henry, for example, has not 
tried to verify his belief by investigating further; that is, by gathering more 
evidence.
65 For counterfactual theories of knowledge and justification see Dretske 
(1971) and (1981), Goldman (1976) and (1986), and Nozick (1981).
66 Falvey and Owens (1994) pp. 116-7.
46
Two: Travelling Cases
question, then, is whether or not her self-ascriptive belief can 
be counted as an instance of knowledge. What do  (RA) and 
(RA’) tell us about Susan’s putative claim to knowledge? 
Falvey and Owens assume that Susan’s belief that she is 
entertaining the thought that water  is  a liquid is based on 
evidence:  evidence  that  is  compatible  with  her  in  fact 
believing that twater is a liquid. If their assumption is correct, 
Susan’s  belief  does  not  constitute  knowledge  according  to 
(RA). But, according to Falvey and Owens, this is not to the 
point,  since it is  (RA’),  and not  (RA),  which “best captures 
the importance of  relevant  alternatives in  refuting putative 
claims to knowledge”67: and if we consider  (RA’) matters are 
different.
(RA’) has  it  that  for  Susan  not  to  know  that  she  is 
entertaining  the  thought  that  water  is  a  liquid,  her 
justification for her self-ascriptive belief must be such that if 
she were entertaining the thought that twater is a liquid, she 
would still believe that she was entertaining the thought that 
water is  a  liquid.  But  reflection  on  the  thesis  of  semantic 
externalism reveals that this could never happen. According 
to  semantic  externalism,  the  two  environments  differ  in 
semantically  relevant  ways.  These  differences  would 
therefore  be  reflected  in  Susan’s  thoughts;  all of  Susan’s 
thoughts.  Susan’s  justification  for  her  belief  that  she  is 
entertaining  the  thought  that  water  is  a  liquid  is  not such 
that, were she on Twin Earth she would still have the belief 
that she was entertaining the thought that water is a liquid. 
Indeed, if Susan were on Twin Earth, she could not believe she 
was entertaining the thought that water is a liquid, since she 
could  have  no  propositional  mental  events  involving  the 
concept  water.  It  is  simply not  true that  were she on Twin 
Earth she would still  believe that  she was entertaining the 
thought that water is a liquid.68
67 ibid.
68 This assumes that Susan on Twin Earth is embedded in the linguistic 
community on Twin Earth. As will become clear in due course, this is an 
important issue.
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It  is  this  consequence of  semantic  externalism to  which 
Falvey and Owens appeal. However, they give no explanation 
as to why it should be so. Spelling this out will be my task in 
sections  2.7 and 2.8. For the moment, it will suffice to note 
that, according to Falvey and Owens, the concepts available 
for  use  in  self-ascriptions  will  be  the  very  same  concepts 
available  for  use  in  first-order  thoughts.  Crucially,  the 
concepts  which  figure  in  higher-order  thoughts  will  vary  in 
tandem with the concepts which figure in first-order thoughts. 
If this is correct, (RA’) does not refute Susan’s putative claim 
to  introspective  knowledge.  Hence  the  Content  Sceptic’s 
Argument does  not  prove  that  semantic  externalism  and 
privileged access are incompatible. 
I agree with Falvey and Owens that “[i]n such a case, the 
inability  of  the  subject  to  eliminate  a  relevant  alternative 
does  not  entail  that  the  subject  is  liable  to  error  in  her 
beliefs”69. In addition, I agree that this is because the appeal 
to  relevant  alternatives  made  by  the  Content  Sceptic’s 
Argument is  indeed  correctly  captured  by  (RA’).  However, 
Falvey and Owens provide no good reason for choosing (RA’) 
over  (RA),  and  their  claim  that  the  appeal  to  relevant 
alternatives  made  by  the  Content  Sceptic’s  Argument  is 
captured by (RA’) and not (RA) has in fact been challenged.70 
In the next section, I look at this challenge and respond by 
showing that the Content Sceptic’s Argument can be refuted 
even if the appeal to relevant alternatives which it makes is 
correctly captured by  (RA).  The argument I  present for the 
rejection  of  (RA) turns  on  the  fact  that  introspective 
knowledge,  if  it  is  to  be  compatible  with  semantic 
externalism, cannot be based on phenomenological evidence.
2.6 (RA) or (RA’)?
The  Content  Sceptic’s  Argument relies  on  the  notion  of  a 
relevant  alternative  in  order  to  refute  a  subject’s  putative 
claims to introspective knowledge. As discussed in section 2.5 
69 Falvey and Owens (1994) p. 117.
70 Tye and McLaughlin (1997).
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above, Falvey and Owens argue against the Content Sceptic’s 
Argument by  maintaining  that  its  appeal  to  relevant 
alternatives  is  correctly  captured  by  (RA’),  and  that  (RA’) 
does not refute such claims to introspective knowledge. It is 
crucial  to their  rejection of  the  Content Sceptic’s Argument 
that the appeal to relevant alternatives is correctly captured 
by (RA’), and not by (RA).
Michael Tye and Brian McLaughlin argue that the  Content 
Sceptic’s Argument for the incompatibility between semantic 
externalism and privileged access need make no appeal  to 
(RA’).71 Tye  and  McLaughlin  maintain  rather  that  the 
argument relies directly on (RA). Tye and McLaughlin’s attack 
on  the  Content  Sceptic’s  Argument therefore  comes  via  a 
direct attack on (RA). The problem they identify with (RA) is 
that in cases of self-ascriptive beliefs the antecedent is never 
satisfied.  It  is  never  satisfied,  they  argue,  because  self-
ascriptive beliefs are not based on evidence of any sort, and 
a fortiori not based on evidence that fails to rule out relevant 
alternatives. This analysis agrees with my formulation of the 
privileged  access  claim  given  in  section  2.2,  and  to  this 
extent I am in accord. 
Here is the argument provided by Tye and McLaughlin for 
the  claim  that  self-ascriptive  beliefs  are  not  based  on 
evidence; and  a fortiori not based on evidence that fails to 
rule out relevant alternatives. 
The  Content  Sceptic’s  Argument ,  according  to  Tye  and 
McLaughlin, appeals to the following three theses.
1 The  Introspective  Evidence  Thesis Whenever  one  is 
occurrently thinking that p, the fact that one is occurrently 
thinking  that  p fails  weakly  to  supervene  on  the 
introspective  evidence  available  to  one.  (Tye  and 
McLaughlin, 1997 p. 9)
2 The  Privileged  Access  Thesis It  is  metaphysically 
necessary  that  if  we  are  able  to  exercise  our  normal 
capacity  for  introspection  to  form  beliefs  about  our 
71 Tye  and  McLaughlin  are  concerned  with  travelling  arguments  in 
general,  and their  reasoning therefore applies to the  Content Sceptic’s 
Argument in particular.
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occurrent thoughts, then if we are able occurrently to think 
that p, then we are able to know that we are thinking that 
p without  our  knowledge  being  justificatorily  based  on 
empirical  investigation  of  our  environment.  (Tye  and 
McLaughlin, 1997 p. 9)
3 The Introspective Evidential Knowledge Thesis When we 
know  what  we  are  currently  thinking  without  our 
knowledge  being  justificatorily  based  on  empirical 
investigation of our environment, our knowledge is based 
upon  introspective  evidence  available  to  us.  (Tye  and 
McLaughlin, 1997 p. 9)
These three theses are incompatible, so the argument goes, 
and hence at least one of them must be given up. This is how 
the theses give rise to the alleged incompatibility. A subject 
cannot  know  that  she  believes  that  p if  her  putative 
knowledge  is  based  on  introspective  evidence,  since  the 
introspective evidence available to her underdetermines the 
fact she claims to know. One of the theses must be rejected. 
Tye  and  McLaughlin’s  suggestion  is  to  abandon  the  third 
thesis, the thesis that a subject’s self knowledge is gained by 
introspective evidence. For reasons I will explain at the end of 
this section, I agree that this is the thesis which the semantic 
externalist  should  reject.  Privileged  access  is  not  based  on 
evidence.
First, I would like to examine a further claim made by Tye 
and  McLaughlin.  They  claim  that  the  challenge  posed  by 
travelling  cases  is  not  a  problem  solely  for  the  semantic 
externalist. Having made a positive case for privileged access 
not  being  evidence-based,  they  try  to  turn  the  argument 
around  against  the  semantic  internalist,  by  accusing  the 
semantic  internalist  of  endorsing all  three  theses,  and 
therefore being similarly forced to reject at least one of them. 
They  write,  “unfortunately,  the  advocate  of  travelling 
arguments  who embraces  the  privileged access  thesis  also 
seems committed to the other two theses. Insofar as there is 
any incompatibility, it lies here and  not between [semantic] 
externalism about  thought-content  and  privileged  access.”72 
72 Tye and McLaughlin (1997) p. 11.
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This  claim,  central  to  their  line  of  argument,  is  at  best 
distracting, and at worst false. They write,
Philosophers  who  attack  [semantic]  externalism 
via  travelling  cases  assume  that  a  traveller’s 
introspective evidence can be exactly  the same 
when  the  traveller  is  thinking  that  water  is  a 
liquid,  while  on  earth,  and  when  thinking  that 
twater is a liquid, while on Twin Earth. They are 
thus  committed  to  denying  a  certain  weak 
supervenience thesis:  for  any world  w,  and any 
individuals x and y, then x is occurrently thinking 
that P if and only if y is. Hence they must accept: 
[1]  The  Introspective  Evidence  Thesis.  (Tye  and 
McLaughlin, 1997 p. 9)
But no semantic internalist should accept such a thesis, since 
no semantic  internalist  is  committed to  accepting that  two 
physical  duplicates  could  have different  thoughts  simply  in 
virtue of inhabiting different physical  environments.73 As set 
out  in  chapter  one,  semantic  internalism  is  a  thesis 
fundamentally opposed to the Introspective Evidence Thesis. 
The force of the  Content Sceptic’s Argument lies in pointing 
out that the semantic externalist owes us a positive account 
of  privileged  access.  Tye  and  McLaughlin  are  wrong  to 
maintain that the content sceptic appeals to the three theses; 
rather she demonstrates that they are incompatible, thereby 
forcing the semantic externalist to give a positive account of 
privileged  access.  Tye  and  McLaughlin’s  statement  of  the 
alleged  incompatibility  between  the  theses  amounts  to  no 
more than a reformulation of the Content Sceptic’s Argument. 
To  point  out  the  alleged incompatibility  is  not  to  solve the 
problem. Providing a positive account of privileged access is 
my concern in sections 2.7 and 2.8 below.
73 It is  open to the internalist to maintain that the beliefs  are different 
when widely construed. However, she would have to maintain that the 
beliefs were the same when narrowly construed, and this is the construal 
which  is  of  significance  for  the  purposes  of  psychology.  There  is  a 
plausible  internalist  position which would not accept the wide /  narrow 
distinction as alluded to here. See for example Segal (1989a) According to 
this position, the beliefs are the same simpliciter. See also Crane (1991).
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This is how I interpret the argument.  1,  The Introspective 
Evidence Thesis, is a statement of semantic externalism.74 3, 
The  Introspective  Evidential  Knowledge  Thesis,  is  a  partial 
account  of  privileged  access  consistent  with  semantic 
internalism. The argument purports to show that if you accept 
semantic externalism, this account of privileged access must 
be  rejected.  In  rejecting  3,  the  semantic  externalist  must 
provide  an  alternative  account  of  privileged  access.  Given 
that 1 and 3 are themselves incompatible, one of them must 
be rejected. However, the issue of which to reject is precisely 
not, as Tye and McLaughlin contend, “orthogonal to the issue 
of whether content-externalism is correct”75. Rather, this lies 
at the heart of the debate. 
To  summarise,  whether  the  Content  Sceptic’s  Argument 
appeals  to  the  notion  of  a  relevant  alternative  which  is 
correctly  captured  by  (RA)  or to  the  notion  of  a  relevant 
alternative which is correctly captured by (RA’), the argument 
does not rule out putative claims to introspective knowledge. 
Hence  the  argument  fails  to  establish  that  there  is  an 
incompatibility between semantic externalism and privileged 
access.
What the argument does, however, is show that there are 
certain  constraints  on  the  kind  of  knowledge  delivered  by 
introspection.76 This brings us back to the claim I made earlier, 
that privileged access is not based on evidence. My aim here 
is not to provide a full account of the nature of introspection. 
My  aim  is,  rather,  the  modest  one  of  pointing  out  what 
introspection cannot be if semantic externalism is true.
74 In  fact,  3 is  a  statement of  one form of  semantic  externalism.  It  is 
consistent  with  semantic  externalism  that  3 be  false  if  introspective 
evidence is itself to be widely construed. This point is discussed further 
below.
75 Tye and McLaughlin (1997) p. 11.
76 I  will  throughout  be  working  with  an  intuitive  characterisation  of 
introspection according to which it is the means by which a subject has 
privileged access to her thoughts. It follows from this characterisation that 
if a subject has privileged access to a thought, she knows that thought by 
introspection. Her knowledge of that thought is introspective knowledge.
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Both in the passage quoted from Falvey and Owens, and in 
the  three  theses  presented  by  Tye  and  McLaughlin,  crucial 
reference is made to the notion of “introspectively available 
evidence”. It is the absence of this “introspectively available 
evidence”  which  is  taken  to  support  the  inference  to  the 
conclusion that introspection alone is  insufficient  to ground 
self  knowledge.  In  short,  so  the  argument  goes,  because 
there  is  no  introspectively  available  evidence  which  could 
distinguish twin thoughts, say a water thought from a twater 
thought, introspection does not yield self knowledge.77
How,  then,  is  this  notion  of  “introspectively  available 
evidence”  to  be  understood?  I  see  only  one  interpretation 
which is feasible in this context, an interpretation according 
to which the evidence for a subject’s introspective knowledge 
is  taken to  be  phenomenological evidence.  Phenomenology 
can be interpreted in one of two ways. Either phenomenology 
supervenes locally on the subject or it does not. To assume 
that it does is to assume that phenomenology and thought-
content can be prised apart; to assume that it does not is to 
assume that phenomenology and thought-content can not be 
prised apart.78
Given  the  former  interpretation,  phenomenology  does 
indeed  underdetermine  thought-content:  things  would  feel 
the  same  to  Susan  in  the  actual  situation,  were  she 
entertaining the thought that water is a liquid, as they would 
do in the counterfactual situation, were she entertaining the 
thought that twater is a liquid.79 But what this shows is that if 
77 I do not mean to imply that Falvey and Owens are committed to this 
inference.  On  the  contrary,  they  set  up  their  version  of  the  Content 
Sceptic’s Argument in order to show that it does not work.
78 For an account according to which all content is conceptual and hence 
to be individuated externally see for example McDowell (1994).
79 To make the example more vivid, consider the case in which Susan 
switches  between  two  hypothetical  environments  which  differ  in 
semantically relevant ways. It must of course be assumed that Susan is 
switched at  a  slow enough rate  to  acquire  the concept  appropriate  to 
each, and thereby to have thoughts with differing contents when situated 
in the different environments. Semantic externalism admits that although 
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thought-content  is  wide,  and  phenomenology  is  narrow, 
introspective  knowledge  is  not,  as  proponents  of  travelling 
case  arguments  suppose,  based on  how things  feel  to  the 
subject.  It  certainly  does  not  show  that  there  can  be  no 
introspective knowledge.
If  phenomenology  is  narrow,  then,  whatever  account  of 
privileged access is to be given by the semantic externalist, it 
must  not  be  one  which  relies  upon  phenomenological 
differences  to  individuate  thought-contents. 
Phenomenological differences would individuate propositional 
mental  events  too  coarsely,  and  would  therefore  be 
inadequate  for  the  purposes  of  individuation.  The  correct 
conclusion to be drawn from this is that introspection is not to 
be  understood  as  based  on  phenomenological  evidence. 
Recognition  of  this  fact  should  lead  one  to  the  following 
conclusion. That a subject entertaining the thought that water 
is a liquid is in a state phenomenologically indistinguishable 
from the  state  she  would  be  in  were  she to  entertain  the 
thought that twater is a liquid has no bearing on the question 
of whether that subject can know the content of her thought 
by introspection alone.80
Given  the  latter  interpretation,  phenomenology  can  no 
longer be said to underdetermine thought-content. However, 
Susan  would  have  different  thoughts  in  each  of  the  different 
environments, she would be unable to tell when and where the changes 
occurred. Phenomenology, if it is narrow, would be of no use as a means 
to distinguish between such differing intentional states. Note that a case 
of quick-switching would not be a case in which Susan’s thoughts altered, 
and a fortiori would not be a case in which Susan’s thoughts altered while 
the phenomenology remained the same.
80 If  one  were  sympathetic  to  the  view  that  phenomenological  facts 
determine  thought-content,  the  view  could  be  modified  as  follows. 
Phenomenological facts will not, if semantic externalism is true, uniquely 
determine the thought a subject is entertaining  across possible worlds. 
Which  thought  the  subject  is  in  fact  entertaining  will  depend  upon 
phenomenological  facts  plus  facts  about  her environment.  However,  in 
any  given  world,  phenomenological  facts  will  uniquely  determine  the 
thought a subject is entertaining in that world.
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even if  phenomenology and thought-content  are  so closely 
linked that  there would be no phenomenological  difference 
without a difference in thought-content, the phenomenology 
can not be appealed to as the evidence on which a subject’s 
introspective  knowledge  is  based.  This  is  because  if 
phenomenology and thought-content go hand in hand, there 
is  no  possibility  that  the  evidence  exist  while  what  it  is 
evidence for not exist: and this is contrary to the notion of 
evidence.
Either way, the conclusion to be drawn from the  Content 
Sceptic’s  Argument is  that  introspective  knowledge  is  not 
based  on  phenomenological  evidence.81 The  upshot  is  that 
semantic  externalism  is  in  need  of  a  positive  account  of 
privileged access. It is to this task which I now turn.82
81 It is in any case curious that proponents of travelling case arguments 
have  appealed  to  the  fact  that  a  subject  would  be  unable  to  tell  the 
difference  between  her  thought-contents  in  the  actual  and  the 
counterfactual situations, since it is by no means obvious that there is any 
particular way it feels to have a certain thought-content. 
82 Davidson has also provided an account of how semantic externalism 
can accommodate the claim of privileged access. See Davidson (1987). I 
will not discuss his account here in any detail, since I think his response to 
the  problem  posed  for  an  account  of  privileged  access  by  semantic 
externalism  belies  a  failure  to  understand  the  nature  of  the  problem. 
Davidson maintains that the appearance of an incompatibility arises from 
the  following  mistaken  inference.  The  fact  that  a  propositional  mental 
event is described by relating it to something outside the head cannot be 
used as  the  basis  from which  to  infer  that  the  thought  must  itself be 
outside the head, and hence unavailable to privileged access. There are 
two points of contention I have with this response. First, it is far from clear 
who, if anyone, makes this mistake. Second, it is implausible to suppose 
that a subject can be attributed with privileged access to a propositional 
mental event of hers, even while she is unable to provide any relevant 
description of that propositional mental event.
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2.7 The privileged access claim
In section 2.5 it was argued that (RA’) did not refute putative 
claims to introspective knowledge. The reason given was that 
it is impossible to set up a relevant alternative in which the 
subject retains her self-ascriptive belief,  yet in which she is 
deceived about the object of that belief. That is, Susan could 
not be on Twin Earth, entertaining the thought that twater is 
a liquid, and yet still have the belief that she is entertaining 
the thought  that  water is  a  liquid.  For  every  difference in 
thought-content,  due  purely  to  a  semantically  relevant 
difference  in  environmental  factors,  there  would  be  a 
corresponding  difference  in  the  content  of  the  associated 
second-order self-ascriptive thought. This provides the basis 
for an account of privileged access consistent with semantic 
externalism.  The  account  is  widely  accepted  amongst 
semantic  externalists.  Thus,  Crispin  Wright  maintains  that 
“the content of my second-order beliefs will ... be externally 
determined ... [and] will,  as it were, co-vary with externally 
determined  variation  in  the  content  of  my  first-order 
attitudes.”83 Sydney Shoemaker claims that “the contents of 
mental  states  are  fixed  holistically  ...  whatever  fixes  the 
content of the first-order belief ... also fixes in the same way 
the embedded content in the second-order belief.”84 Similarly, 
John Heil claims that the contents of second-order thoughts 
are  determined  “just  as  are  the  contents  of  first-order 
thoughts, by the obtaining of appropriate conditions.”85
Burge  has  offered  an  account  which  appeals  to  similar 
facts.  It  will  prove  instructive  to  examine  Burge’s  account 
further,  in  particular  its  appeal  to  two  notions,  those  of 
containment and of self-reference. Burge writes:
The content of the first-order (contained) thought 
[that  water  is  a  liquid]  is  fixed  by  non-
individualistic  background conditions.  And by  its 
reflexive, self-referential character, the content of 
83 Wright (1991) p. 76.
84 Shoemaker (1994) p. 260.
85 Heil (1988) p. 251.
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the  second-order  judgement  is  logically  locked 
(self-referentially)  onto  the  first-order  content 
which  it  both  contains  and  takes  as  its  subject 
matter. (Burge, 1988 pp. 659-60)
That the first-order thought is taken to be contained in the 
second-order thought could be regarded as controversial. For 
instance,  such  an  analysis  would  go  against  one 
interpretation of Frege, according to which instances of a term 
contained  in  a  first-order  thought  and  in  a  second-order 
thought would differ  in  their  sense and in their  reference.86 
The term “water” in “Susan believes that water is a liquid” 
would be taken to refer to the sense of the term “water” in 
“water  is  a  liquid”.  According  to  Frege,  terms  in  opaque 
contexts cannot have their  normal  reference, as this  would 
violate  his  principle  that  when  the  reference  of  the  parts 
remains  the  same,  so  does  the  reference  of  the  whole.  A 
sentence is here understood as referring to its truth-value. A 
further,  more  powerful  concern  about  the  containment 
principle  is  this.  Maintaining  that  a  thought  can  literally 
contain another thought commits one to certain metaphysical 
views  about  propositional  mental  events  which  one  might 
otherwise  be  unwilling  to  accept.  My  formalisation  of  the 
privileged access claim will therefore not be couched in terms 
of containment. I will talk of an embedded content, but not of 
an embedded propositional mental event.87
The part of Burge’s account which I do wish to endorse is 
the notion of self-reference. According to Burge, introspective 
knowledge is self-referential  in the sense that the object of 
reference just is the thought being thought.
When one knows that one is thinking that  p, one 
is not taking one’s thought ... that p merely as an 
object. One is thinking that p in the very event of 
thinking knowledgeably that one is thinking it. It 
is thought and thought about in the same mental 
act. (Burge, 1988 pp. 659-60)
86 For an interpretation of Frege contrary to this see Dummett (1973).
87 The thought that grass is green or grass is blue contains the content 
that grass is blue, but not the thought that grass is blue.
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This is a stronger claim than is made, for example, by Falvey 
and Owens,  or  by Wright.  Burge’s  claim is  not  merely  that 
second-order  beliefs  will  co-vary  with  the  environmental 
conditions which are taken to explain the covariation in first-
order thoughts. Rather, the second-order thought takes itself 
as  its  object.  Thus,  when  a  subject  ascribes  a  thought  to 
herself, she does not have a second-order thought which is 
directed  towards  a  distinct  first-order  thought.  Neither  is 
there a second-order “empty shell” which could take any one 
of a number of thoughts as its object.
The attribution of a propositional mental event to oneself 
is taken to be a matter of thinking a particular thought, an 
ability grounded in the environment, self-ascriptively.  Burge 
maintains  that  “one  knows  one’s  thought  to  be  what  it  is 
simply  by  thinking  it  while  exercising  second-order,  self-
ascriptive  powers”88.  This  is  what  provides  Burge  with  the 
means to refute the Content Sceptic’s Argument.
If background conditions are different enough so 
that there is another object of reference in one’s 
self-referential  thinking,  they  are  also  different 
enough so that there is another thought. (Burge, 
1988 p. 659)
It  is  the  self-referential  nature  of  putative  claims  to 
introspective knowledge,  and not the containment principle 
per se which characterises introspective knowledge.
2.8 A formalisation of the privileged access claim
I propose the following formalisation of the claim of privileged 
access.
(PA) For all  x, if  x believes that she thinks that  p, then x 
thinks that p.
Let “thinks” satisfy the condition that any attitude of the form 
“S ϕ’s that p” (e.g. “S desires that p”, “S fears that p”) entails 
88 Burge (1988) p. 656.
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“S thinks that p”. This allows for the possibility that a subject 
could be mistaken about the relation in which she stands to 
the  proposition  concerned.  For  example,  it  allows  that  a 
subject can believe she desires that p when in fact she fears 
that  p. The privileged access claim captured by  (PA) is the 
modest claim that one cannot be mistaken about the content 
of the proposition.89 
The second point to notice about (PA) is that the truth of 
the first-order thought is irrelevant to the truth of the second-
order belief. A subject who believes that she thinks that water 
is a liquid, according to  (PA), thereby thinks that water is a 
liquid,  independently  of  whether  or  not  water  is  in  fact  a 
liquid. Thus, a subject who believes she thinks that water is a 
metal  does  in  fact  think,  on  this  account,  that  water  is  a 
metal. “S thinks that p” does not even entail “S believes that 
p”, let alone  p. The truth-value of the embedded content is 
irrelevant to the truth-value of the embedding belief. The self-
ascription is correct in both instances.
(PA) is  a  principle  about  the self-verifying nature of  the 
content given in putative claims to introspective knowledge, 
and not about either the attitude taken towards that content, 
or  the  truth  of  that  content.  As  expressed  by  (PA), 
necessarily,  a  judgement  expressible  by  a  sentence  of  the 
form, “I think that p”, will be true.
We are now in  a  position to  provide an  account  of  first 
person  authority.  The  account  of  first  person  authority  is 
based  on  the  claim  of  privileged  access.  However,  the 
authority  a  subject  has  over  the  content  of  her  current 
thought derives not from the lack of an evidential  base for 
her  judgement,  but  from  the  fact  that  such  a  judgement 
cannot but be true.
The claim that such a judgement cannot but be true can 
be brought out by stating (PA) contra-positively.
89 Note that it follows from this that no contradiction is involved in S’s 
thinking that p but believing that ¬p. For an argument to the effect that 
privileged access should be construed as privileged access to the relation 
in which one stands to the proposition expressed by one’s thought see 
McDonald (1995).
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(PA) For all x, if x believes she thinks that p, then x thinks 
that p; i.e. for all x, if ¬(x thinks that p), then ¬(x believes 
that she thinks that p). 
(PA) accords  with  the  response  to  the  travelling  case 
arguments  as  presented  by  Falvey  and  Owens:  that  is,  it 
brings  out  the  reason  why  (RA’) does  not  refute  putative 
claims to introspective knowledge. According to (PA), it would 
be impossible for a subject to believe that she thinks that p, 
in circumstances in which she was unable to think that p. For 
example, it would be impossible for Susan to believe that she 
is  entertaining  the  thought  that  water  is  a  liquid  without 
thereby doing so. The existence of a given first-order content 
is conditionally guaranteed by the existence of, and therefore 
guarantees  the  truth  of,  the  corresponding  second-order 
belief. In short, putative claims to introspective knowledge are 
self-verifying.
2.9 Unconscious mental states and past mental events
There  are  three  basic  types  of  self-ascriptive  belief:  those 
which  ascribe  occurrent  propositional  mental  events  (I  am 
currently  entertaining  the  thought  that  p);  those  which 
ascribe  unconscious  propositional  mental  states  (I  have  an 
unconscious  mental  state  that  p);  and those which ascribe 
past propositional mental events (I once thought that  p).90 In 
section 2.8 above, I argued that self-ascriptive beliefs of the 
first sort are self-verifying. As yet there has been no mention 
of putative claims to knowledge of unconscious propositional 
mental  states  or  past  propositional  mental  events.  In  this 
section I will argue that a principle of privileged access akin to 
(PA) can be formalised for both types of mental act. These 
formalisations show the very limited sense in which a subject 
can be said to have privileged access to such mental acts, 
and will serve to clarify the force of (PA).
90 I  will  talk  of  unconscious  mental  states rather  than  unconscious 
propositional mental events, or unconscious thoughts, since according to 
my definition of a thought, there could be no unconscious thoughts.
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It  might be thought that the natural  way to formalise a 
principle  of  privileged  access  with  regard  to  one’s 
unconscious mental states would be as follows.
(PAU) For all x, if x believes that she unconsciously thinks 
that p, then x unconsciously thinks that p.
But  (PAU) is  clearly  false.  It  is  undoubtedly  possible  for  a 
subject to be mistaken in her beliefs about her unconscious 
mental  states.  The access a subject has to an unconscious 
mental  state  will  generally  be  based  on  evidence  equally 
available  to  others  as  to  the  subject.  In  this  respect,  a 
subject’s  knowledge  of  that  state  can  not  be  regarded  as 
privileged.  The  correlate  of  (PA) for  unconscious  mental 
states cannot be (PAU).
I  remarked in section  2.8 above that  (PA) is  a principle 
about  the  self-verifying  nature  of  the  content given  in 
putative claims to introspective knowledge, and not about the 
attitude taken  towards  that  content.  This  suggests  an 
enlightening parallel. Suppose Susan were to believe that she 
had an unconscious hatred of dogs. Susan may be mistaken 
in the belief that she has an unconscious hatred of dogs, just 
as she may be mistaken in her belief that she desires to hate 
dogs when she in fact fears that she hates dogs. What Susan 
cannot  be  mistaken  about  is  that  she  is  entertaining  a 
thought with the content that she hates dogs. The very act of 
believing that she has an unconscious mental state that she 
hates dogs determines that she has a conscious propositional 
mental event with that content.
This suggests the following principle.
(PAU’) For all x, if x believes that she unconsciously thinks 
that p, then x thinks that p.
(PAU’) is the correct correlate of (PA) for unconscious mental 
states. Putative claims to knowledge of such states are self-
verifying in the limited sense shown.
What  about  thoughts  about  past  propositional  mental 
events? It might be thought that the natural way to formalise 
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a  principle  of  privileged  access  with  regard  to  one’s  past 
propositional mental events would be as follows. 
(PAP) For all x, if x believes that she once thought that p, 
then x once thought that p.
This is in line with (PAU) above, and is similarly false. This is 
because semantic externalism opens up the possibility of  a 
change  in  semantic  reference  over  time  which  the  subject 
cannot detect. Suppose that at time t1 Susan has the thought 
that  her  cat  drowned  in  water.  Suppose  that  Susan  is 
subsequently  transported  to  Twin  Earth  without  her 
knowledge. At some much later time, t2, by which time Susan 
is  semantically  efficient  in  her  “new”  environment,  Susan 
thinks to herself, wishing to refer to the thought she had at t1 
, “I once thought that my cat drowned in water”. This second 
order belief is false, according to semantic externalism, since 
the concept Susan expresses at t2 by the term “water” is not 
the same concept as the one she expressed at t1 by the term 
“water”. The second-order belief therefore fails to capture the 
content of Susan’s original thought. 
Once again, I remarked in section 2.8 above that (PA) is a 
principle about the self-verifying nature of the  content given 
in putative claims to introspective knowledge, and not about 
the  truth of that content. And once again, as in the case of 
unconscious  mental  states,  this  suggests  an  enlightening 
parallel. A subject may be mistaken about whether or not her 
judgement correctly captures the content of one of her past 
thoughts, but she cannot be mistaken about whether or not 
she is entertaining a thought with that content.
This suggests the following principle.
(PAP’) For all x, if x believes that she once thought that p, 
then x thinks that p.
(PAP’) is the correct correlate of  (PA) for past propositional 
mental events. Putative claims to knowledge of such thoughts 
are self-verifying in the limited sense shown.
62
Two: Travelling Cases
In  conclusion,  that  (PA) is  a  principle  about  the  self-
verifying nature  of  the  content given  in  putative  claims to 
introspective  knowledge,  and  not  about  the  attitude  taken 
towards  that  content,  nor  about  the  truth  of  that  content, 
allows  there  to  be  a  limited  sense  in  which  claims  to 
knowledge  of  unconscious  propositional  mental  states  and 
past  propositional  mental  events  are  self-verifying.  This  is 
reflected  in  (PAU’) and  (PAP’).  These  principles  serve  to 
highlight the limited claim of (PA). It is a formal principle, and 
does  not  provide  an account  of  the sort  of  interesting self 
knowledge that makes a subject a special object of study for 
herself.
2.10 The Argument from Memory 
It  is  perhaps  the  realisation  that  the  contents  of  past 
propositional mental events may not be captured by thoughts 
of  the  form “I  once  thought  that  p”  which  lies  behind the 
following line of argument. Paul Boghossian91 has argued that 
semantic externalism has the implausible consequence that a 
subject could have introspective knowledge of a propositional 
mental event at time t, forget nothing, and yet be unable to 
say at some later time what the content of her thought at  t 
was. He writes,
The  only  explanation,  I  venture  to  suggest,  for 
why [Susan] will not know tomorrow what [she] is 
said  to  know  today,  is  not  that  [she]  has 
forgotten,  but  that  [she]  never  knew.  ...  What 
other  reason  is  there  for  why  our  slowly 
transported thinker will not know tomorrow what 
[she] is said to know directly and authoritatively 
today? (Boghossian, 1989 p. 23)
Certainly,  when  Susan,  having  been  transported  to  Twin 
Earth, sincerely utters the sentence “I once thought that my 
cat drowned in water”, she thereby expresses the belief that 
she  once  thought  her  cat  drowned  in  twater,  since  the 
content of a memory is fixed by environmental conditions at 
91 Boghossian (1989).
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the  time  of  recollection.92 Boghossian  is  correct,  then,  in 
maintaining that Susan does not know at  time  t2 what she 
knew at time t1. The switching example has the consequence 
that the content of a subject’s memories can change without 
the  subject  forgetting  anything  or  learning  anything,  and 
without her being aware of any such change.93 But in the light 
of the principle of privileged access, an alternative conclusion 
to that drawn by Boghossian must be drawn, since according 
to (PA), Susan has privileged access to her thought at t1, and 
according to (PAP’), she has privileged access to her thought 
at  t2 .  That is, Susan does know the content of her thought 
both at t1 and at t2. 
So  what  is  wrong  with  Boghossian’s  line  of  reasoning? 
Boghossian assumes that there are two possible explanations 
for the fact that Susan will  not know tomorrow what she is 
said to know today: either that Susan will forget the content 
of  her  original  thought,  or  that  her  putative  claim  to 
knowledge is illegitimate. Neither possibility is feasible. The 
correct  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the  Argument  from 
Memory,  then, is the following. Semantic externalism opens 
up a  third  possible  explanation  for  why a  subject  may not 
know tomorrow what  she  is  said  to  know today.  The  third 
possible  explanation  is  quite  simply  this:  that  she  has 
undergone a semantically relevant environmental switching.
However  unsavoury  this  consequence may be,  I  think  it 
must  simply  be  accepted  as  a  natural  consequence  of 
semantic externalism.94
92 For an argument along these lines see Ludlow (1995b).
93 Note that even though a subject may be unable to report the content of 
her past thought directly, she can nevertheless do so indirectly. Consider 
Susan’s two beliefs about her cat. Although Susan’s belief that she once 
thought that her cat drowned in twater fails to capture the content of her 
original  belief,  she  can  capture  the  content  of  her  original  belief  by 
referring to it as “that thought which I would then have expressed by the 
words  ‘my  cat  drowned  in  water’”.  However,  the  original  scepticism 
remains.
94 Wright  has  maintained  that  the  mere  possibility  of  a  change  in 
semantic reference over time should not undermine our general practice 
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2.11 The temptation of the arguments
So what is the appeal of the Content Sceptic’s Argument and 
of  the  Argument from Memory? At first  sight,  individualism 
seems to follow from the possibility of privileged access to the 
contents of one’s thoughts.
A person need not investigate the environment to 
know what his thoughts are. A person does have 
to investigate the environment to know what the 
environment  is  like.  Does  this  not  indicate  that 
the  mental  events  are  what  they  are 
independently of the environment? (Burge, 1988 
p. 650)
The  question,  then,  is  “why  ...  having  non-empirical 
knowledge of our thoughts [is] not impugned by the fact that 
such  thoughts  are  individuated  through  relations  to  an 
environment that we know only empirically”95.
Burge provides the following explanation.  That a subject 
can be immediately aware of the contents of her propositional 
mental  events  is  logically  independent  of  the  individuation 
conditions of those mental events. Privileged access to one’s 
thoughts,  and  the  individuation  of  those  thoughts,  are 
therefore to be treated as distinct matters.
To  know that  water  exists,  or  that  what  one  is 
touching  is  water,  one  cannot  circumvent 
empirical procedures. But to think that water is a 
liquid, one need not know the complex conditions 
that must obtain if one is to think that thought. 
Such  conditions  need  only  be  presupposed. 
(Burge, 1988 p. 654)
of assuming first person authority. On this view, our general practice takes 
for granted that semantically relevant factors of our environment are not 
prone to change in reference-altering ways. See Wright (1991) pp. 79-80. 
However, if semantic reference is socially determined, such switching is 
presumably  commonplace.  For  an  argument  to  this  effect  see  Ludlow 
(1995a).
95 Burge (1988) pp. 651-2.
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The ability to think particular thoughts presupposes certain 
environmental conditions, and this applies equally to second-
order  thoughts  as  to  first-order  thoughts.  Introspective 
knowledge requires no more than the conditions presupposed 
in first-order thought, together with an ability of the subject 
to self-ascribe propositional mental events. (PA) respects this 
distinction between the ability of a subject to think that p and 
knowledge of  the conditions required for  a subject to have 
that ability.
To illustrate the point,  Burge draws an analogy between 
introspective knowledge and perceptual knowledge.96 Just as it 
is  a  mistake  to  regard  perceptual  knowledge  of  physical 
entities as resting on some prior justified belief that certain 
enabling conditions are satisfied, so it is taken to be a mistake 
to regard introspective knowledge as requiring knowledge of 
the conditions which make such a judgement possible. 
Knowing  one’s  thoughts  no  more  requires 
separate investigation of the conditions that make 
the  judgment  possible  than  knowing  what  one 
perceives. (Burge, 1988 p. 656)
Consequently, in the case of introspective knowledge it is not 
necessary  to  rule  out  counterfeit,  or  counterfactual, 
96 While  the  parallel  between  perceptual  knowledge  and  introspective 
knowledge  is  helpful,  fundamental  differences  are  evident.  Burge 
acknowledges such distinctions, and himself repudiates any interpretation 
of  introspective  knowledge  according  to  the  observational  model. 
According  to  Burge,  perceptual  knowledge  has  the  following  two 
characteristics. First, it is possible that any physical object perceived could 
have been different even while the perceptual states, and other mental 
states of  the subject remained the same. There is,  then,  no necessary 
relation between the subject and the physical object. Second, perceptual 
knowledge, being a form of empirical knowledge, is impersonal. In other 
words, a different observer could have been equally well-placed to make 
the  same  observation.  Neither  of  these  characteristics  are  true  of 
introspective knowledge as explicated by Burge. Introspective knowledge 
according to Burge is essentially personal and non-contingently related to 
the object of that knowledge. See Burge (1996).
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situations.  No  comparison  need  be  made  between  the 
thought one in fact has, and various other possible thoughts 
one might have had were one related in the appropriate way 
to  an  environment  which  differed  in  semantically  relevant 
ways.  Given  the  self-verifying  nature  of  putative  claims  to 
introspective  knowledge,  the  possibility  of  a  counterfeit 
situation does not even arise. It makes no sense to claim that 
external conditions for this thought could be different.
The belief that there is an incompatibility arises, according 
to Burge, from the assumption of two distinct perspectives. 
From a first-person perspective a subject thinks that she is 
thinking  that  water  is  a  liquid;  but  from  a  third-person 
perspective we know that her thinking that thought depends 
upon a contingent fact about her environment of which she is 
ignorant. This gives rise to the worry that the original first-
person  judgement  is  unjustified  unless  either  it  can 
“encompass the third-person perspective, or unless the third-
person perspective on empirical matters is irrelevant to the 
character of the first-person judgement”97. For the worry to be 
accommodated in  the first  way,  the first-person judgement 
must be regarded as containing the knowledge available to 
the third person.  That  is,  the first-person perspective must 
somehow rule out alternatives. It is this line of thought which 
gives  rise  to  arguments  such  as  the  Content  Sceptic’s 
Argument.  To  accommodate  the  worry  in  the  second  way, 
however, would be to give up on semantic externalism.
2.12 Conclusion
I  have argued that neither the  Content Sceptic’s Argument 
nor  the  Argument  from  Memory show  that  semantic 
externalism  is  incompatible  with  privileged  access. (PA) 
captures the respect in which a subject has privileged access 
to  her  thoughts,  since  it  illustrates  how  introspective 
knowledge  remains  constant  under  possible  unnoticeable 
variations in environmental circumstances. The self-verifying 
97 Burge (1988) p. 661.
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nature of claims to introspective knowledge in turn accounts 
for the claim of first person authority.
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The Argument from Privileged 
Access
3.1 Introduction
In chapter two I examined two arguments designed to show 
that semantic externalism could not accommodate the claim 
of privileged access. A positive account of privileged access 
was proposed, formalised as (PA), which demonstrates that 
the claim of privileged access is indeed compatible with 
semantic externalism. (PA) shows why both the Content 
Sceptic’s Argument and the Argument from Memory 
ultimately fail.
Having answered the challenge posed by so-called 
travelling cases, however, the semantic externalist is now 
faced with a second, derivative challenge. It has been 
claimed that the conjunction of privileged access and 
semantic externalism entails that a subject could have non-
empirical98 knowledge of contingent empirical facts about her 
environment; the empirical facts upon which her thoughts 
essentially depend. This is assumed to be absurd, and hence 
taken to constitute a reductio ad absurdum of that very 
conjunction. I will refer to this argument against the 
compatibility of semantic externalism and privileged access 
as the Argument from Privileged Access.99 
Giving a precise formulation of the Argument from 
Privileged Access has proved to be no easy task. The purpose 
of the present chapter is to arrive at a plausible formulation, 
and hence to show that the semantic externalist is faced with 
a genuine challenge.
98 Once again, “non-empirical” is here taken to mean without recourse to 
observation, or external perception.
99 The Argument from Privileged Access is generally taken as an 
argument against semantic externalism. See in particular McKinsey 
(1991) and (1994), and Brown (1995). One alternative would be to deny 
the claim of privileged access. However, it is hard to see this as a 
possibility in the light of (PA).
Three: The Argument from Privileged Access
3.2 The McKinsey recipe
The  problem  in  its  current  form  was  first  raised  by 
McKinsey100,  who expresses it  as an  ad hominem charge of 
inconsistency  against  Burge.  However,  I  will  treat 
McKinsey’s  argument  as  a  general  charge  against  the 
semantic  externalist  who  wishes  to  endorse  the  claim  of 
privileged access. According to McKinsey, then, the semantic 
externalist  who  wishes  to  endorse  the  claim of  privileged 
access  is  committed  to  the  following  three  propositions, 
propositions which McKinsey maintains are inconsistent.
(1) Oscar knows [non-empirically]101 that he is thinking 
that water is wet.
(2) The proposition that Oscar is thinking that water is 
wet necessarily depends upon E.
(3) The proposition E cannot be known [non-
empirically], but only by empirical investigation. 
(McKinsey, 1991 p. 12)
E is taken to be a proposition expressing the contingent 
external facts which determine the content of the subject’s 
thought; that is, facts about the subject’s physical 
100 McKinsey (1991).
101 McKinsey uses the phrase “a priori” where I have used “non-
empirical”. Since McKinsey defines a priori knowledge simply as 
knowledge obtained independently of empirical information (McKinsey, 
1991 p. 9) nothing is lost by the use of my terminology. I have 
deliberately avoided talk of privileged access as being a form of a priori 
knowledge, since the issue of how to define a priori knowledge is 
contentious and need not concern us in this context. For one, Burge 
distinguishes knowledge of one’s propositional mental events from a 
priori knowledge, on the grounds that the former is essentially tied to a 
perspective where the latter is not. For more on this distinction see Burge 
(1996). For recent interesting accounts of the a priori see Peacocke 
(1993), and Boghossian (1996).
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environment or facts about the linguistic practices of the 
subject’s community. 
The question, then, is twofold. First, is the semantic 
externalist who wishes to endorse the claim of privileged 
access committed to the three stated propositions? Second, 
are the propositions inconsistent? At first gloss, (1) is a 
statement of the claim of privileged access, (2) is a statement 
of the thesis of semantic externalism, and (3) is a plausible 
claim about our knowledge of the external world. For 
instance, according to Brueckner, the negation of (3) 
“embodies a claim which is obviously false on anyone’s 
view”102. The important point here is that semantic 
externalists do accept (3). So it would seem that the semantic 
externalist who wishes to endorse the claim of privileged 
access is indeed committed to the three propositions.
With regard to the alleged inconsistency, McKinsey’s idea 
is this. If a subject had privileged access to a given thought, 
where her having that thought necessarily implied the 
existence of certain external objects, then she could know 
non-empirically that those objects exist. Since a subject 
cannot know non-empirically that the external world exists, 
she cannot have privileged access to the thought in 
question.103
However, a satisfactory answer to the twofold question 
depends upon the resolution of two crucial issues. An 
appropriate interpretation needs to be determined for the 
phrase “necessarily depends upon” in (2), and an appropriate 
content needs to be determined for the proposition E in (2) 
and (3). These issues are intimately linked, and will be 
102 Brueckner (1992) p. 111.
103 It is important to distinguish the Argument from Privileged Access 
from a line of reasoning which argues that one needs to know the 
empirical conditions which are conceptually entailed by one’s self 
knowledge before one can have that self knowledge. This is clearly 
fallacious. Just because p conceptually entails q, it does not follow that a 
subject could not know p without first knowing q. Think about the 
(perhaps infinite) conceptual entailments of any given proposition.
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addressed respectively in the next two sections of this 
chapter.
It is evident that the alleged incompatibility between 
semantic externalism and the claim of privileged access can 
be brought out only by appeal to a third claim about the 
nature of our knowledge of the external world. I will refer to 
this third claim as (EC), where (3) above is an instance of the 
more general claim captured by (EC).
(EC) x could not have non-empirical knowledge of 
contingent facts about her environment.104
The terms “empirical” and “non-empirical” are epistemic 
terms; they distinguish not between types of fact, but 
between ways of knowing facts. Thus a fact is neither 
empirical nor non-empirical per se, but can be classified as 
such, if at all, only by bringing in reference to the means by 
which it came to be known. Consequently, the categories of 
empirical fact and non-empirical fact are not mutually 
exclusive. A good illustration of this point is provided by 
considering Susan’s current belief that she is jealous of her 
sister. Assuming that this belief falls within the purview of her 
introspective knowledge, it would be possible for her to know 
its content both non-empirically, by introspection, and 
empirically, by noticing how she behaves towards her sister.105 
Others could have only empirical knowledge of the content of 
104 The force of the phrase “could not” in this context is not one of logical 
impossibility. The possibility that an Omniscient being could have non-
empirical knowledge of contingent facts about the environment need not 
be excluded. (EC) is restricted to creatures who are relevantly similar to 
us: that is, to beings whose knowledge of the world generally comes via 
external perception. “Could not” should therefore be interpreted as 
embodying a weaker form of impossibility, perhaps that of metaphysical 
impossibility. 
105 It should be clear from the discussion of privileged access in chapter 
two that the principle of privileged access, (PA), is consistent with Susan 
gaining a large part of her knowledge of her own psychology via 
empirical investigation.
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her belief.106 The claim embodied in (EC) is that knowledge of 
contingent facts about the environment will always be 
empirical knowledge; there is no way to come to know such 
facts other than by empirical investigation.
The Argument from Privileged Access, then, takes the 
following three theses.
(PA) For all x, if x believes that she thinks that p, then x 
thinks that p;
(SE) x’s thinking that p necessarily depends upon 
contingent facts about her environment;
(EC) x could not have non-empirical knowledge of 
contingent facts about her environment;
and runs as follows.
(pi) (PA) & (SE)
(pii) (EC)
(piii) {(PA) & (SE)} ∅  ¬ (EC) 
therefore (c) ¬ {(PA) & (SE)}
It is now time to turn to the first of the two crucial issues, the 
nature of the necessary dependence of a thought on 
contingent environmental facts.
3.3 The first crucial issue: “necessarily depends upon”
How  are  we  to  interpret  the  necessary  dependence  of 
thought  on  environment?  Two options  present  themselves. 
Either  semantic  externalism  should  be  interpreted  as  a 
106 One problem raised for Davidson’s account of radical interpretation is 
how to ensure that the propositional mental event which the radical 
interpreter attributes to the subject, and the propositional mental event 
which the subject attributes to herself are one and the same propositional 
mental event; and hence that the interpreter and the subject have 
knowledge, when they do, of the very same fact. For Davidson on radical 
interpretation see his (1973). For a defence of Davidson against this 
objection see McDowell (1994).
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conceptual  thesis,  according  to  which  interpretation  (SE) 
would express the following.
(SEC) x’s thinking that p conceptually implies contingent 
facts about her environment;
or semantic externalism should be interpreted as a 
metaphysical thesis, according to which interpretation (SE) 
would express the following.
(SEM) x’s thinking that p metaphysically entails 
contingent facts about her environment.
Conceptual implication and metaphysical entailment can be 
distinguished in the following way: if  p conceptually implies 
q,  q will  be  deducible non-empirically  from  p;  if  p 
metaphysically entails q,  however,  q may not be deducible 
non-empirically from p, since some metaphysical necessities 
are knowable only empirically. Each interpretation will thus 
have  different  repercussions  for  the  Argument  from 
Privileged  Access,  and  hence  for  the  semantic  externalist 
who wishes to endorse the claim of privileged access.
Adoption  of  the  conceptual  interpretation  brings  the 
alleged incompatibility to the fore. If semantic externalism is 
correctly captured by  (SEC), a subject could come to know 
non-empirically,  for  any  given  thought,  which  contingent 
empirical  conditions  that  thought  depended  upon.  Such 
knowledge, together with introspective knowledge that she 
was currently entertaining a given thought, would provide a 
non-empirical  route  to  knowledge  that  those  specific 
contingent empirical conditions in fact obtained.107 Hence, the 
conjunction of  privileged access  and semantic  externalism, 
granted as a conceptual thesis,  does indeed contradict the 
plausible third claim, (EC).
107 Exactly which such contingent facts could be thus known is still in 
question. This matter will be dealt with in section 3.4 where I discuss 
possibilities for the content of the proposition E, using Susan’s thought 
that water is a liquid as an example.
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Adoption of the metaphysical interpretation, on the other 
hand, may have no such unsavoury consequence. If the thesis 
of  semantic  externalism  is  correctly  captured  by  (SEM), 
there is no immediate reason to suppose that a subject could 
have privileged access  to the contingent facts  upon which 
her thoughts depend, even if she does have privileged access 
to the contents of those thoughts.
Since metaphysical dependencies are often only 
knowable  [empirically],  propositions  that  are 
knowable [non-empirically] might metaphysically 
depend  upon  other  propositions  that  are  only 
knowable [empirically]. (McKinsey, 1991 p. 13)
The apparent effect of exchanging conceptual implication for 
metaphysical dependence, then, is to loosen the epistemic 
relation between knowledge of a thought and knowledge of 
the contingent facts upon which that thought necessarily 
depends. Hence, the conjunction of privileged access and 
semantic externalism, interpreted as a metaphysical thesis, 
does not lead immediately to a contradiction of the plausible 
third claim, (EC).
The Argument from Privileged Access has no obvious force 
if semantic externalism is interpreted as a metaphysical 
thesis. It might seem, then, that the semantic externalist 
should endorse the metaphysical interpretation, since this 
would allow her consistently to maintain both the claim of 
privileged access and the plausible third claim about the 
nature of our knowledge of the external world. But is the 
metaphysical interpretation feasible?
McKinsey thinks not. McKinsey maintains that such an 
interpretation fails to capture the significance of semantic 
externalism. He writes,
... to say that a state is wide ... cannot mean 
merely that the state metaphysically entails the 
existence of external objects. For if it did, then 
given certain materialistic assumptions ... , it 
would follow that probably all psychological states 
... would be wide ... and [semantic externalism] 
would be merely a trivial consequence of (token) 
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materialism. (McKinsey, 1991 pp. 13-14, original 
emphasis)
McKinsey’s thought is that since one can endorse physicalism 
independently of the semantic internalist / semantic 
externalist debate, semantic externalism cannot amount to 
the mere claim that having a thought entails the existence of 
external objects. McKinsey provides the following example.
For instance, it is plausible to suppose that no 
human could (metaphysically) have existed 
without biological parents, and that no human 
could (metaphysically) have had biological 
parents other than the ones she in fact had. If this 
is so, then Oscar’s thinking that water is wet 
metaphysically entails that Oscar’s mother exists. 
In fact, Oscar’s having any psychological property 
... would metaphysically entail the existence of 
Oscar’s mother. Thus if metaphysical entailment 
of external objects were what made a 
psychological state wide, then probably all of 
Oscar’s - and everyone else’s - psychological 
states would be wide. (McKinsey, 1991 p. 14, 
original emphasis)108
I agree that the metaphysical interpretation as characterised 
by  McKinsey  fails  to  capture  the  significance  of  semantic 
externalism.  Semantic  externalism  is  a  thesis  about  what 
determines  the  content of  certain  propositional  mental 
events, and not a thesis solely about what physical conditions 
must  be  presupposed in order  for  a  subject  to be able  to 
think per se. The metaphysical dependence of a propositional 
mental  event  upon  the  (prior)  existence  of  the  subject’s 
mother is  one which holds independently of  the particular 
content  of  the  given  propositional  mental  event,  and  will 
therefore be insensitive to the content of that propositional 
mental event. The passages from McKinsey thus portray the 
metaphysical interpretation as failing to capture the crucial 
distinction between what conditions must hold for a subject 
to  be  able  to  think,  and  what  conditions  must  hold  for  a 
subject to be able to think the thought that  p.  In this way, 
108 See Kripke (1980) pp. 312-4.
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McKinsey portrays the metaphysical interpretation as failing 
to capture the significance of semantic externalism.
But need the nature of the metaphysical dependencies be 
so general? Could there not be some other objects the 
existence of which were metaphysically necessary for the 
thinking of a given thought, objects which were sensitive to 
the content of the thought in question? Perhaps McKinsey 
simply fails to alight upon the more relevant external objects 
which are metaphysically entailed by a given propositional 
mental event, and which are sensitive to its content. If there 
were such objects, specifying them would presumably give 
more credence to the thought that semantic externalism 
could be interpreted as a metaphysical thesis. Consider 
Susan’s thought that water is a liquid. Susan’s having this 
thought may well metaphysically entail the (prior) existence 
of Susan’s mother. It may also, more interestingly, entail the 
existence of H2O.109 This latter possibility gestures towards a 
metaphysical dependence which is sensitive to the content of 
the relevant thought.110
Suppose, then, that Susan’s thinking that water is a liquid 
metaphysically entails the existence of H2O. That is, that the 
following metaphysical entailment holds.
(SEM1) Susan thinks that water is a liquid ∅ (∃)  H2O.
109 While it may be feasible to alight upon such dependencies for natural 
kind concepts, it is by no means obvious that the same can be said for 
non-natural kind concepts. Since I argued in chapter one that natural 
kind concepts are in fact mediated through the practices of the linguistic 
community, this leaves the prospect that the prima facie plausibility of 
the metaphysical interpretation will not hold for natural kind concepts 
either.
110 What emerges here is an indication of the integral relation between 
the nature of the dependence of a thought on contingent facts about the 
environment, and the nature of the contingent facts upon which that 
thought depends. I deal with the specific entailments in section 3.4 
below.
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It is important not to get hung up on the thought that Susan 
could not have non-empirical knowledge of such a 
metaphysical entailment just because it involves knowledge 
of chemical theory, knowledge which can be gained only via 
empirical investigation. It may be true that Susan does not 
understand the term “H2O”, and that this fact impedes her 
knowing (SEM1). But this cannot be all that the metaphysical 
account amounts to for the following reason. While the left 
hand side of the statement of the entailment must specify 
the concepts Susan employs to think the thought she does, 
the right hand side will happily tolerate substitution of co-
extensional terms. That is, (SEM1) is equivalent to (SEM1’).
(SEM1’) Susan thinks that water is a liquid ∅ (∃)  water.
The metaphysical interpretation of semantic externalism, if it 
is to side-step the Argument from Privileged Access, has to 
maintain that Susan could no more have non-empirical 
knowledge of (SEM1’) than she could have non-empirical 
knowledge of (SEM1). And her lack of knowledge of (SEM1’) 
certainly cannot be due to her ignorance of chemical theory, 
since knowledge of (SEM’) need involve no knowledge of 
chemical theory. The crucial reason that Susan should not be 
taken to have non-empirical knowledge of (SEM’), on the 
metaphysical interpretation, is that the entailment itself is 
knowable only empirically. 
I must confess that I find it hard to believe that semantic 
externalism is an empirical theory. For one thing, the fact that 
semantic externalism is established by thought experiments 
might be thought to tell against its status as an empirical 
theory. However, this is not conclusive. Scientists have 
variously used thought experiments as a means to 
establishing empirical theories.111 Still, such thought 
experiments as have been used in science are subject to 
empirical testing, and will be rejected if the empirical 
evidence is found consistently to tell against them. In the 
111 For an interesting account of the use of thought experiments in 
science see the fascinating Brown (1991).
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case of semantic externalism, it is hard to see what kind of 
empirical evidence would refute it.112
Although endorsing some form of metaphysical 
interpretation may have the consequence that the Argument 
from Privileged Access poses no genuine challenge to 
semantic externalism, in the end I agree with McKinsey that 
the relevant entailments between thought and environment 
we ought to be considering are conceptual entailments.
..., to say that the [propositional mental event] is 
wide is not to say something that is true by virtue 
of [the subject’s] nature or the nature of the 
particular event  ... . Rather it is to say something 
about the concept ... that is expressed by the 
English predicate ‘x is thinking that [p]’; it is to 
say something about what it means to say that a 
given person is thinking that [p]. (McKinsey, 1991 
p. 14 original emphasis) 
So from now on I will treat semantic externalism as a 
conceptual thesis. The Argument from Privileged Access 
therefore poses a prima facie worry for the semantic 
externalist who wishes to endorse the claim of privileged 
access. The next important step is to resolve the nature of 
the specific environmental conditions upon which a given 
thought depends, ones to which the content of the thought in 
question are sensitive.
3.4 The second crucial issue: the proposition E
I have argued that semantic externalism should be 
interpreted as a conceptual thesis. What remains to be 
determined is which environmental conditions are 
112 Noonan has argued that in any particular case, the status of a 
psychological state as object-dependent is “not ... that of an a priori 
knowable conceptual necessity, but rather that of a merely a posteriori 
knowable Kripkean metaphysical necessity”. (Noonan, 1993 p. 284). 
However, the kind of object-dependence he has in mind here is not the 
kind of object-dependence referred to, if any, in the thesis of semantic 
externalism.
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conceptually implied by any given thought content. Let us 
take as an example Susan’s thought that water is a liquid. 
Thinking back to McKinsey’s argument, the question now is 
whether there is some E which will be both deducible non-
empirically from the fact that Susan thinks that water is a 
liquid, and such as to ensure that non-empirical knowledge of 
E is implausible. The proposition E is subject to two 
constraints. First, the environmental conditions which it states 
must be necessary to determining the content of Susan’s 
thought that water is a liquid. Second, its truth must be 
conceptually entailed by Susan’s thinking that water is a 
liquid.
Anthony Brueckner113 has maintained that there is no such 
E. He thus defends semantic externalism against the 
Argument from Privileged Access by denying that the 
McKinsey recipe can be satisfied. Brueckner considers various 
possibilities for the content of the proposition E, and suggests 
the following.
(E1) [Susan] inhabits an environment containing H2O and 
not XYZ
If (E1) gave the content of the proposition E, then the 
semantic externalist would be in trouble, in line with the 
general McKinsey argument, since it is indeed implausible to 
maintain that Susan could have non-empirical knowledge of 
the conditions specified in (E1). However, as Brueckner points 
out, (E1) cannot be the correct interpretation of the content 
of the proposition E. (E1) satisfies neither of the two requisite 
constraints. The environmental conditions which it states are 
not specific to determining the content of Susan’s thought, 
and neither is it conceptually entailed by her thought. 
Brueckner’s objection to (E1) is related to its failing to satisfy 
the first of these constraints.
The environmental conditions which it states are not those 
upon which Susan’s thought depends, since it is false that 
every environment in which Susan could think that water is a 
liquid is a world containing H2O. Burge, for example, 
113 Brueckner (1992).
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maintains that “it is logically possible for an individual to 
have beliefs involving the concept of water ... even though 
there is no water ... of which the individual holds those 
beliefs”114. According to Burge, then, an individual can come to 
have water thoughts in ways other than being in causal 
contact with H2O. The worry would be that in such a waterless 
world, nothing in the individual’s environment would license 
the ascription of water thoughts as opposed to twater 
thoughts, or any other counterfactually possible thoughts. 
Burge claims, however, that if the individual were part of a 
linguistic community “there might ... be enough in the 
community’s talk to distinguish the notion of water from that 
of twater and from other candidate notions”115. This would 
depend both on the community having sufficiently 
sophisticated chemical theory, and on the existence in their 
world of enough physical entities to guarantee reference for 
some of their theoretical terms. According to Burge, the 
correct attribution of psychological states has to have some 
grounding in physical objects in the individual’s world, so that 
reference can be secured. In this particular case, for instance, 
hydrogen and oxygen may have to exist, even though they 
do not combine in the subject’s world to form water. Thus the 
existence of water-thoughts in a world with no water, but in 
which scientists theorised about H2O, would be contingent 
upon the assumption that “not all of the community’s beliefs 
involve similar illusions”116. Burge’s idea seems to be that in 
such a waterless world, there must exist enough physical 
entities to fix an appropriate content for the community’s 
theoretical sentences and psychological states.
Burge does not explicitly consider the possibility of a 
solitary chemical theoretician. There is no reason to believe, 
however, that Burge would deny such a solitary figure the 
ability to entertain thoughts about water, given the same 
114 Burge (1982) p. 114.
115 Burge (1982) p. 116.
116 Burge (1982) p. 116, original emphasis. The term “illusion” here is 
misleading. Strictly speaking there need be no illusion involved. Rather, 
the terms do not refer to items in the relevant world under consideration.
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proviso as was made for the waterless community, that not 
all of his thoughts involve similar illusions. What Burge denies 
is that an ‘ignorant’ and ‘indifferent’ individual could think 
water thoughts if neither water nor other people exist.
What seems incredible is to suppose that [Oscar], 
in his relative ignorance and indifference about 
the nature of water, holds beliefs whose contents 
involve the notion, even though neither water nor 
communal cohorts exist.117 (Burge, 1982, p. 116, 
emphasis added)
These considerations lead Brueckner to modify his statement 
of the environmental conditions which are entailed by 
Susan’s thought. For the moment I will postpone discussion of 
these modifications, set out below as (N), since it still 
remains to explain why (E1) fails to satisfy the second 
constraint, that it be conceptually entailed by Susan’s 
thought.
With regard to the second constraint, then, there are two 
reasons why (E1) is not conceptually entailed by Susan’s 
thought. First, it is simply not of the right form. Any 
proposition which is to follow conceptually from the fact that 
Susan has the thought that water is a liquid, must have the 
same structure as the proposition that Susan thinks that 
water is a liquid. That is, the right hand side of the entailment 
must match up with the left hand side of the entailment.118 
This constraint is respected by both of the following.
(SEC1) Susan thinks that water is a liquid as opposed to 
that twater is a liquid ∅ (∃)  H2O and ¬ (∃)  XYZ.
117 As Burge sets up the example, it is stipulated that the subject knows 
no chemical theory. Hence, Burge has no immediate interest in the case 
of the solitary chemical theoretician.
118 This is not a genuine feature of entailment. Clearly, the following are 
all conceptual entailments.
p ∅ p
p ∅ ¬ ( ¬ p)
p ∅ (p v q)
The point is rather to do with the notion of a relevant alternative.
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(SEC1’) Susan thinks that water is a liquid ∅ (∃)  H2O.
So which one of these should we choose? Brueckner chooses 
the former. He focuses on the notion of a relevant alternative, 
and hence suggests that the proposition entailed by Susan’s 
thought must state the environmental conditions which 
determine that thought to be a water thought as opposed to 
a twater thought. However, according to (PA), privileged 
access to a given thought does not require the ruling out of 
various possible alternative thoughts. Not realising this was 
the mistake of the Content Sceptic’s Argument. Hence, 
(SEC1’) must be chosen above (SEC1). 
The second reason for rejecting (E1) is as follows. 
Knowledge of (E1), stated in those terms, depends upon 
knowledge of chemical theory, which is knowable only via 
empirical investigation. Since we are dealing with conceptual 
entailment, both sides of the statement of the entailment 
must specify the concepts Susan employs to think the 
thought she does. The statement of the entailment must be 
sensitive to the way in which the entailment is specified.
Brueckner’s reasons for denying that (E1) correctly 
captures the conditions which are entailed by Susan’s 
thought - that a subject can think about water without living 
in a world with H2O - lead him to the following formula.
(N) It is necessary that if S is thinking that water is wet, 
then either
(i) water exists, or
(ii) S theorises119 that H2O exists, or
(iii) S is part of a community of speakers some 
of whom theorise that H2O exists. (Brueckner, 
1992 p. 116)120
119 Burge emphasises that for one to theorise about water, for instance, 
one must be in appropriate causal relations to other particular substances 
that enable one accurately to theorise about water. Burge (1988) p. 653.
120 While it seems correct to maintain that not every environment in 
which a subject can think that water is a liquid is a world containing 
H2O, it is by no means obvious. Burge states that “thinking that water is 
not fit to drink is different from thinking that H2O is not fit to drink” 
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This, however, is of no more use in the McKinsey recipe than 
(E1), for the same reasons as those given against (E1). 
Brueckner maintains that (N) is knowable only empirically.
Burge’s anti-individualism does not commit him 
to the view that Oscar can know [non-empirically] 
that either (i), or (ii), or (iii) is true, even if Burge’s 
theory does have the consequence that the 
disjunction in question is metaphysically 
necessitated by the proposition (knowable [non-
empirically] by Oscar) that Oscar is thinking that 
water is wet. (Brueckner, 1992 p. 116, original 
emphasis)
Brueckner goes on to determine whether there is some 
interesting proposition, less specific than (N), of which a 
subject could have non-empirical knowledge on the 
assumption that he has privileged access to his thoughts. He 
(Burge, 1979 p. 76). Two concepts can be distinguished; a water concept, 
and an H2O concept. It is of course possible, although perhaps not 
necessary, that a subject’s water concept and a subject’s H2O concept 
get fixed by the very same stuff. Now, consider Susan, who lives in the 
actual world prior to any chemical theorising. For any thought Susan 
were to have about water, it would involve a water concept, and not an 
H2O concept, which is, in her state of ignorance, unavailable to her. What 
about Susan*, who, in her waterless lonely world, theorises about H2O? 
Would the situation not be precisely reversed? It could be argued, in 
broad agreement with Church, that only one concept is available to 
Susan* when she entertains thoughts about water, that concept being an 
H2O concept, and precisely not a water concept. Now consider Susan**, 
who, while living in a waterless world and being ignorant of chemical 
theory, is a member of a community some of whom theorise about H2O. 
Presumably she is in the same position as Susan*, in that the concept 
which features in her water thoughts is dependent on the concept had by 
the chemists in her community. Her concept is determined by deference. 
These considerations seem to suggest that Susan, Susan*, and Susan** 
could not be attributed the very same thought content. While this line of 
reasoning is not conclusive, it does urge caution about whether or not a 
subject in a waterless world could really have a water concept.
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reasons as follows. Semantic externalism tells us that in order 
for a subject to be attributed a water thought, there must be 
enough in that subject’s world to rule out the attribution to 
him of various possible twin thoughts. It further tells us that 
the candidates for such content-determining states of affairs 
are physical entities distinct from the subject in question. As 
a result, Brueckner comes up with the following proposition 
as one which may be knowable a priori, if semantic 
externalism is true.
(E2) It is necessary that if Oscar is thinking that water is 
wet, then there exist some physical entities distinct from 
Oscar.
Brueckner maintains that even if (E2) can be known non-
empirically, a subject can still at best know that his 
environment contains physical entities sufficient to fix the 
contents of his thoughts; which sorts of entities are required 
remaining to be settled empirically. He seems to disagree 
with McKinsey in regarding this is an acceptable 
consequence.
McKinsey says that ‘you obviously can’t [have 
non-empirical knowledge] that the external world 
exists’ [(1991 p. 16)]. This does seem obvious if 
the alleged ... knowledge is said to contain much 
detail concerning the character of the external 
world distinct from oneself. But if the alleged ... 
knowledge is simply knowledge that something or 
other physical exists distinct from oneself, it is not 
obvious that such knowledge is impossible. 
(Brueckner, 1992 p. 118, original emphasis)
It is by no means obvious, however, that the “weak” 
conclusion which Brueckner would be willing to accept ought 
to be regarded as acceptable. It is at least a point of 
contention.121 Further, I do not accept that the weak 
conclusion is the only non-empirical knowledge a subject 
121 One possibility might be to deny that “the world exists” is really an 
empirical statement. I deal with this issue more fully in my discussion of 
Putnam and Wright in chapter six.
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could gain if semantic externalism and privileged access were 
both accepted. Brueckner has made the mistake, identified in 
the discussion above concerning McKinsey, of failing to 
acknowledge all the entailments between a thought and the 
environmental conditions necessary for that thought. In the 
next section, it will become apparent that knowledge of 
semantic externalism, together with privileged access to a 
thought, can yield non-empirical knowledge of specific facts 
about the external world; knowledge which is prima facie 
implausible.
3.5 Brown’s elaboration of the McKinsey recipe
In this section I will be concerned with an elaboration of 
McKinsey’s argument, presented by Jessica Brown122. Brown 
claims, contra Brueckner, that there is indeed some 
proposition E which will be both deducible non-empirically 
from the fact that Susan thinks that water is a liquid, and 
such as to ensure that non-empirical knowledge of E is 
implausible. In other words, Brown argues that the McKinsey 
recipe can be satisfied.123
Brown rightly stresses that any entailment between mind 
and world of which a subject can be supposed to have non-
empirical knowledge must not draw on application conditions 
of concepts of which that subject is ignorant. For example, if 
a subject does not know that something is water if and only if 
it is H2O, she could not know the following entailment.
(P) Necessarily, if x has a thought involving the concept of 
water, and x is agnostic about the application conditions of 
water, then either x is in an environment which contains 
H2O, or x is part of a community which has a term ‘water’ 
which applies to something if and only if it is H2O. (Brown, 
1995 p. 152)
122 Brown (1995).
123 Brown follows McKinsey in taking what I have called the Argument 
from Privileges Access as an ad hominem charge of inconsistency against 
Burge.
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However, Brown claims that an entailment between mind and 
world can be formulated which does not require a subject to 
know the chemical composition of water; that is, a 
formulation which does not appeal to facts which the subject 
could know only via empirical investigation. Brown gives the 
following general formula.
(Q) Necessarily, if x has a thought involving the concept of 
a natural kind k, and x is agnostic about the application 
conditions of the concept of k, then either x is in an 
environment which contains k, or x is part of a community 
with the concept of k. (Brown, 1995 p. 152)
In the water example, the specific instance of this formula 
would be,
(P’) Necessarily, if x has a thought involving the concept of 
water, and x is agnostic about the application conditions of 
water, then either x is in an environment which contains 
water, or x is part of a community with the concept of 
water.
(Q) deals with mind-world entailments for natural kind 
concepts only. The question is whether it allows a subject to 
gain non-empirical knowledge of her environment. In order 
for a subject to be able to use (Q) to gain non-empirical 
knowledge about her environment, she would have to know 
non-empirically that the antecedent of (Q) was satisfied. That 
is, she would have to be able to replace “x” by “I”, and “k” by 
a term referring to a natural kind. However, this would 
require non-empirical knowledge of the status of one’s 
concept as a natural kind concept. Is such knowledge 
available non-empirically? 
It is plausible to maintain that the status of a concept as a 
natural kind concept is determined by some combination of 
the physical nature of the world and the intentions of the 
linguistic community. It is consequently plausible to maintain 
that the status of a concept as a natural kind concept is not 
something of which a subject could have non-empirical 
knowledge. If this is correct, (Q) cannot be used by a subject 
to gain non-empirical knowledge of contingent external facts, 
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since the antecedent of (Q) can itself be known only 
empirically.124
However, Brown maintains that a similar formula which 
deals with mind-world entailments for non-natural kind 
concepts can also be formulated. For this she draws on the 
idea that the attribution to a subject of a specific concept 
requires that there be some fact which determines that that 
concept is the one that should be attributed, as opposed to 
some other similar concept. This idea is evident in Burge’s 
statement, given above, that for an ignorant subject without 
water or communal cohorts, there is nothing licensing the 
attribution of water thoughts as opposed to thoughts about 
any other possible substance indistinguishable for the 
subject.125 Brown reasons as follows.
Imagine that Oscar is agnostic about the 
application of the word, “sofa”. For example, he 
may apply it firmly and correctly to what we call 
“sofas”, but be unsure about whether it also 
applies to broad single-seat armchairs. According 
to Burge, if Oscar is part of an English speaking 
community then, despite his agnosticism, he has 
thoughts involving the concept sofa. But if, 
counterfactually, Oscar had been part of a 
community in which “sofa” is applied both to 
what we call “sofas” and to broad single-seat 
armchairs, then Oscar would have had chofa 
thoughts, where the concept of a chofa applies 
both to what we call “sofas” and to broad single-
seat armchairs, ... . Now imagine that there are 
no other speakers in Oscar’s environment. How 
could Oscar have propositional attitudes involving 
the concept of sofa? Since sofa is not a natural 
kind concept, Oscar’s natural environment cannot 
help him to acquire the concept. There are no 
other speakers. Nothing seems to show that his 
attitudes involve the concept of sofa as opposed 
to chofa. (Brown, 1995 p. 153)
124 For more on the difference between natural kind concepts and non-
natural kind concepts see McGinn (1989) especially pp. 30-6.
125 See also Burge (1979) pp. 77-83.
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Thus Brown formulates the following for non-natural kind 
concepts.
(R) Necessarily, if x has a thought involving a non-natural 
kind concept n, and x is agnostic about the application 
conditions of n, then x is part of a community which has 
the concept n. (Brown, 1995 p.154)
However, (R) can no more be used to gain non-empirical 
knowledge of the environment than (Q). The categories of 
“natural kind concept” and “non-natural kind concept” are 
jointly exhaustive. If a subject’s knowledge that a given 
concept is a natural kind concept must be empirical 
knowledge, so must her knowledge that a concept is a non-
natural kind concept. Hence it would seem that the 
antecedent of (R), just like the antecedent of (Q), can be 
known only empirically.
However, the conjunction of (Q) and (R) together yield the 
following further principle (S).
(S) Necessarily, if x has a thought involving a concept c, 
and x is agnostic about the application conditions of c, 
then either x is in an environment which contains 
instances of c and c is a natural kind concept, or x is part 
of a community which has the concept c, whether or not c 
is a natural kind concept. (Brown, 1995 pp. 154-5)
On the  assumption  that  a  subject  can  have  non-empirical 
knowledge  of  (Q)  and  (R),  she  can  likewise  have  non-
empirical knowledge of (S); and, unlike the antecedents of 
(Q) and (R), a subject  can have non-empirical knowledge of 
the antecedent of (S).  Hence (S) can be used by a subject 
who has privileged access to the content of a propositional 
mental  event  to  gain  non-empirical  knowledge  of  her 
environment.
The  consequent  of  (S),  then,  is  a  schema  for  the 
proposition E in the McKinsey recipe. Taking the example of 
a  subject’s  thought that  water  is  wet,  the  schema can be 
filled in to yield the following specific proposition E of which 
a subject could have non-empirical knowledge.
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(T) Either my environment contains water and the concept 
of water is a natural kind term, or I am part of a 
community which has the concept of water.
That such information is available to a subject without 
recourse to empirical investigation contradicts the claim 
embodied in (EC), that one can have only empirical 
knowledge of the external facts which individuate one’s 
thoughts.
3.6 Tye and McLaughlin
Tye and McLaughlin have tried to block Brown’s argument by 
denying that semantic externalism is committed to (R). They 
argue that one cannot have non-empirical knowledge of (R), 
since (R) is false. If this is correct, neither can one have non-
empirical knowledge of (S), since the truth of (S) depends on 
the truth both of (Q) and of (R). Hence if (R) is false there 
would be no non-empirical route to contingent facts about the 
environment, and the Argument from Privileged Access would 
be fallacious. What does their claim that (R) is false amount 
to?
Tye and McLaughlin make two claims in support of their 
view that (R) is false. First, they claim that a subject could 
have a non-natural kind concept without being a member of a 
linguistic community. I agree that this is plausible. However, 
what would need to be the case for (R) to be false is not 
simply that a subject could have a non-natural kind concept 
without being a member of a linguistic community, but rather 
that a subject could be attributed a non-natural kind concept 
without being a member of a linguistic community, even 
though that subject is unable to apply her concept correctly.
It should be stressed that the kind of ignorance which is at 
issue here is ignorance of a kind which could not be resolved 
by the subject gaining more information about the object 
concerned.126 For example, suppose Susan was wondering 
126 The caveat “... other than information which exploits the concept 
under discussion ...” is necessary, since Oscar could resolve every issue 
of whether a given object α fell under a concept φ simply by being told, by 
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whether or not Oscar had a wooden leg, but was too shy to 
ask. Here we have a case in which Susan is unable to apply 
her concept correctly. However, the issue could be resolved 
simply by Susan gaining more information about the object 
concerned - while Oscar was sleeping, for instance. Crucially, 
Susan’s ignorance stems from her lack of perceptual 
knowledge, and is not purely a product of semantic 
ignorance. The kind of ignorance which Tye and McLaughlin 
need to allow for is, however, purely semantic ignorance. 
According to their position, it must be possible for a subject to 
possess a given concept which she is unable to apply 
correctly to a given object, even though she is in an ideal 
perceptual position with regard to that object. This is what I 
claim is implausible.
The following scenario might be thought to favour Tye and 
McLaughlin’s position, and hence be raised as an objection to 
my position. Suppose there is a subject who lives, and has 
always lived, alone on an island. Call him Solo. Suppose 
further that from time to time there is a food shortage, and 
Solo has to go for a number of days with no food. To refer to 
those times of hardship which last for more than four days, 
Solo introduces the term “longfast”. Now suppose that, at 
some time later, and having gone without food for four days, 
Solo wonders whether or not he is in a period of longfast. 
Solo’s deliberation in this instance comes not from any lack of 
knowledge of the length of time for which he has not eaten, 
since he always records such things faithfully. Solo’s 
deliberation comes rather from the fact that he can no longer 
remember whether he introduced the term “longfast” to 
apply to periods of more than four days or to periods of more 
than three days. Solo is aware of the fact that if the latter is 
correct he is in a period of longfast, but if the former is 
correct he is not yet in a period of longfast.
It looks, then, as if we have exactly the kind of scenario 
which I maintain is implausible: that is, a scenario in which a 
solitary subject has a non-natural kind concept even though 
that subject is unable to apply his concept correctly, and that 
a sincere and knowledgeable subject, that α was φ,  or that α was not φ.  
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not through any perceptual inadequacies. However, on closer 
examination it will be seen that this is not so. The example is 
one in which the crucial notion of deference is used. While it 
is true that Solo does not defer to a linguistic community 
consisting of current subjects other than himself, he 
nevertheless defers, on this view, to a subject other than his 
present self, namely his past self, the introducer of the term 
“longfast”. This response depends upon the notion of 
deference being the crucial notion employed by semantic 
externalism, rather than the notion of a current linguistic 
community.
I maintain that the attribution of any non-natural kind 
concept to an independent subject will depend upon the 
subject’s knowing the application conditions of that concept. 
If this is correct, (R) will stand up against the Tye and 
McLaughlin’s first claim, so long as a subject can be assumed 
to have non-empirical knowledge, at least some of the time, 
of whether or not she can apply her concept correctly, and 
this I see no reason to dispute.
The second claim that Tye and McLaughlin make in support 
of their view that (R) is false is that, in establishing (R), Brown 
commits herself to the claim that Oscar actually has a non-
natural kind concept. But this cannot be right. At most, the 
wording of the example is misleading. The fact that Oscar in 
his actual linguistic community has the concept sofa, and that 
counterfactual Oscar in the counterfactual linguistic 
community would have the concept chofa, does not obviously 
falsify the claim that Oscar in a counterfactual solitary world 
could be attributed no relevantly similar concept. Clearly, it is 
not Oscar-as-he-is who is under consideration, but a 
counterpart of Oscar who has always been in the solitary 
situation.127 The question, then, is what concept Tye and 
McLaughlin believe can be attributed to that counterpart of 
Oscar.
127 It is easier to take the extreme example of a subject who has always 
been alone in his world, since this avoids issues such as whether a 
subject could keep a non-natural kind concept after a long period of time 
after travelling to an otherwise uninhabited world.
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Twin Earth thought experiments involving natural kind 
concepts differ from those involving non-natural kind 
concepts in one important respect. In the former type of 
example, we are presented with subjects who, because of the 
physical difference in their environment, have distinct, 
mutually exclusive concepts, referring to distinct sets of 
instances. Susan can have water thoughts but not twater 
thoughts; and the instances her concept ranges over are 
necessarily distinct from the instances over which her twin’s 
concept ranges. In the latter type of case, on the other hand, 
the referents of the actual concepts, say sofa, or arthritis, 
constitute a subset of the referents of the twin concept, 
chofa, or tharthritis respectively. Oscar and twin Oscar can 
refer to the very same object by means of their distinct 
concepts. The difference is that twin Oscar can refer to more 
with his concept than Oscar can with his. It is perhaps this 
idea that a non-natural kind concept and its twin concepts 
form a hierarchical set which leads Tye and McLaughlin to 
attribute a concept to solitary Oscar: he at least has one of 
the possible concepts in the hierarchy. However, it seems that 
for any concept we could attribute to solitary Oscar, there is 
no reason to attribute him that concept as opposed to any of 
the other possible concepts constituting the relevant 
hierarchy. If that is the case, it is implausible to attribute him 
with any one of the concepts in the relevant range, since any 
specific attribution would be completely arbitrary. The only 
alternative would be to stipulate that solitary Oscar be 
attributed with either the least inclusive concept, or the most 
inclusive concept. But this is implausible. First, the attribution 
would be just as arbitrary; and second, it is not clear that 
there are concepts at either end of the range.
Semantic externalism, at least as endorsed by Burge, is 
committed to (R). Hence, semantic externalism is prima facie 
committed to the claim that a subject could come to have 
non-empirical knowledge of (S), knowledge which, together 
with privileged access to her thought-contents, can be used 
to gain knowledge of the external world via conceptual 
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analysis and introspection alone. This is inconsistent with 
(EC).
3.7 Conclusion
The Argument from Privileged Access demonstrates that from 
the conjunction of semantic externalism and privileged 
access, one can generate specific arguments such as the one 
below. I will refer to such arguments as instance arguments, 
since they take one from an instance of a thought to a 
contingent fact about the external world.
(1) I am thinking a water-thought
(2) If I’m thinking a water-thought, then I’m in a 
water-world
therefore (3) I’m in a water-world.
It is a necessary condition for a subject’s being in a water-
world that the following disjunction be true. Either the 
subject’s environment contains water and water is a natural 
kind, or the subject is part of a community which has the 
concept of water, whether or not water is a natural kind.128 
Given that introspection can yield knowledge of premise (1), 
and conceptual analysis can yield knowledge of premise (2), 
it would seem that if semantic externalism is true, the 
conclusion (3) can be known on the basis of introspection and 
conceptual analysis alone. This contradicts the plausible 
claim embodied in (EC). 
Hence the Argument from Privileged Access urges the 
rejection of one of the following theses.
(PA) For all x, if x believes that she thinks that p, then x 
thinks that p.
128 It may be objected that there are other disjuncts which have not been 
taken into account. However, if semantic externalism is a conceptual 
thesis, non-empirical knowledge of all the disjuncts will be available. That 
a complete set has not yet been put forward would tell at most against 
the current state of our knowledge, and not at all against the Argument 
from Privileged Access.
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(SE) x’s thinking that p necessarily depends upon 
contingent facts about her environment.
(EC) x could not have non-empirical knowledge of 
contingent facts about her environment.
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World
I cannot resist a methodological reflection. It may 
happen  that  one  is  committed  to  delivering  a 
paper and that one discovers, at the last minute, 
and  to  one’s  horror,  that  one’s  theory  has  an 
absurd  consequence,  a  consequence  so  absurd 
that if it is pointed out by a critic it will, without 
further  ado,  be  taken  as  a  refutation  of  one’s 
position.  Now  the  best  thing  to  do  in  this 
deplorable situation is to point out the disastrous 
consequence  oneself,  before  anyone  else  can 
notice it, and to embrace it. (Schiffer, 1987 p. 80)
4.1 Introduction
In chapter three, I set up what I have termed the  Argument 
from  Privileged  Access.  The  Argument  demonstrates  that 
from the conjunction of semantic externalism and privileged 
access to a thought, one can generate an instance argument 
such as the one below.
(1) I am thinking a water-thought
(2) If I’m thinking a water-thought, then I’m in a 
water-world
therefore (3) I’m in a water-world.129
As we have seen, knowledge of the premises is non-empirical 
knowledge. Privileged access yields knowledge of premise (1), 
and  conceptual  analysis  yields  knowledge  of  premise  (2). 
Consequently, it would seem that a subject could gain non-
empirical  knowledge  of  contingent  facts  about  her 
environment.
129 It  is  important  to remember that it  is  a necessary condition for a 
subject’s being in a water-world that the following disjunction be true. 
Either the subject’s environment contains water and water is a natural 
kind,  or the subject  is  part  of  a community  which has the concept of 
water, whether or not water is a natural kind.
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The Argument from Privileged Access, then, puts pressure 
on anyone who wishes to maintain the following three theses.
(PA) For all  x, if  x believes that she thinks that  p, then x 
thinks that p.
(SE)  x’s  thinking  that  p necessarily  depends  upon 
contingent facts about her environment.
(EC)  x could  not  have  non-empirical  knowledge  of 
contingent facts about her environment.
Responses to the Argument have thus far taken one of two 
lines. Proponents of semantic internalism have claimed that 
the derivation of empirical knowledge from introspection and 
conceptual  analysis  constitutes  a  reductio ad absurdum  of 
semantic externalism.130 Proponents of semantic externalism, 
accepting that such a derivation  would constitute a  reductio 
of their position, have expended their time and energy trying 
to show that no such derivation is possible.131 I call those who 
take the first  line  incompatibilists,  and those who take the 
second  line  compatibilists.  It  is  their  dislike  of  instance 
arguments which they have in common. In this chapter I will 
examine a number of compatibilist responses, explaining why 
each  ultimately  fails.  I  will  then  offer  a  solution  which 
disagrees with the standard divide of the debate; one which 
challenges the common assumption behind the debate.  My 
position is that the conjunction of semantic externalism and 
privileged access does indeed have the consequence that one 
can  come  to  know  truths  about  one’s  environment  via 
introspection and conceptual analysis. In this respect I am in 
accord with the incompatibilists. However, I maintain that this 
consequence should in fact be embraced, and in this respect 
my  position  falls  squarely  within  the  compatibilist  camp.  I 
argue  that  inferences  from  introspective  knowledge  to 
empirical  knowledge  are  not  to  be  seen  as  intrinsically 
130 See  McKinsey  (1991)  and  (1994),  Brown  (1995),  and  Boghossian 
(1997).
131 See Brueckner (1992) and (1994), Warfield (1992), Millar (1997), and 
Tye and McLaughlin (1997).
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unacceptable; on the contrary, there is a certain class of such 
inferences  which  are  legitimate,  and  the  Argument  from 
Privileged Access deals only with those inferences which fall 
into this class.
My claim is that we should reject neither  (SE),  semantic 
externalism, nor (PA), the claim of privileged access. Rather, 
taking semantic externalism seriously,  we should reject the 
third  claim,  (EC),  that  we  could  not  have  non-empirical 
knowledge  of  contingent  facts  about  our  environment. 
Instance arguments are to be accepted as a valid means of 
arriving  at  knowledge  of  contingent  facts  about  the 
environment.
4.2 Compatibilist responses
The purpose of this section is to review a number of ways in 
which  it  might  be  thought  that  compatibilists  could  argue 
against  instance  arguments.  As  will  become  clear,  no 
response along these lines is satisfactory.
A  good  argument  can  be  thought  of  as  a  way  of 
transferring  knowledge:  deductive  inference  can  yield 
knowledge  of  a  proposition  if  it  is  validly  inferred  from 
premises  which  are  themselves  known.  One  compatibilist 
response,  then,  would  be  to  deny  that  a  subject  has 
knowledge  of  her  thoughts.  This  would  ensure  that  the 
conclusion of  instance arguments could not be  known.  Is  it 
feasible to maintain that a subject’s judgements concerning 
her  thoughts  somehow  failed  to  be  knowledgeable 
judgements, even in the face of  (PA).  Certainly,  more than 
truth is needed if a judgement is to count as knowledgeable. 
But (PA) yields not just truth, but infallibility. Is it feasible to 
maintain  that  a  subject’s  judgements  concerning  her 
thoughts somehow failed to be knowledgeable even though 
those judgements were infallible?
Consider the following Cartesian scenario. Suppose that in 
the  middle  of  his  meditations,  Descartes  decides  that  the 
project of enquiry upon which he has embarked is proving far 
too difficult,  and that rather than continue on this tortuous 
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path, he will toss a coin. He resolves, in the event of the coin 
landing heads up, to believe that the proposition,  I exist, is 
true, and in the event of its landing tails up, to believe that it 
is  false.  Suppose  further  that  the  coin,  having  duly  been 
thrown  towards  the  heavens,  lands  heads  up.  Descartes, 
according to his resolution, duly believes a proposition which 
could  not  but  be  true;  but  we  would  not,  I  think,  want  to 
accord his belief the status of knowledge, since he could just 
as easily have come to believe the opposite.132 
It would seem, then, that infallibility is no more sufficient 
for knowledge than truth.  What  is missing in the Cartesian 
scenario,  I  take  it,  is  reliability.133 Although  the  proposition, 
whilst thought, could not but be true, the method leading to 
its adoption could just as easily have secured the alternative, 
necessarily  false  belief.  (PA),  however,  differs  from  the 
Cartesian scenario in this very important respect. Reflection 
on (PA) gives a subject a reliable method by which to arrive 
at truths about the thought she is currently entertaining.134 
The only  remaining possibility  of  denying that  a  subject 
could  have  knowledge  of  her  thoughts  appears  to  be  to 
maintain, along with Wittgenstein, that it  makes no sense to 
say of  a  proposition that  it  is  known,  if  that  proposition  is 
guaranteed to  be true135.  On this  account,  infallibility  is  not 
132 For this example I am grateful to John Watling.
133 I am here adopting a reliabilist epistemology. For reliabilist accounts 
of  knowledge  and  justification  see  Armstrong  (1973),  and  Goldman 
(1986).
134 This is not to say that when a subject entertains the proposition  I 
exist she can not know that it is true. Reflection on the nature of the 
proposition will  yield  such knowledge.  The point  is  rather  that  in  the 
situation  described,  Descartes’  belief  would  not  have  counted  as 
knowledge. Similarly, if a subject came to believe that she was thinking of 
water  on  the  basis  of  the  toss  of  a  coin,  her  belief  would  be  true, 
infallible, and yet not known. It is not mere conformity with (PA) which 
yields  knowledge  of  any  given  thought,  but  rational  reflection  on  the 
truth of (PA).
135 Similar  reasoning  is  widespread  with  respect  to  the  status  of  a 
representation:  nothing  can  be  a  representation  unless  it  can 
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insufficient for  knowledge,  rather  it  is  incompatible with 
knowledge. According to Wittgenstein, then, the possibility of 
error  is  a  necessary  condition  for  a  belief  to  count  as 
knowledge.  Thus  the  account  of  privileged access  given to 
accommodate semantic externalism is not, on this view, an 
account  of  self  knowledge,  since  the  possibility  of  error  is 
ruled out.
For the moment, let us set aside particular responses, such 
as Wittgenstein’s, and turn to a positive proposal to the effect 
that  self-ascriptions  must typically  be  knowledgeable. 
Ironically, perhaps, Burge has been concerned to defend such 
a claim.136 Burge does not himself address the problem raised 
by  instance  arguments.  However,  his  claim  that  self-
ascriptions are generally knowledgeable rules out one line of 
response  against  them.  His  defence  of  the  claim  that  a 
subject’s  judgements  about  her  thoughts  must  count  as 
knowledgeable  comes  as  the  second  stage  in  a  three-part 
argument. First, he argues that an epistemic entitlement to 
one’s  second-order  judgements  is  required  for  critical 
reasoning.  Second,  he  argues  for  the  stronger  thesis  that 
critical  reasoning  further  requires  that  one  know one’s 
thoughts. Third, he argues that this knowledge must take a 
distinctive non-observational form. This third stage will be of 
no concern to us here; but an examination of  the first  two 
stages of his argument will prove instructive.
The  notion  of  epistemic  entitlement  is  assumed  to  be 
broader than the ordinary notion of justification.
An individual’s epistemic warrant may consist in a 
justification that the individual has for a belief ... . 
But it may also be an entitlement that consists in 
a  status  of  operating  in  an  appropriate  way  in 
accord  with  norms  of  reason,  even  when  these 
norms cannot be articulated by the individual that 
has that status. We have an entitlement to certain 
perceptual beliefs or to certain logical inferences 
even though we may lack reasons or justification 
for them. (Burge, 1996, p. 93, original emphasis)
misrepresent. 
136 Burge (1996). See also Peacocke (1996).
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The epistemic warrant to much of our self-knowledge is taken 
to be of this sort. Judgements concerning our thoughts often 
lack justifying argument or evidence. They are immediate and 
non-inferential.  The  characteristic  feature  of  the  epistemic 
entitlement to  self-ascriptions  on the semantic  externalist’s 
account  is  that  it  presupposes  understanding,  which 
according  to  semantic  externalism  is  local  to  a  given 
environment,  and  yet  the  entitlement  itself  is  capable  of 
surviving environmental switches.
Burge’s argument for our epistemic entitlement to our self-
ascriptions runs as follows,
... if one lacked entitlement to judgements about 
one’s  attitudes,  there  could  be  no  norms  of 
reason  governing  how one  ought  check,  weigh, 
overturn, confirm reasons or reasoning. For if one 
lacked  entitlement  to  judgements  about  one’s 
attitudes,  one  could  not  be  subject  to  rational 
norms  governing  how  one  ought  to  alter  those 
attitudes given that one had reflected on them. If 
reflection  provided  no  reason-endorsed 
judgements  about  the  attitudes,  the  rational 
connection between the attitudes reflected upon 
and the  reflection would  be broken.  So reasons 
could not  apply  to  how the  attitudes  should  be 
changed, suspended, or confirmed on the basis of 
reasoning  depending  on  such  reflection.  But 
critical reasoning just is reasoning in which norms 
of  reason  apply  to  how  attitudes  should  be 
affected  partly  on  the  basis  of  reasoning  that 
derives from judgments about one’s attitudes. So 
one must have an epistemic entitlement to one’s 
attitudes. (Burge, 1996 pp. 101-2)
Burge  argues  that  the  self-ascriptions  to  which  we  are 
epistemically entitled should be regarded as knowledgeable 
since systematic error and Gettier-type counterexamples are 
impossible. Systematic error is ruled out because reflection 
could not add a rational element to the complex process of 
critical  evaluation  and  subsequent  action  unless  reflective 
judgements were normally true.  Similarly,  if  reflection were 
connected to the truth of such judgements in an accidental 
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way,  the  entitlement  itself  would  be  undermined.  Critical 
reasoning would not be possible if reflective judgements were 
either  systematically  false,  or  true  in  an  accidental,  non-
knowledge-yielding  way.  Critical  reasoning  is  not  only 
possible, but is a commonplace occurrence. Critical reasoning 
requires knowledge of our thoughts. Therefore, we must have 
knowledge of our thoughts.
There is a question as to whether the account of privileged 
access embodied in  (PA)  provides a sufficiently rich form of 
knowledge to bear any connection with the sort of complex 
rational  reflection  on  one’s  beliefs  that  concerns  Burge. 
However, denying the compatibilist this line of response does 
not depend upon accepting Burge’s reasoning here.  (PA) by 
itself  provides  sufficient  reason  to  attribute  a  subject  with 
knowledge of her thoughts.
One further response runs as follows. While it is generally 
held  that  arguments  provide  a  means  by  which  to  gain 
knowledge, certain exceptions have been acknowledged. For 
instance, Robert Nozick’s counterfactual theory of knowledge 
has  the  consequence  that  knowledge  is  not  closed  under 
known entailment.137 This is supposedly shown by arguments 
such as the following.
(1’) I am working at my desk
(2’) If I am working at my desk then I am not a 
brain-in-a-vat
therefore (3’) I am not a brain-in-a-vat
According to Nozick’s counterfactual theory, (1’) and (2’) can 
be known, but (3’) cannot be known as a result of knowing 
(1’) and (2’). The principle of closure under known entailment 
will  fail  only  in  cases  where  the  relevant  propositions  are 
assessed  relative  to  different  sets  of  possible  worlds. 
However,  it  is  implausible  to maintain that  the principle  of 
closure under known entailment fails for instance arguments 
for  this reason,  since there is little prospect of  maintaining 
137 See Nozick (1981).
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that  the  premises  and  the  conclusion  should  be  assessed 
relative to different sets of possible worlds.
Claiming that the conclusion of instance arguments are not 
known does  not,  I  think,  allow  one  to  side-step  the  real 
problem  posed  by  the  Argument  from  Privileged  Access. 
Those worried by the Argument will surely take little comfort 
in the response that one cannot  know the conclusion of an 
instance argument, since it is worrying enough that by using 
such instance arguments we always come to have true beliefs 
about our environment. Moreover,  we can know that this is 
so. The potency of the Argument from Privileged Access does 
not  turn  solely  on  whether  or  not  we  can  know the 
conclusions  of  instance  arguments.  Having  the  means  to 
arrive systematically at true beliefs about our environment is 
surely bad enough.
Personally, I find it highly implausible to maintain that the 
conclusions of instance arguments are not known, given that 
they  provide  one  with  a  reliable  method  of  obtaining  true 
beliefs. I see no reason to deny a subject epistemic warrant 
for  believing  the  conclusion  of  an  instance  argument.  If  a 
subject knows that she can systematically  come to believe 
true  propositions,  what  more  epistemic  warrant  could  be 
needed? The epistemic warrant for holding the belief that I 
am  in  a  water-world  comes  from  my  knowledge  that  this 
belief was reasoned to by way of a reliable method. Hence 
the Argument from Privileged Access stands.
4.3 Instance arguments reconsidered
Compatibilists have made no headway in responding to the 
Argument  from  Privileged  Access by  criticising  instance 
arguments.  The  Argument  establishes  that  if  semantic 
externalism  is  true,  and  privileged  access  possible, 
substantial knowledge of empirical facts can be inferred from 
introspective knowledge and conceptual  analysis.  I  want  to 
argue  that  this  should  be  embraced  as  a  natural  and 
acceptable  extension  of  semantic  externalism.  The  claim 
which ought to be rejected is the claim embodied in (EC).
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My  vindication  of  instance  arguments  will  take  the 
following  line.  First,  I  will  explain  why  it  is  that  instance 
arguments deliver truths about one’s environment. Second, I 
will  identify  a  causal  feature  which  is  generally  lacking  in 
inferences  from  introspective  knowledge  to  empirical 
knowledge,  the  lack  of  which  renders  such  inferences 
unacceptable.  That  is,  inferences  from  introspective 
knowledge  to  empirical  knowledge  are  not  to  be  seen  as 
intrinsically unacceptable,  rather  they  should  be  seen  as 
unacceptable only in so far as they lack the necessary causal 
feature  which  would,  were  it  present,  justify  any  such 
inference.  Finally,  I  will  show  that  semantic  externalism 
ensures  the  presence  of  this  necessary  causal  feature  in 
instance  arguments,  and  therefore  that  the  inference  from 
introspective knowledge to  empirical  knowledge is  in  these 
cases acceptable. In this way I will disarm the Argument from 
Privileged Access.
How is it,  then, that instance arguments can without fail 
deliver  truths  about  the  subject’s  environment?  (PA) is  a 
principle of privileged access to one’s thoughts. Since it would 
be  impossible  to  know  the  content  of  a  thought  without 
knowing which concepts occurred in that thought, the claim 
that  a  subject  has  privileged  access  to  her  concepts  is 
entailed by the claim that a subject has privileged access to 
her thoughts. This entailment is important for the argument 
which follows.138
Concept-acquisition,  on  the  semantic  externalist  view  of 
things, is rather like photography. Photography is a method 
by  which  information  about  the  external  world  can  be 
recorded  for  future  reference.  Various  complex,  physical, 
causal  processes  are  in  play,  whereby  certain  amounts  of 
light reflecting off objects in a given situation interact for a 
precise amount of time with a piece of photographic paper, 
thus producing an image of the original scene.139 The resulting 
photographs, once developed, can be brought out at any later 
138 Given the way I have formalised the claim of privileged access, there 
is in fact little more to privileged access to a thought than access to the 
concepts involved in that thought. The entailment, then, is trivial.
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time, and used as the evidence from which to infer to the 
existence of a past event or state of affairs in the world. The 
Argument from Privileged Access relies upon making explicit 
the similarity between photography and concept-acquisition. 
According  to  semantic  externalism,  one  of  a  unique  set  of 
possible causal processes is necessary for the acquisition of 
any given concept. Causal interaction with the environment 
imprints concepts, mental photographs, in our minds. These 
concepts can be thought of as items which are essential to 
the  storing  of  information  about  the  external  world, 
information  which  can  be  used  at  a  future  time  for  the 
purposes of thought and communication. As a consequence, 
any  mental  concept,  once  acquired,  can,  just  like  a 
photograph, be used as the evidence from which to infer to 
the  past  existence  of  the  state  of  affairs  which  led  to  the 
existence of the requisite concept.
It  could be objected that,  while it  may not be physically 
possible,  it  is  certainly  logically  possible  that  “phoney 
photographs” be produced, which depict scenes that do not in 
fact  exist.  The  crucial  claim  I  am  endorsing  on  behalf  of 
semantic  externalism  is  that  there  could  never be  an 
analogous situation in the case of concepts.140 This is precisely 
where the analogy breaks down. Instance arguments can be 
used  to  yield  beliefs  about  one’s  environment  which  are 
guaranteed to  be  true,  whereas  there  is  at  least  a  logical 
possibility  that  inferences  from  photographs  to  the 
environment yield false beliefs. Clearly the possibility of error 
is  not  by  itself  sufficient  to  undermine  knowledge. 
Photographs  provide  a  perfectly  good  route  to  knowledge 
about the past. However, that there is a possibility of error 
leaves one open to the sceptic. The inference from a thought 
to a fact about the world is, on the other hand, demon-proof.
139 There are various ways in which photographs can be produced, but all 
of them result in an image of the original scene. 
140 It  should  be  remembered  that  I  am  throughout  this  discussion 
assuming  a  version  of  semantic  externalism as  espoused  by  Burge.  I 
accept that there may be forms of semantic externalism which are not 
committed to this specific kind of causal theory of reference.
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Why is  the analogy certain  to  break  down? The phoney 
photograph case depends on there being a possible way of 
getting just the right amount of light in just the right places 
on  a  piece  of  photographic  film,  so  that  the  resulting 
photograph looks exactly the same as it would have done if 
the state of affairs depicted had in fact caused the image, but 
where the appropriate causal  connection,  between possible 
state of affairs and film, has been lost. This is a possibility. But 
according to semantic externalism, there is precisely no way 
to get just the right concept in the mind without the actual 
causal connections being in place; and herein lies the crux: 
causal  contact  (either  to  a  natural  kind  or  to  a  linguistic 
community) is a necessary condition for the acquisition of a 
concept. To maintain that one could break the causal link, and 
yet produce the same effect, is to deny semantic externalism, 
which is not to win the game, but rather to give it up.
Could one be mistaken in one’s thought that one had a 
certain  concept?  Given  the  entailment  between  privileged 
access  to  one’s  thoughts  and  privileged  access  to  one’s 
concepts,  one could no more  be mistaken in  ones  thought 
that one had a given concept than in one’s thought that one 
was entertaining a given propositional mental event. Putting 
(PA) contrapositively illustrates this.
(PA) For all x, if ¬(x thinks that p), then ¬(x believes that 
she thinks that p).141
There  are  two  further  important  disanalogies  between  a 
photograph and a concept. In the former case the relevant 
inference takes one to a specific fact about the world: that 
Ralph  once  went  digging  for  gold,  say.  In  the  latter  case, 
however, the relevant inference takes one not to a specific 
141 (PA) entails that a subject could not think she had a concept which 
she did not in fact have. I take this claim to be backed up by the fact that 
semantic externalism is at least partly motivated by the thought that a 
subject can have a concept while having only partial understanding of the 
reference of that concept. How much understanding can be tolerated in 
any given case is presumably a vague issue.
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fact, but to a general fact about the world: that either there’s 
gold,  or  a  there’s  a  community  that  thinks  about  it.  This 
difference can be invoked as an explanation for the crucial 
difference  mentioned  above;  that  photographs  concern 
specific incidents allows for the possibility that there could be 
phoney  photographs.  It  is  precisely  because  instance 
arguments  take  one  to  a  general fact  that  rules  out  the 
possibility of error. The second further difference is this. The 
main purpose of photographs is arguably to store information 
about the past.142 The main purpose of concepts, on the other 
hand, is presumably not to store information about the past, 
but  to  be  used  for  the  purposes  of  thought  and 
communication. However, that concepts  can be used for the 
purposes of thought and communication is precisely because 
they encode information about the world. 
Time to make a qualification explicit. Instance arguments 
were initially presented as arguments by means of which one 
could come to know facts about one’s current environment. 
However, it is not facts about one’s current environment, but 
rather facts about one’s recently past environment which can 
be  known.  Consider  Susan.  Suppose  she  is  abducted  from 
Earth,  and  placed  on  twin-Earth.  According  to  semantic 
externalism, a change in one’s concepts is not immediate, but 
requires  the passing of  a  sufficient  length of  time,  so that 
appropriate causal interaction with the new environment can 
be established. For an indefinite period of time, then, Susan 
can think, for example, about water, and run through various 
instance  arguments.  However,  Susan  would  conclude 
something false  if  she  concluded that  she  was in  a  water-
world. She would be correct, on the other hand, to conclude 
from  her  introspective  knowledge  and  conceptual  analysis 
that in the near past she had been in a water-world.143 That is, 
a  subject  can  be  sure,  by  running  through  instance 
142 I would not of course want to rule out photographs as pieces of art, 
but even in these cases, original scenes are depicted.
143 This  qualification  results  from  the  discussion  in  chapter  two 
concerning  the  possibility  of  privileged  access  to  past  propositional 
mental events, and the Argument from Memory.
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arguments,  that  she  used  to  lie  in  certain  specific  causal 
relations in her near past.144
4.4 A necessary causal connection
I  claimed  that  inferences  from  introspective  knowledge  to 
empirical knowledge were not intrinsically unacceptable, but 
rather that they were so only in so far as a certain causal 
feature  was  lacking.  The  reason  that  we  are  resistant  to 
embracing instance arguments, I maintain, is because we are 
used to such arguments lacking this casual feature, so that 
the  situation  which  evolves  from  the  Argument  from 
Privileged Access bears a superficial similarity to a situation 
which we would be justified in rejecting as impossible. 
Consider  individualism.  According  to  individualism,  no 
causal  contact  is  needed  for  the  acquisition  of  a  concept; 
rather,  subsequent  causal  contact  is  needed to  be  able  to 
know whether the concept one possesses has reference in the 
world.145 On  the  picture  individualism  presents,  one  can 
imagine  a  subject  equipped  with  certain  concepts  prior  to 
exposure to the world. It would certainly make sense to be 
worried if  it  turned out that such a subject could correctly, 
and infallibly,  infer from her thoughts involving experience-
independent concepts to the nature of her world; it is always 
possible on the individualist picture that the subject have just 
those concepts she does have, and yet those concepts pick 
nothing  out  in  her  world.  Individualism presents  us  with  a 
picture  of  an  isolated  subject  trying  to  determine  what 
relation  she  bears  to  an  independent,  external  world.  The 
main  obstacle  to  accepting  the  soundness  of  instance 
144 This means that the sceptical hypothesis that one is currently a brain-
in-a-vat remains a logical possibility. The sceptical hypothesis that in the 
near past one was a brain-in-a-vat, however, is ruled out. Since this is the 
concern of chapter six, I will postpone further discussion until then.
145 It is of course consistent with individualism that the way we in fact 
learn concepts is via causal contact with the world. What individualism 
must maintain, however, is that it is logically possible that a subject have 
thoughts, and therefore concepts, independently of the way the world is.
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arguments  is  the  fear  that  they  present  as  a  genuine 
possibility  a  subject  who can  know about  the  environment 
independently of any causal contact with that environment.146
But  now  consider  semantic  externalism.  Semantic 
externalism  denies  the  very  coherence  of  the  picture 
described above. There is simply no way a subject could ever 
have the concepts she does have without either the referents 
of  those  concepts,  or  other  people  existing.147 Concepts 
cannot, as it were, be programmed in by anything other than 
the actual referents of those concepts or the practices of the 
linguistic  community.  Semantic  externalism  requires  that 
there  be  causal  contact  right  at  the  stage  of  concept-
acquisition; and this means that there is already no room for 
the possibility that one’s concepts do not refer.148
The widespread resistance to instance arguments assumes 
a view of the self, and in particular of introspection, which is 
largely a hangover from Cartesianism. Semantic externalism 
is precisely the view that an individual cannot be regarded as 
complete  with  thoughts  independently  of  any  prior  causal 
contact with a specific  given environment.  The self  can no 
longer be regarded as an entity completely separate from her 
environment. As a result, the apparent clear divide between 
the  mind  and  the  world  is  eroded.  The  world  we  inhabit 
determines our mental capacities, our ability to think certain 
thoughts. To suppose that we can “look into our minds” and 
see  things  which  are  themselves  independent  of  the 
146 The  difference  between  semantic  internalism  and  semantic 
externalism is similarly illustrated by the way in which each theory treats 
accidental  replicas.  Proponents  of  semantic  externalism typically  deny 
that an accidental replica should be attributed any intentional states. For 
further discussion of accidental replicas see Millikan (1984) p. 94, and 
Papineau (1993) pp. 91-4.
147 Again,  this  is  for  any  concept  about  the  application  conditions  of 
which the subject is agnostic.
148 I am using the term “reference” here loosely. As is evident from the 
preceding chapter, a subject cannot infer, for instance, that the substance 
referred to by her concept exists in the world,  since this would be to 
ignore the role of the linguistic community to which she belonged.
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environment is the mistake of the individualist.149 According to 
semantic  externalism,  the  concepts  to  which  we  have 
privileged access themselves bear the trace of  the specific 
empirical conditions which led to their acquisition.
Of course it would be unacceptable if a subject could come 
to know about the external world  just by looking inside her 
mind; that is, despite the lack of prior causal contact between 
that  subject and the world.  But instance arguments do not 
allow a subject to argue from world-independent facts to facts 
about the world, but rather to argue from the way the world 
is, via the mark the world leaves on her, back out to the way 
the world must have been to leave such a mark. Without prior 
causal contact, there is no concept available to introspection.
One entailment of (PA) is that we have infallible access to 
the  concepts  which  feature  in  our  propositional  mental 
events;  to  the  concepts  we  possess  at  a  given  time.  The 
concepts  themselves  are  quite  clearly  dependent  on 
contingent empirical facts, and semantic externalism tells us 
about  the  acquisition-conditions  of  those  concepts.  So  the 
conjunction of  the claim of privileged access with semantic 
externalism amounts  to  the  claim that  we can have direct 
knowledge both of the concepts we possess at a given time, 
and of  the acquisition-conditions of  those concepts.  Putting 
things this way highlights the fact that for a subject to gain 
empirical knowledge of the world via instance arguments, it is 
not  enough that  semantic  externalism be true,  the  subject 
must have knowledge of semantic externalism. For any truth, 
however, it is at least possible that it be known; and that a 
subject  could come to know such empirical  truths must be 
accounted for on this basis.
This does not, I think, mean that we have a new crisis in 
epistemology, or in the philosophy of mind. It does not even 
mean that empirical science becomes a purely non-empirical 
activity. Certainly, introspection becomes a viable method of 
acquiring  knowledge  of  our  environment;  but  it  must  be 
149 The metaphor of looking into one’s mind is particularly suited to the 
individualist  picture,  and  should  probably  be  rejected  along  with  the 
rejection of individualism.
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recognised  that  introspection  will  yield  knowledge  only of 
those  empirical  facts  that  the  subject  could  already  have 
come to know via empirical means. Here it is worth reflecting 
on the function of memory. As I am, at the present moment in 
time, I can “look inside my mind” and produce various pieces 
of  empirical  knowledge:  for  instance,  that  the  battle  of 
Hastings was fought in 1066. Why are people willing to accept 
memory  as  a  route  to  empirical  knowledge?  Presumably 
because  memory  is  recognised as  a  way  of  retrieving 
information  which  was  acquired  via  empirical  means  at  an 
earlier time, even if the means by which it was acquired can 
themselves no longer be remembered.150 Semantic memory is 
of  this  type.  I  may be unable to recollect  when and how I 
learnt certain of the concepts I possess, but this does nothing 
to  impugn  my  knowledge  of  those  concepts.  Instance 
arguments similarly yield knowledge which is based on beliefs 
that were acquired empirically at an earlier time. This is not, 
however,  to  say that instance arguments do not yield  new 
knowledge.  They do. They yield new knowledge in just  the 
same  way  that  deductive  arguments  generally  yield  new 
knowledge: they clarify the consequences of the knowledge 
we already have.
4.5 What should we say about Vatbrain?151
There is a further worry with instance arguments which takes 
the form of a question: namely, what should we say about 
Vatbrain? There are two available options. But it is important 
to notice that no matter which option is preferred, instance 
arguments can still be admitted as a genuine route to non-
empirical  knowledge  of  contingent  facts  about  the 
150 The memory case bears a close resemblance to the photograph case. 
First, it is possible to have false memories. Second, the inference from a 
memory is an inference to a specific  as opposed to a general state of 
affairs. Once again, that memories concern specific incidents allows for 
the possibility that a subject could have false memories. Third, the main 
purpose of memories is arguably to store information about the past. 
151 Vatbrain is, as the name would suggest, a brain-in-a-vat.
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environment. That is, on no account does Vatbrain constitute 
a counterexample to the validity of instance arguments.
The two options, then,  are the following. Either Vatbrain 
can  think,  or  he  can't.  To  assume  the  first  disjunct  is  to 
maintain that it is legitimate to attribute propositional mental 
events to Vatbrain. On this assumption, there is no reason not 
to  suppose  that  Vatbrain  could  reason  through  instance 
arguments and thereby come to know, without recourse to 
empirical investigation, certain facts about his environment. 
Although the instance arguments available to Vatbrain would 
be  syntactically  identical  to  those  available  to  Susan,  for 
example,  the  propositions  expressed  by  the  respective 
thoughts  of  the  subjects  would,  of  course,  be  different. 
Vatbrain can no more reason to the fact that he is in a water-
world than Twin Susan can. With their respective, syntactically 
identical instance arguments, Susan would conclude that she 
was in a water-world, Twin Susan would conclude that she was 
in  a  twater-world,  and  Vatbrain  would  conclude  something 
like,  perhaps,  that  he  was  in  a  water-in-the-image-world.152 
Each of their respective conclusions would be true.
What  about  the  second  possibility,  according  to  which 
Vatbrain  cannot  think?  For  this  scenario  to  present  a 
counterexample  to  the  validity  of  instance  arguments,  it 
would have to be assumed that it  could  seem the same to 
Vatbrain,  even  though  he  somehow  failed  to  have 
propositional mental events. The reason this would provide a 
counterexample  is  because  it  would  raise  the  sceptical 
possibility that  we could be in that position. We could think 
we  were  gaining  knowledge  about  our  environment,  but 
would be unable to rule out the possibility that we were just 
like Vatbrain;  that there was nothing but  phenomenology153. 
152 This possibility is owed to Putnam (1981),  where it  is  used as the 
basis  for  a  transcendental  argument  against  scepticism.  Once  again, 
since this is the concern of chapter six, I will postpone further discussion 
until then. 
153 This  possibility  would  require  that  phenomenology  be  locally 
supervenient.  On  the  supposition  that  Vatbrain  has  no  propositional 
mental events, I am strongly inclined to deny Vatbrain phenomenological 
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However, on closer examination it becomes evident that this 
line of reasoning is misguided. The supposition that a subject 
could  think she  was  gaining  knowledge  and  yet  it  be 
illegitimate to attribute propositional mental events to her is 
clearly incoherent. The only scepticism that could be raised 
here is a full-blooded scepticism about whether we think at 
all;  and  I  take  it  that  this  very  possibility  is  incoherent.  A 
minimal  requirement  on  a  theory  of  thought  is  that  it  be 
descriptive of whatever it  is we do. It is not as if  we could 
settle on a theory, and then discover that whatever it is we 
do, it's certainly not thinking.
Thus,  whatever  we  say  about  Vatbrain,  he  provides  no 
counterexample to the validity of instance arguments.
4.6 Conclusion
Introspection  and  conceptual  analysis  can  together  yield 
knowledge of contingent facts about the external world; but 
only  in  so  far  as  those  contingent  facts  are  themselves  a 
necessary  condition  for  the  very  existence  of  the  objects 
introspected. Of the three following claims,
(PA) For all  x, if  x believes that she thinks that  p, then x 
thinks that p;
(SE)  x’s  thinking  that  p necessarily  depends  upon 
contingent facts about her environment;
(EC)  x could  not  have  non-empirical  knowledge  of 
contingent facts about her environment;
the one which should be rejected is  (EC).  If  one accepts a 
new  theory  about  what  a  concept  is,  namely  semantic 
externalism,  one  should  expect  a  new  theory  about  what 
knowledge  of  a  concept  entails.  The  Argument  from 
Privileged  Access fails  to  establish  its  intended  conclusion. 
states also. That is, I am sympathetic to the view that phenomenology is 
broad.
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Semantic externalism and privileged access are compatible. 
We can have privileged access to the world.154
154 The claim that, on the assumption of a certain theory of the mind, if 
knowledge of  mental  items is  demon-proof,  knowledge of  the  items to 
which they correspond is demon-proof, has roots at least as far back as 
John Locke. Thus Locke not only acknowledges that his theory of simple 
ideas has this consequence, though he would no doubt have expressed it 
differently,  he  actually  takes  it  as  a  point  in  favour  of  his  theory.  He 
invokes the allegedly unsavoury consequence as providing the solution to 
a problem about knowledge of the external world. Locke writes,
§ 3. ... How shall the Mind, when it perceives nothing but its own 
Ideas, know that they agree with Things themselves? This, though 
it seems not want to difficulty, yet, I think there be two sorts of 
Ideas, that, we may be assured, agree with Things.
§ 4.  First, The first are simple  Ideas, which since the Mind, as 
has  been  shewed,  can  by  no  means  make  to  it  self,  must 
necessarily be the product of Things operating on the Mind in a 
natural way, ... . Thus the Idea of Whiteness, or Bitterness, ... has 
all  the  real  conformity  it  can,  or  ought  to  have,  with  Things 
without us. And this conformity between our simple Ideas, and the 
existence of Things, is sufficient for real Knowledge. (Locke, 1689 
Book IV, Chapter IV, original emphasis)
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5.1 Introduction
In chapter four I argued that instance arguments are a valid 
means by which a subject can come to have non-empirical 
knowledge of her environment. It was stressed that instance 
arguments  take  one  from  an  instance  of  a  general 
propositional  mental  event  to  knowledge  of  a  general  fact 
about the world.
It  is  tempting  to  think  that  semantic  externalism 
characterises  thought  as  essentially  object-dependent,  and 
that  it  is  this  fact  which  explains  the  validity  of  instance 
arguments.155 If  this  reasoning  were  correct,  it  ought  to  be 
possible to use analogous instance arguments to infer from 
any object-dependent thought to the existence of the object 
upon which that thought depended. A prima facie example of 
an object-dependent thought is a singular thought, or  de re 
thought.156 Such  thoughts,  broadly  speaking,  concern 
individuals, or particular objects.
In this chapter I discuss two opposed theories of singular 
thought,  each  of  which  is  defined  by  its  answer  to  the 
following question: is the content of  a  de re thought to be 
understood  as  object-dependent,  or  object-independent?  To 
maintain  that  the  content  of  a  de  re thought  is  object-
dependent  is  to  maintain  that  the  content  would  not  be 
available to be thought in the absence of the object which the 
thought concerns. If this view is correct, it will be possible to 
gain  non-empirical  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  the 
particular object or objects upon which a given de re thought 
depends.  If  the  alternative  view  is  correct,  no  such  non-
155 For example see Brown (1995),  who has claimed that what I  have 
called the  Argument from Privileged Access works in effect because it 
can be generalised to apply to all cases of object-dependent thought. See 
also Noonan (1993).
156 I  will  use  the  terms  “singular  thought”  and  “de  re thought” 
interchangeably.
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empirical knowledge is possible, since the content of a de re 
thought  would  exist  even  in  the  absence  of  the  object  or 
objects the thought in fact concerns.157
Given  the  complex  nature  of  the  theories  I  will  be 
discussing, it  will  be worth while to examine them in some 
detail before moving on to establish my intended conclusion.
5.2 De dicto and de re attributions
To give an account of singular thought has been, in the first 
instance, to provide a criterion of differentiation between the 
attribution of a de dicto thought and the attribution of a de re 
thought.158 For  ease  of  exposition,  I  will  throughout  the 
following  discussion  use  belief  as  the  exemplar  type  of 
thought.  At  first  sight,  then,  it  might  be  thought  that  the 
distinction between the attribution of a  de dicto belief,  and 
the attribution of a de re belief could be drawn by appeal to a 
surface-level,  grammatical distinction; a distinction between 
belief in a proposition and belief  of something that it has a 
given property. To illustrate this, consider the following.
(1) Ortcutt believes the proposition that someone is a spy.
(2)  Someone in particular is believed by Ortcutt to be a 
spy.159
157 As will become clear, the debate centres on the notion of “content”. 
De  re thoughts  are  object-dependent  according  to  both theories.  The 
crucial  issue  is  whether  to  admit  some  form  of  content  even  in  the 
absence of a truth-evaluable thought.
158 On the face of it, there is no reason to suppose that an examination of 
the nature of the attributions of beliefs should provide any insight into 
the  nature  of  the  beliefs  thereby  attributed.  Consider  an  analogous 
approach towards the nature of baldness. There is no obvious reason why 
a  subject  would  learn  anything  about  the  nature  of  baldness  by 
investigating the nature of baldness-attributions. However, I take it that 
this was the traditional approach, and that the surface-level grammatical 
distinction is the traditional one.
159 The examples are taken from Quine (1956).
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According to the grammatical distinction, (1) is taken to relate 
Ortcutt  to  a proposition,  and is thus the ascription of  a  de 
dicto belief; (2) is taken to relate Ortcutt to an individual - a 
res - and is thus the ascription of a de re belief.
Burge160,  however,  has  argued  that  the  grammatical 
distinction does not provide a sufficient condition for drawing 
the relevant distinction between the attribution of a de dicto 
belief and the attribution of a de re belief. This is shown by a 
proposal  about the structure of propositions put forward by 
Bertrand  Russell.  Russell  held  that  sentences  containing 
logically  proper  names  express  propositions  whose 
components include the individuals thereby named.161 Burge 
claims that  since  this  notion  of  proposition  was  introduced 
specifically to account for the notion of  de re  knowledge, a 
statement that says that this sort of proposition is believed 
should not be regarded as de dicto but as de re. An example 
of such a proposition is given in (3).
(3) Ortcutt believes the proposition that this is red.
According  to  the  grammatical  distinction,  the  ascription 
expressed by (3) is that of a  de dicto belief, since it relates 
Ortcutt  to  a  proposition;  yet  the  proposition  is  such  that 
believing  it  would  be  to  have  a  singular  belief.  Hence, 
according  to  Burge,  the  grammatical  distinction  can  not 
underpin the relevant distinction between de dicto belief and 
de re belief.
Quine’s  discussion  of  the  topic  has  led  to  the  relevant 
distinction  being drawn instead in  terms of  a  substitutivity 
criterion.  On  this  account,  the  distinctive  mark  of  the 
attribution of a  de re belief about a given object is that it is 
legitimate to substitute salva veritate any correct description 
160 Burge (1977).
161 According to Russell, a proposition is an abstract entity with objects 
and properties in it.  See Russell (1912) and (1956). A logically proper 
name is  a  genuinely  referring  expression,  one  which  presupposes  the 
existence of the object named.
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of that object. For example, suppose Ortcutt believes de re of 
the woman in the alleyway that she is a spy. In characterising 
Ortcutt’s  belief,  it  would  be  legitimate  to  use  any  correct 
description  of  that  woman,  regardless  of  whether  Ortcutt 
could  describe  the  woman  in  that  way.  Thus,  on  the 
supposition  that  the  woman  in  the  alleyway  is  the  prime 
minister,  Ortcutt’s  belief  would  be  correctly  characterised 
both as the de re belief of the woman in the alleyway that she 
is a spy, and as the de re belief of the prime minister that she 
is a spy. Theoretically, the ascription relates Ortcutt directly to 
the  woman,  without  attributing  to  Ortcutt  any  particular 
description or conception that he could use to represent her.162
If,  on the other hand, Ortcutt  believes  de dicto that the 
woman  in  the  alleyway  is  a  spy,  it  would  be  incorrect, 
according to Quine, to infer that he has the  de dicto belief 
that  the  prime  minister  is  a  spy.  Even  were  Ortcutt  to  be 
aware  of  the  relevant  identity,  and  hence  to  believe  both 
propositions,  the  beliefs  are  to  be  regarded  as  distinct. 
Essentially,  it  is  possible  for  a  rational  subject  to  take 
opposing attitudes  to  the propositions.  On this  view it  is  a 
mark of belief de dicto that an ascription of it will not tolerate 
co-extensional substitution.
Once again, however, Burge maintains that the distinction 
cannot  be  adequately  drawn  in  these  terms  either,  since 
there are ascriptions in  which substitutivity  fails,  yet  which 
are nevertheless de re. Consider the following.
(4) Ortcutt believes that the woman in the alleyway is a 
spy.
The  problem  Burge  sees  here  is  that  the  expression  “the 
woman in the alleyway” may be “doing double duty at the 
surface level  -  both characterising Ortcutt’s conception and 
162 It is a notable point from Quine that he assumes that when a subject 
is related directly to an object, the subject’s conceptions of the object are 
not taken into account at all. As will become clear, this mutual exclusion 
should be abandoned.
118
Five: Singular Thought
picking  out  the  relevant  res163.  Burge  concludes  that  the 
distinction between de re and de dicto attributions can not be 
adequately  drawn  by  differences  at  the  surface  level. 
Essentially,  the  difficulty  is  that  attributions  of  a  given 
thought  need  not  reflect  the  type  of  thought  which  is 
attributed.  Hence,  any  account  which  tries  to  draw  the 
distinction between de dicto and de re beliefs by appeal to a 
distinction between de dicto and de re attributions of beliefs 
will ultimately fail.
5.3 Burge’s distinction
The  realisation  that  differences  at  the  surface  level  are 
inadequate for the purposes of distinguishing  de re from de 
dicto attributions leads Burge to provide an account of  two 
distinctions: a distinction between the attribution of  de dicto 
thought  and the attribution  of  de re thought,  as  well  as  a 
distinction  between  de  dicto thought  and de  re thought, 
where  the  latter,  epistemic  distinction  grounds  the  former, 
semantic distinction. In this way, Burge focuses not only on 
the attributions of thought, but on the logical status of the 
thoughts entertained.
Let  us  look  at  the  semantic  distinction  between  the 
attribution  of  a  de  dicto and  a  de  re belief  first.  Burge 
expresses  this  distinction  in  terms  of  logical  form,  and 
represents (1) and (2) above as,
(1’) Bd (Ortcutt, ¢(∃x) Spy (x)Ü )
(2’) (∃x)(Br (Ortcutt, <x>, ¢Spy (y)Ü ))
‘Bd’ represents that the subject has a de dicto belief, and ‘Br’ 
that  the  subject  has  a  de  re belief.  The  pointed  brackets 
contain a bound variable representing the object presented, 
and indicate that it is the object itself which is of importance, 
rather than any description of that object; substitution of co-
163 Burge (1977) p. 341. For essentially the same point see Castañeda 
(1967), and Loar (1972).
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extensional descriptions within slanted brackets is therefore 
legitimate. The corner quotes, according to Burge, “may be 
regarded as a convenience for  denoting the proposition,  or 
component  of  proposition,  expressed  by  the  symbols  they 
enclose”164.  No  singular  term  will  appear  inside  the  corner 
quotes,  and  the  predicates  which  do  appear  will  not  be 
substitutable by co-extensive predicates.
Burge  maintains  these  formulations  make  the  relevant 
distinction  explicit:  ‘Bd’  relates  the  subject  to  a  complete 
proposition, expressed by a closed sentence; ‘Br’ relates the 
subject in part to an incomplete proposition, expressed by an 
open sentence, and in part to a res. He writes,
Purely  de  dicto  attributions  make  reference  to 
complete  propositions -  entities  whose  truth  or 
falsity is determined without being relative to an 
application  or  interpretation  in  a  particular 
context.  De  re  locutions  are  about  predication 
broadly  conceived.  They  describe  a  relation 
between open sentences (or what they express) 
and  objects.  (Burge,  1977  p.  343,  original 
emphasis) 
According  to  Burge,  this  way  of  drawing  the  distinction 
captures the intuition behind both the substitutivity criterion 
and the surface-level grammatical distinction.
Examining  the  function  and  placement  of  the  corner 
quotes  makes  it  clear  why  Burge  claims  that  Quine’s 
substitutivity criterion will be unable to distinguish the de re 
from the de dicto, for it is no longer the individuating criterion 
of  the  de  dicto that  it  will  not  tolerate  substitution  of  co-
extensional  terms.  No  expression  inside  corner  quotes  will 
tolerate substitution of co-extensional terms, so according to 
Burge’s distinction attributions of belief de re will not tolerate 
substitution  of  co-extensional  terms  simpliciter either.  It  is 
clear  that  substitution  is  legitimate  only  in  the  first  and 
second argument places. It is not legitimate anywhere in the 
third  argument  place,  which  specifies  the  open  sentence, 
164 Burge (1977) p. 341.
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since this  is characterised in terms specific  to  the way the 
subject is thinking about the supposed referent.
This  can  be  illustrated  by  examining  the  following 
examples of the logical form of beliefs which could make (4) 
true.
(4’) Br (Ortcutt, <the woman in the alleyway>, ¢Spy (y)Ü )
(4’’) Br (Ortcutt, <the woman in the alleyway>, ¢Spy (y) & 
Woman (y) & In Alleyway (y)Ü )
The  second,  and  not  the  first,  attributes  the  notion  of  a 
woman in the alleyway to Ortcutt.165 
To  reiterate,  then,  the  semantic  distinction  is  this.  A  de 
dicto attribution of a belief relates the subject to a complete, 
or completely expressed, proposition; a de re attribution of a 
belief  relates  the  subject  to  a  res and  an  incomplete 
proposition.  Underlying  this  semantic  distinction  is  an 
epistemic distinction. The epistemic distinction is between de 
dicto beliefs that are fully conceptualised, and  de re beliefs, 
“whose  correct  ascription  places  the  believer  in  an 
appropriate nonconceptual, contextual relation to objects the 
belief is about”166. This is not to say that the non-conceptual 
relation  precludes  any  conceptual  relation  between  the 
subject and the object, as is explicit in (4’’). While there is no 
constraint  on  the  involvement  of  concepts  available  to  the 
subject entertaining a de re belief, there is a requirement that 
the relation between the subject and the object not be merely 
conceptual.  A  further  relation  must  hold,  a  description  of 
which is external to the content of the belief, and which need 
not correctly be described in terms of concepts available to 
the  subject.  The  connection  between  the  subject  and  the 
object  is  a  brute  causal  connection.  The subject  need not, 
however,  be  denied  the  concepts  required  to  express  the 
relevant connection.167
165 Burge assumes (4’’) to be a fairly ordinary reading for cases in which 
Ortcutt sees the woman.
166 Burge (1977) p. 346.
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The semantic and the epistemic distinction are of course 
interrelated. If  a subject satisfies the epistemic criterion for 
having a de re belief, any correct ascription of that belief will 
satisfy the semantic criterion for  the attribution of  a  de re 
belief.  Mutatis mutandis for a  de dicto belief and its correct 
ascription. Thus, while all beliefs will be partly characterisable 
in terms of the subject’s concepts, it is, according to Burge, 
the  distinctive  mark  of  a  de  dicto belief  that  it  be 
characterisable purely in such terms. He writes,
A correct ascription of a de dicto belief identifies it 
purely  by reference to  a “content”  all  of  whose 
semantically  relevant  components  characterise 
elements in the believer’s conceptual repertoire. 
(Burge, 1977 p. 346)
Similarly, according to Burge, if a belief is essentially  de re, 
that is in virtue of the fact that a context involving the  res 
itself enters into determining how the belief can be correctly 
ascribed. 
At first sight, the following could be regarded as a threat to 
Burge’s characterisation. Suppose Ralph, in conversation with 
Ernie, sincerely asserts, “The richest man in Britain is mean”, 
not knowing who the richest man in Britain is. Suppose later 
that  Ernie,  an  acquaintance  of  the  richest  man  in  Britain, 
reports Ralph’s belief to him by saying, “Ralph believes you 
are mean”. Prima facie what we have here is a case in which 
the belief ascription relates Ralph both to an open sentence 
and  to  the  richest  man,  thus  fulfilling  the  semantical 
characterisation  of  de  re belief,  even  though  Ralph’s 
epistemic  state  depends  completely  on  concepts  in  his 
repertoire, thus fulfilling the epistemic characterisation of de 
dicto belief.  The  semantic  and  epistemic  characterisations 
167 Burge (1977) p. 361. Although Burge admits that there is no adequate 
general explication of this contextual, not purely conceptual relation, he 
takes perception as the paradigm, with further examples of such possible 
relations being those involved in memory, introspective beliefs,  certain 
historical beliefs,  beliefs about the future, and perhaps beliefs in pure 
mathematics.
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provided  by  Burge  thus  appear  to  diverge.  However,  the 
characterisations can be seen to diverge only in so far as the 
belief-ascription is true. The question, then, is whether or not 
the belief ascription is true: and I take it that strictly speaking 
it is not. What we have here is not a correct ascription of a de 
re belief, but rather a de re ascription of a de dicto belief. All 
the example can be taken to show is that the attribution of a 
belief may come apart from the type of belief which is taken 
to  make  the  attribution  true;  and  there  is  no  reason  why 
Burge should not accept this.168
Burge,  then,  holds  a  dual-component  theory  of  de  re 
thought.  A  de  re thought  is  composed  of  a  reference-
independent  content  and  a  context.169 The  content  is  the 
“mentalistic”  part  of  the  thought,  expressed  by  an  open 
sentence. Which object the content applies to may vary with 
context. Ortcutt could have the same thought-content were 
he to think of Ralph as a spy, or of Ralph’s twin as a spy. The 
thoughts would nevertheless have different truth-conditions. 
Without the contextual component, then, there is no thought. 
The first would be true if and only if Ralph were a spy, the 
second if and only if Ralph’s twin were a spy.
Burge maintains that this de re content cannot be reduced 
to  a  complete  de  dicto thought.  Any  incomplete  de  dicto 
168 I  take it  that  the distinction I  invoke between an ascription being 
literally  true  and  an  ascription  being  understood  and  accepted  even 
though literally false lies behind Burge’s proposal that, in the example 
given,  the  term  “you”  would  be  anaphoric,  acting  as  a  “pronoun  of 
laziness” for  the description “the richest  man in Britain”. If  this  were 
correct, the ascription would then relate Ralph to a closed sentence, thus 
fulfilling the semantic characterisation of  de dicto belief. Consequently, 
the  semantic  and  epistemic  characterisations  would  remain  in  step. 
(Burge,  1977  p.  346).  The  treatment  of  “you”  as  anaphoric  could, 
however,  be  criticised,  since  if  it  were  anaphoric,  it  ought  to  be  a 
condition on understanding the attribution that the richest man in Britain 
know the relevant description under which he was referred to by Ralph, 
which does not seem right.
169 For alternative ideas about reference-independent content, see Fodor 
(1987), Searle (1983) chapter 8, and Loar (1988).
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content  will  by  itself  be  insufficient  to  pick  out  the  actual 
referent of the de re belief. Since Burge places no restriction 
on the number or type of concepts which can enter into the 
content of a de re thought, he must presumably allow that it 
be possible for the content of a de re thought in fact to pick 
out the referent of that de re thought. However, in any given 
case in which the concepts featuring in the content of a de re 
thought do in fact uniquely identify the object of the  de re 
thought, it will not be in virtue of the fact that the referent 
satisfies the relevant description in the thought-content that 
the thought concerns the object it does, but in virtue of the 
non-conceptual relation which holds between the subject and 
the object. Thus Burge expresses his commitment to a non-
reductivism with respect to de re thought. Further, of the two 
types of thought, it is the de re which Burge maintains is the 
more fundamental.  It  is  de re thoughts which he maintains 
are essential for the use and understanding of language.
It  might  be thought  that  the content  invoked in  a dual-
component  theory  is  naturally  individualistic.  However, 
Burge’s  non-reductive fundamentalism about  de re thought 
ties  in  neatly  with  his  semantic  externalism.  A  dual-
component  theory will  be distinguished as individualistic  or 
anti-individualistic depending on the status of  the concepts 
involved in the content of  the thought, in the propositional 
fragment. Since the concepts which constitute the content of 
the  thought  will,  on  Burge’s  theory,  be  externally 
individuated, his dual-component theory of  de re thought is 
anti-individualistic. While Ortcutt could have the same type of 
content were he to think of Ralph as a spy, or of Ralph’s twin 
as a spy,  this  would depend on his remaining in the same 
linguistic environment, such that the term “spy” has the same 
meaning  in  each  case.  The  content  of  his  thought  is  not 
locally supervenient, but externally determined.
5.4 Object-dependent thoughts
There  are  two  defining  characteristics  of  dual-component 
theories such as Burge’s. First is the claim that the elements 
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of  the content of  the thought,  the incomplete propositional 
fragment,  may  be  insufficient  to  pick  out  the  object  the 
thought concerns. Second is the claim that the content of a 
de re thought is available to be thought whether the object 
which it purportedly concerns exists or not. It is McDowell’s 
contention  that  this  view  is  adopted  as  a  result  of  the 
mistaken belief that,
... a Fregean philosophy of language and thought 
can  represent  an  utterance,  or  a  propositional 
attitude,  as  being  about  an  object  only  by 
crediting  it  with  a  content  that  determines  the 
object by specification, or at least in such a way 
that  the  content  is  available  to  be  thought  or 
expressed  whether  the  object  exists  or  not. 
(McDowell, 1984 p. 98)
The work of both Evans and McDowell is strongly opposed to 
such a belief.170 Their concern is to demonstrate that a Fregean 
philosophy  of  language  and  thought  can  accommodate  a 
notion of de re thought, according to which the very content 
of  a  de  re thought  is  object-dependent.  On  this  view,  the 
existence of  a  de re content  depends essentially  upon the 
existence of the object the content concerns. If the supposed 
object  does  not  exist,  neither  does  the  supposed  content. 
Crucially, the SSTT admits of no distinction between content 
and thought; to say that a thought is object-dependent is to 
say that its content is object-dependent. The dual-component 
theory,  on  the  other  hand,  divorces  content from  thought, 
and hence allows that the content of a  de re thought is not 
object-dependent,  even if  the  thought  itself  is  regarded as 
object-dependent.
170 My concern here is not directly with the motivational contention of 
McDowell’s, but rather with the claim that a  de re thought is not such 
that  it  is  available  to  be  thought  whether  the  object  exists  or  not. 
However, both Evans and McDowell are largely motivated by an attempt 
to account for certain types of thought within a Fregean framework. See 
McDowell  (1977)  for  a  Fregean  account  of  proper  names.  See  Evans 
(1981) for a Fregean account of demonstratives.
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The  idea  that  the  content  of  a  thought  can  be  object-
dependent  is  evident  in  Russell’s  account  of  singular 
propositions. Russell held that sentences containing genuinely 
referring expressions express propositions whose components 
include the  individuals  thereby named.  From this  it  follows 
that a singular proposition is only available to be thought in 
so far as the object referred to exists. Singular propositions 
are object-dependent.
Since Russell  maintained that  “[e]very proposition which 
we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents 
with  which  we  are  acquainted”171,  where  a  subject  is 
acquainted  with  something  if  it  is  “immediately  known  to 
[her] just as [it is]”172, he was naturally wedded to the claim 
that  we can understand a proposition only if  we cannot be 
mistaken  about  which  object  it  is  that  the  proposition 
concerns. The requirement that one have such demon-proof 
knowledge of the object concerned led Russell to restrict the 
possible  constituents  of  singular  propositions  to  universals, 
sense-data and, tentatively, the self.173
Evans  and  McDowell  propose  to  accept  the  Russellian 
notion  of  an  object-dependent  thought,  and  yet  reject  the 
restrictive nature of Russell’s theory of singular propositions. 
That is, they allow acquaintance also with objects knowledge 
of which is fallible; and hence propose that object-dependent 
thoughts could also concern physical objects in the world.174 
Acquaintance  is  not  undermined  by  fallibility,  as  Russell 
believed. The question is whether object-dependent thoughts 
can plausibly be recognized outside Russell’s restriction.
It might be suggested that the most natural way to adopt 
a theory of object-dependent thought without also adopting 
Russell’s  restriction  is  simply  to  maintain  that  the  physical 
objects which are now supposed to be the proper concern of 
object-dependent  thoughts  can  themselves  be  the 
constituents of the relevant thoughts. But there is a problem 
171 Russell (1912) p. 32.
172 Russell (1912) p. 25.
173 See Russell (1912) especially chapter 5.
174 See Evans (1982), and McDowell (1986). 
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with this suggestion; how is one to account for the fact that a 
subject  could  rationally  take  different  cognitive  attitudes 
towards a thought with the very same constituents?
For if we say that the object itself is actually in the 
thought - like a pea in a pod - then we seem to 
have made no provision for a distinction between 
different thoughts in which the same property is 
ascribed to the same object. (Evans, 1982 p. 82)
If a thought is conceived of as an ordered pair consisting of 
an object and a property, there can be no way to distinguish 
thoughts containing the same constituents, and therefore no 
way  in  which  to  account  for  someone’s  having  a  differing 
cognitive  attitude towards  such an ordered  pair.  There  are 
possible situations for which the ordered pair conception will 
not be adequate. Take the following example, given by Evans.
Suppose a person can see two views of what is in 
fact a very long ship, through two windows in the 
room in which he is sitting. He may be prepared 
to accept ‘That ship was built in Japan’ (pointing 
through one window), but not prepared to accept 
‘That  ship  was  built  in  Japan’  (pointing  through 
the other window). (Evans, 1982 p. 84)
The problem comes when we try to describe the situation on 
the ordered pair  conception of  Russellian  thought.  There is 
one ordered pair  –  <the ship,  the property  of  having been 
built in Japan> – to which the person both does and does not 
stand in the belief-relation. Not only does this fail to capture 
the state of mind of the person involved, but it also appears 
to be contradictory.175
175 It might be thought that Burge’s account faces the same difficulty in 
distinguishing pairs of thoughts which ascribe the same property to the 
same  object.  Taking  Evans’s  example,  Burge’s  account  yields  the 
following.
    Br (S, <that ship>, ¢Built in Japan (y)Ü ) & 
¬ Br (S, <that ship>, ¢Built in Japan (y)Ü )
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There  is  perhaps  no  problem  here  for  Russell.  On  his 
theory  the  objects  contained  in  singular  propositions  are 
restricted to things which were conceived to be so fleeting 
and insubstantial  that it seemed unintelligible to suppose a 
person might  identify  the same one twice without  knowing 
that  it  was  the  same.  This  way  of  making  the  account 
consistent  is  unavailable  to  those  who,  like  Evans  and 
McDowell, wish to apply Russellian object-dependent thoughts 
to objects in the world.
The account which Evans and McDowell propose, then, is a 
combination of the following two compelling insights. First,
... the idea that there are things which we say and 
believe  whose  content  cannot  be  faithfully 
represented without the reporter himself making 
a reference to an object in the world which those 
utterances and beliefs  concern -  so  that,  where 
there is no such object, there would be no such 
content  available  to  be faithfully  represented ... 
(Evans, 1982 p. 82)
and second, the idea that there needs to be a way in which to 
distinguish pairs of thoughts which ascribe the same property 
to the same object, and that only Fregean sense will suffice 
for this purpose. The result is an account of de re thoughts as 
object-dependent, but as containing senses, and not objects, 
as constituents. On this account, unlike Russell’s, a thought is 
not  determined by the sheer identity  of  its  referent.  There 
are, in McDowell’s terms, de re senses.
However, Burge has a way of overcoming the difficulty by an appeal to 
the necessary contextual relation between the subject and the object for 
any given  de re thought.  There will  be  no inconsistency  if  a  different 
contextual relation relates the subject to the ship in each case. However, 
this solution leads to a modification of the logical form of  de re beliefs. 
Rather than the above, we should have,
    Br (S, R, <that ship>, ¢Built in Japan (y)Ü ) & 
¬ Br (S, R’, <that ship>, ¢Built in Japan (y)Ü )
For  a  discussion  of  whether  the  non-conceptual  relation  should  be 
incorporated  into  the  content  of  the  thought,  and  of  the  difficulties 
involved, see Bach (1987).
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According  to  the  dual-component  theory,  it  will  be 
remembered,  the  content  of  a  thought  is  available  to  the 
subject whether or not there is an object which it concerns, 
and,  consequently,  the  object  a  belief  is  about  will  not 
necessarily be determined by elements of the content of the 
thought, since features of the proposition or content will  in 
certain cases not be sufficient to pick out the relevant object. 
In stark contrast, according to the theory of object-dependent 
thought  proposed,  not  only  is  the  content  of  a  thought 
available to be thought only on the condition that the object 
or objects which it concerns exist, but the very constituents of 
the thought will  therefore themselves always be capable of 
securing reference. This theory of object-dependent thoughts 
has  been  termed  the  “Strong  Singular  Thought  Theory” 
(hereafter “SSTT”).176 
There is a certain unease felt about  de re senses, which 
Segal expresses by means of the following example.
If  at  some time,  t,  you  think  it’s  bedtime now, 
then you have a thought about t. You represent t 
as now (from your perspective at the time) and as 
bedtime. What makes it  the case that it  is  t,  in 
particular,  that  your  thought  is  about?  Is  it 
because you had a thought of a certain kind at t, 
so  the  referent  was  determined  in  part  by  the 
nature of the thought, in part by the fact that you 
had the thought at  t? Or is it because you had a 
thought  of  a  certain  kind,  a  thought  that 
contained a special purpose sense, a sense that 
differs in kind from any later or earlier sense, a 
sense part of whose essence it is to refer to t and 
no other  time? Which of  these sounds strange? 
(Segal, 1989, p. 53)
The passage quoted is clearly rhetorical; and the idea that the 
proposition  expressed  by  an  indexical  or  demonstrative 
thought is  determined by a content,  or  character,  together 
with a context external to the cognitive world of the subject, 
is  perhaps  the  entrenched  view.177 But  rhetoric  is  not 
176 This terminology comes from Blackburn (1984) chapter 9.
177 See Kaplan (1980), and Perry (1977).
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argument. The very point at issue here is whether there is a 
conception of sense which determines reference in the very 
strong way which Evans and McDowell advocate.178
Certainly, the notion of character can look very appealing. 
One purpose which it serves is to allow for the intuition that 
subjects who think, for example, of themselves as being hot 
by thinking respectively I am hot, thereby have some thought 
content in common. Classifying thoughts by their content is 
unavailable to the SST theorist. Segal writes,
If  thoughts  are  type-identified  by  their  contents 
and  singular  thoughts  about  different  objects 
have  different  contents,  then  such  singular 
thoughts must be type distinct. SSTT, in rejecting 
reference-independent content, entails that there 
is no taxonomy of thoughts that identifies them 
by  their  contents  and  groups  together  singular 
thoughts about different objects. (Segal, 1988, p. 
39)
Certainly, some form of systematic taxonomy is required; but 
there is no pre-theoretical reason to suppose that content is 
the best, or the only, way to taxonomise thoughts. McDowell 
suggests the following.
Particular  de re senses,  each specific  to  its  res, 
can be grouped into sorts. Different  de re sense 
(modes  of  presentation)  can  present  their 
different res in the same sort of way: for instance, 
by exploiting their perceptual presence. And the 
univocity of a context-sensitive expression can be 
registered by associating it  with a single sort of 
de re sense. (McDowell, 1984 p. 103)
178 In his fascinating paper on demonstratives, Evans proposes that  a 
sense be thought of as a way of thinking about an object. This then allows 
for so-called “dynamic thoughts”, where a subject keeps track of a day, 
for instance, as it recedes into the past, by thinking of it respectively as 
today, yesterday, two days ago, and so on. See Evans (1981). The paper, 
which builds on McDowell’s (1977), is intended as a response to Perry 
(1977),  where  it  is  claimed  that  a  Fregean  framework  cannot 
accommodate demonstrative thoughts. 
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Whether McDowell’s suggestion is plausible or not, to assume 
that  thoughts  should  be  grouped  together  by  only  their 
content is to beg the question against the SSTT.179
5.5 Against Burge
The contrast between the two opposed accounts of singular 
thought can be highlighted by examining the major objections 
raised against each. It will therefore be worth while spending 
time on these. I  will  start  in this  section by discussing two 
criticisms  of  the  dual-component  theory.  Criticisms  of  the 
SSTT tend to focus on its treatment of a deluded subject, a 
subject who is mistaken in her belief  that she is presented 
with  an  object,  and  correspondingly  mistaken  in  her  belief 
that she is entertaining a singular thought. This will largely be 
the concern of the three sections which follow.
The first objection to the dual-component theorist, then, is 
as  follows.  As  mentioned  in  section  5.4 above,  it  is 
McDowell’s  contention  that  the  dual-component  theory  is 
adopted  as  a  result  of  the  mistaken  belief  that  a  Fregean 
philosophy of thought and language could not accommodate 
singular thought in any other way. However, McDowell objects 
to the separation of context from content which characterises 
the  dual-component  theory.  The  SSTT  demonstrates  that 
there is no need for such a forced separation, since singular 
thought can be accommodated within a Fregean framework 
which does not require any such separation. He writes,
Given  that  conceptual  content  is  made  up  of 
means of  representation  in  thought,  a  belief’s 
being fully conceptualised can mean only that it 
has  a  fully  propositional  content  exhausted  by 
some collection of thought symbols; and it would 
follow that there is no room for contextual factors 
to  contribute  to  determining  how  such  a  belief 
may  be  correctly  ascribed.  This  makes  Burge’s 
picture  of  the  relation  between  conceptual 
179 For arguments against the idea that a psychological taxonomy should 
taxonomise by content, see Stich (1983), and McGinn (1982).
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content and context obligatory. (McDowell,  1984 
p. 101)
McDowell maintains that the separation is plausible only by a 
conflation  between  the  two  readings  the  term  “concept” 
allows;  between  what  is  expressed  and  what  does  the 
expressing. If there is a possible account according to which 
what  is  expressed  is  context-dependent,  while  the  thought 
content  is  nevertheless  fully  conceptual,  then this  account, 
according to McDowell, is surely to be preferred.
He argues  that  given Frege’s  account  of  sense,  and the 
assumed equation  between “conceptual  content”  and what 
can be “completely expressed”, there is no need to accept 
that  contextual  factors  are  extraneous  to  the  content-
determining powers of a conceptual repertoire; and no need 
to  accept  that  what  is  expressed  by  a  context-sensitive 
utterance  cannot  be  partly  determined  by  the  context  in 
which  it  is  made.  In  effect,  McDowell  maintains  that  de re 
Fregean senses yield thoughts which are both  de re and yet 
part of the subject’s cognitive world.
...  for  all  that  Burge  shows,  a  conceptual 
repertoire  can  include  the  ability  to  think  of 
objects  under  modes  of  presentation  whose 
functioning  depends  essentially  (say)  on  the 
perceived  presence  of  the  objects.  Such  de  re 
modes of presentation would be parts or aspects 
of content, not vehicles for it; no means of mental 
representation  could  determine  the  content  in 
question itself, without benefit of context, but that 
does not establish any good sense in which the 
content  is  not  fully  conceptualized.  (McDowell, 
1984 p. 102)
Both theories accept the importance of the role of context in 
determining  thought.  McDowell’s  contention  is  that  this 
importance can be acknowledged without siphoning off  the 
contextual  factors  from the very  content  of  the  thought  in 
question.
The  second  criticism  McDowell  raises  for  the  dual-
component  theory  arises  as  a  result  of  this  separation  of 
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thought  content  and  context.  This  objection  concerns  the 
supposed  relation  between  the  incomplete  propositional 
content and the res. McDowell writes,
How does the relational expression relate the res 
to  the  propositional  fragment?  In  the  state  of 
affairs  that  the  attribution  represents,  the 
propositional fragment should figure as somehow 
tied  to  the  res by  a  predicational  tie;  can  this 
intuitive requirement be met? If as in the Fregean 
position, the de re attribution is conceived as true 
in virtue of the truth of a de dicto attribution, this 
question  holds  no  terrors:  in  the  underlying  de 
dicto the  predicational  tie  will  be  explicitly 
expressed. But if, as in Burge’s framework, the de 
re  attribution  is  conceived as “barely  true”,  the 
belief relation has to secure the presence of the 
predicational  tie  all  on  its  own;  and  it  is  quite 
unclear that it can be explained so as to carry the 
weight. (McDowell, 1984 p. 107)
It will be remembered that Burge holds that  de re thoughts 
are the fundamental type of thought: the description of a de 
re thought will not always be reducible to the description of a 
de dicto thought, and neither will there be, for every  de re 
thought,  an  underlying  de  dicto thought.  The  problem 
McDowell  sees  is  that  in  the  absence  of  an  underlying  de 
dicto thought, there is no underlying explicit predicational tie 
for the given  de re thought, and hence nothing to hold the 
elements of the thought together. 
Segal  has  elaborated  Burge’s  account,  and  provided  a 
response  to  this  challenge.180 According  to  Segal,  the 
predicational  tie  is  taken  to  be  achieved  by  a  reference 
relation between the variable in the propositional  fragment 
and  the  object,  together  with  the  logical  form of  an  open 
sentence. The open sentence will then be true if and only if 
the referent  of  the variable  satisfies  the predicate.  On this 
account, the predicational tie is effected in the same way for 
de re as for de dicto beliefs. The important difference, claims 
Segal, is that for the former the relation must be supplied by 
180 Segal (1989) pp. 50-2.
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the context, whereas for the latter it is supplied entirely by 
elements of the thought itself.
However, this is not so much an answer to the problem, as 
a  restatement  of  the  theory  under  consideration.  It  is 
precisely  the  nature  of  the  predicational  tie  between  the 
content of the thought and the object external to that content 
which is in question. Something has to point the propositional 
fragment toward the object concerned, and concepts will not 
always be sufficient to do the job.
5.6 Deluded subjects
As mentioned above, criticisms of the SSTT tend to focus on 
its treatment of a deluded subject; a subject who is mistaken 
in her belief  that she is presented with an object.  It  is  the 
purpose of this section to present the treatment of deluded 
subjects by both the SSTT and the dual-component theory.
Let  us  start  with  a  look  at  the  dual-component  theory. 
According  to  this  theory,  the  object  of  any  given  singular 
thought  is  not  part  of  its  content,  rather  it  is  an  external 
object which, together with the content constitutes a thought. 
This  appeal  to  such  reference-independent  content  allows 
that thoughts be treated as psychologically the same if and 
only if they have the same content, independently of whether 
or not there is an object with which the content can combine. 
The criterion for being in the same psychological state can be 
given independently of how things are in the environment. On 
the Burgian conception of  de re belief,  then,  if  the context 
fails  to  supply  an  appropriate  object,  the  subject  is  still 
alleged to  have,  because of  the  descriptive  content  of  the 
open sentence,  something in her  head sufficient  to explain 
her actions, even if this does not amount to a truth-evaluable 
thought. Deluded subjects are regarded as being in some kind 
of intentional state, since the content is available to make up 
a  thought  when  coupled  with  an  object,  even  in  the 
immediate absence of an appropriate object. 
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Evans has argued that any such so-called “content”, since 
it must be given in schematic terms, ought not to be regarded 
as representational at all. He writes,
It  is  of  the  essence  of  a  representational  state 
that  it  be  capable  of  assessment  as  true  or  as 
false.  If  a  state  is  a  representational  state,  it 
represents  something other  than  itself  as  being 
thus and so. ... . But a schema is not assessable 
as true or false, nor is any state whose ‘content’ 
can  be  given  only  in  schematic  terms  ...  .  So, 
since [a  de re thought] has a ‘content’ which is 
strictly  specifiable  only  in  schematic  terms,  the 
[de re belief]  is not assessable as true or false; 
hence it  is  not  a representational  state.  (Evans, 
1982 p. 202)
The problem Evans sees is not that a representation must be 
assessable either as true or as false, since the possibility that 
certain representations are simply vague should not be ruled 
out. Rather, the problem is that a propositional fragment and 
an  object  do  not  yet  make  up  anything  which  is  truth-
evaluable.181
If  de re thoughts involve object-dependent senses, on the 
other hand, it follows that there can be no thought at all in 
the absence of an appropriate object. McDowell writes,
Given a context, a  de re sense may determine a 
de re sense ... , or else it may determine nothing. 
And in the latter  sort  of  case,  according to this 
way  of  thinking,  there  can  only  be  a  gap  -  an 
absence - at ... the relevant place in the mind - 
the  place  where,  given  that  the  sort  of  de  re 
sense  in  question  appears  to  be  instantiated, 
there  appears  to  be  a  specific  de  re sense. 
(McDowell, 1984 p. 103)
This entails an essentially disjunctive conception of the state 
a subject is in when she believes herself to be entertaining a 
singular  thought.  If  she  is  correct,  the  subject  has  direct 
181 The objection posed by Evans can be seen as another form of  the 
objection raised by McDowell that there is no predicational tie between 
the content (of the thought) and the object (of the thought).
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access to the world. If she is incorrect, the subject has merely 
apparent  access to  the  world,  and fails  to  think  a  singular 
thought at all. Following Evans, I will refer to such a deluded 
subject as entertaining a “mock thought”.182 Crucially,  there 
are no such things as empty singular thoughts. 
Segal183 has argued that the attribution of empty singular 
thoughts  to  deluded  subjects  allows us  to  understand  how 
things seem from their  point  of  view, and that  this sort  of 
understanding of how things seem to the deluded subject is 
unavailable to proponents of the SSTT. Consider the following 
example. Little Johnny is drawing up a list of toys he would 
like for Christmas. When asked what he is doing, little Johnny 
says,  “I’m  writing  a  letter  to  Santa  Claus”.  The  dual-
component  theorist  can  explain  little  Johnny’s  actions  and 
utterances  by  appeal  to  a  series  of  reference-independent 
psychological states. If, however, the senses of proper names 
are  object-dependent,  little  Johnny  can  have  no  such 
psychological states, so the argument goes, and a fortiori no 
such  psychological  states  which  could  explain  his  actions. 
According to Segal, the SST theorist cannot therefore accept 
our description of little Johnny’s state of mind.
McDowell claims that this is no real objection, since in such 
cases we are simply “playing along with the deluded subject - 
putting  things  his  way”184.  Similarly,  Evans  claims  that  in 
182 See  Evans  (1982)  p.  82.  To  avoid  the  “mock  thought”  analysis,  it 
might be tempting to analyse the singular thoughts of deluded subjects 
as  follows. In  the event  of  their  being no object  to which the subject 
intends to refer, a particular location in space would be regarded as the 
object of the  de re thought. For instance, Ortcutt could be taken to be 
predicating spyhood of that space which would be occupied if a woman 
were present. However, Evans has argued against the reduction of “the 
demonstrative  identification  of  spatially  located  objects”  to  “the 
identification of positions in egocentric space” for the reason that it is 
possible to identify  an object  perceptually even when it  is moving too 
rapidly for us to be able to assign it a precise location in space (Evans, 
1982). 
183 Segal (1989).
184 McDowell (1977) p. 154.
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attributing  a  belief  to  a  deluded  subject  we  are  “only 
sympathetically  approximating  to  his  state  of  mind”185. 
Unsatisfied  with  this  response,  Segal  writes  that 
“understanding someone is putting things their way. Put them 
any other way and you miss the point”186. 
Evans  offers  the  following  thoughts  to  explain,  and 
dismiss, the attractiveness of the view that a deluded subject 
must have some thought before her mind.
To hallucinate is precisely to be in a condition 
in  which  it  seems  to  one  as  though  one  is 
confronting something. So of course it will seem 
right to the hallucinator to say that he is actually 
confronting something;  the situation is  very like 
one in which he is confronting something. ... 
If after it has been acknowledged on all sides 
that  it  seems  to  the  hallucinator  that  he  is 
confronting something ... one says that it seems 
reasonable  to  the  generality  of  mankind  to 
suppose  that  the  hallucinator  is  actually 
confronting something, ... then one is attempting 
to  double-count  the  fact  that  has  already  been 
acknowledged.
Now  it  is  essentially  the  same  consideration 
that  underpins  the  view  that  if  it  seems  to  a 
person that he is thinking something, then there 
must be some thought before his mind. Perhaps 
the  same  explanation  of  the  attraction  this 
consideration has for us will serve to undermine it 
in this application as well. (Evans, 1982 p. 200)187
The passage quoted from Evans  draws upon an instructive 
parallel  between  the  view  that  particular  uses  of  singular 
terms are credited with senses that determine objects in such 
a way that  the senses are expressible  whether the objects 
exist  or  not,  and  representative  realism  in  the  theory  of 
perception,  where  representative  realism  postulates  items 
185 Evans (1982) p. 199.
186 Segal (1989) p. 57, emphasis added.
187 It  would seem that  criticisms such as  Segal’s  rest  on a  failure  to 
distinguish between what Evans calls “situation-specifying attitudes” and 
“content-giving specifications of attitudes”. See Evans (1982) p. 199.
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that  are before the mind whether  objects  are perceived or 
not.188 
Given that it is possible for it to appear to a subject as if 
she is perceiving, or thinking about, a particular object when 
the object is presented to her, and to have a phenomenally 
indistinguishable experience when there is no such object, it 
is  tempting  to  assume  that  there  is  something  which  the 
subject  has  before  her  mind  in  both  cases.  McDowell  and 
Evans both reject this line of  inference. According to them, 
that  things  are  the  same  for  the  subject  does  nothing  to 
establish  that  worldly  circumstances  are  only  externally 
related to experiences:  “to  think otherwise is  to  fall  into  a 
fully  Cartesian  conception  of  the  [subjective]”189.  Both  in 
perception,  and  in  the  case  of  singular  thought,  the 
legitimacy of the subjective is consistent with an essentially 
disjunctive conception of the state a subject is in.
McDowell claims that such dual-component theories of the 
mind  fail  to  capture  the  nature  of  demonstrative  thought, 
because  the  relevant  object  is  “before  the  mind  only  by 
proxy”190.  The  force  of  de  re senses  is  that  they  allow  the 
subject to be in direct contact with the world, while respecting 
rational explanation by explaining how the subject can have 
differing cognitive attitudes to the same object and property.
5.7 The Two List Argument
The treatment of empty cases by the SSTT has, however, led 
to  the  following  powerful  line  of  argument.  Noonan  has 
argued that reference to object-dependent thoughts is never 
required for the purposes of  psychological  explanation,  and 
hence that either there are no singular thoughts reference to 
which is essential to the adequate psychological explanation 
188 The  corresponding  analogy  is  between  object-dependent  singular 
thought and the disjunctive conception of experience. For an interesting 
defence of the disjunctive conception of experience see McDowell (1982).
189 McDowell (1986) p. 157.
190 McDowell (1986) pp. 292-3.
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of  action,  or  those  singular  thoughts  reference  to  which  is 
essential are not object-dependent.191
Whenever  an  action  is  directed  towards  a 
concrete, contingently existing object, other than 
its agent, in the sense that it is intentional under 
a  description  in  which  there  occurs  a  singular 
term  denoting  that  object,  then  an  adequate 
psychological explanation of it is available under 
a (possibly distinct) description in which occurs a 
term denoting that object; and in this explanation 
the  only  psychological  states  of  the  agent 
referred to are ones which would also be present  
in a counterfactual situation in which the object 
did  not  exist. (Noonan,  1986 p.  68-9,  emphasis 
added)
Consider the following example.192 While walking in his garden, 
Ralph  spies  the  cat  he  believes  to  have killed  his  beloved 
canary. Angry Ralph lashes out and kicks the cat.  If  object-
dependent  thoughts  are  essential  for  the  purposes  of 
psychological  explanation, the explanation of Ralph’s action 
must invoke his object-dependent thoughts about the cat. It is 
these  object-dependent  thoughts  which,  at  least  in  part, 
explain his action.
Now  imagine  a  counterfactual  situation  exactly  like  the 
actual  situation  except  for  the  fact  that  there  is  no  cat: 
Counterfactual  Ralph  is  subject  to  a  hallucination.  Since 
things seem the same to Counterfactual Ralph as they do to 
Ralph, we can assume that Counterfactual Ralph will move in 
the  very  same  way  as  Ralph  in  fact  moves.  That  is, 
Counterfactual Ralph will lash out at what he takes to be the 
cat in question.
This is where the challenge to the SST theorist comes into 
play.  The  challenge  is  to  explain  Counterfactual  Ralph’s 
behaviour. Noonan writes,
191 Noonan (1986),  (1991)  and (1993).  Essentially  the same argument 
can be found in Segal (1989).
192 The example is in essence taken from Noonan (1993).
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The [proponent of object-dependent thoughts] is 
thus faced with a dilemma: he must either deny 
that the behaviour of [Ralph] in the hallucinatory 
situation  is  rationally  explicable  by  reference to 
his  contentful  psychological  states,  or  he  must 
acknowledge that reference to a proper subset, X, 
of  the  thought  contents  available  to  [Ralph] 
suffices  to  explain  [Counterfactual  Ralph’s] 
actions. (Noonan, 1993 p. 286)
The  first  option  is  unattractive,  since,  on  the  face  of  it  at 
least,  Counterfactual  Ralph’s  behaviour  does  make sense.193 
The  second  option,  however,  is  assumed  to  be  equally 
unpalatable.  The  argument  for  this  runs  as  follows. 
Counterfactual  Ralph  has  a  set  of  beliefs  and  desires  that 
constitutes a sufficient reason for him to lash out. This is what 
Noonan refers to as “X” in the passage quoted above. Since 
Ralph  is  Counterfactual  Ralph’s  twin,  Ralph  has  this  set  of 
beliefs and desires, and possibly some extra ones, namely the 
object-dependent  thoughts  he  was  originally  assumed  to 
have.  X  is  a  proper  subset  of  Ralph’s  thoughts.  But  X  is 
sufficient reason for a subject to lash out - which is just what 
Ralph did. Hence, X is sufficient to explain Ralph’s behaviour 
as  well  as  Counterfactual  Ralph’s.  To  endorse  the  second 
option,  so  the  argument  goes,  is  to  accept  that  object-
dependent  thoughts  are  redundant in  the  psychological 
explanation of action.
This line of reasoning is, however, fundamentally flawed. It 
can be agreed on all sides that Counterfactual Ralph has a 
set,  X,  of  beliefs  and  desires  that  constitute  a  sufficient 
reason for him to lash out. Noonan goes on to claim that since 
Ralph is Counterfactual Ralph’s twin, Ralph also has this set of 
beliefs and desires: X is a proper subset of Ralph’s thoughts. 
But  this  is  where  the  SST  theorist  should  object:  the  SST 
193 I will leave aside the issue of whether counterfactual Ralph does act 
rationally. Even if one were to adopt an externalist account of rationality, 
and hence deny that counterfactual Ralph acts rationally, one could still 
accept that his behaviour has an explanation. For an externalist account 
of action according to which the actions of agents are rational only within 
a given context, see Millikan (1993).
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theorist  should  simply  reject  the  claim  that  Ralph  has  X. 
According to the SSTT, Ralph, since he is not hallucinating, 
does not have X. The SSTT is essentially a disjunctivist theory 
with  respect  to  psychological  states.  The  defining 
characteristic of such a theory is precisely that there will be 
no psychological state which subjects have in common simply 
in virtue of  things seeming the same to them. To maintain 
that because the set X is sufficient to move Counterfactual 
Ralph to act, X is sufficient to move any physical duplicate of 
Counterfactual Ralph to act is already to assume the falsity of 
the SSTT.194
194 There is an important description under which the actions of Ralph 
and Counterfactual Ralph differ; the former kicks a cat, while the latter 
lashes out into thin air. Noonan acknowledges this difference, and goes on 
to explain it as follows.
What  makes  [Ralph’s]  action  a  kicking  of  a  cat  then,  is 
simply: the presence of a cat. (Noonan, 1995 p. 287)
The explanation offered by  Noonan of  the difference  between Ralph’s 
action  and  Counterfactual  Ralph’s  action  relationally  described  is  far 
from  satisfactory.  This  can  be  illustrated  by  the  following  example. 
Consider a third situation in which Ralph is subject  not to a standard 
hallucination, but to a veridical hallucination. That is, suppose that at the 
very place at which he hallucinates the presence of a cat, there is in fact 
a cat. Call him Veridical Ralph. When Veridical Ralph lashes out, he kicks 
a  cat.  Thus,  according  to  Noonan’s  account,  Veridical  Ralph’s  action, 
relationally  described,  is  just  the  same  as  Ralph’s  action,  relationally 
described, where both actions differ from the action of Counterfactual 
Ralph. But surely this taxonomises actions in the wrong way. Veridical 
hallucinations,  on  Noonan's  account,  yield  just  the  same  actions, 
relationally  described,  as  genuine  perceptions;  whereas  ordinary 
hallucinations  and  veridical  hallucinations  yield  different  actions.  But 
surely  ordinary  hallucinations  and  veridical  hallucinations  should  be 
classified together for the purposes of psychological explanation. I do not 
wish to argue that a dual-component theory cannot be modified so as to 
alter the groupings of the actions relationally described. One plausible 
way  to  do  this  would  be  to  add  in  a  causal  constraint.  What  makes 
Ralph’s action a kicking of a cat would then be:  the presence of a cat 
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I  have argued that the SSTT can withstand the  Two List 
Argument, since a crucial assumption should be rejected by 
the  SSTT.  However,  the  SST  theorist  does  owe  some 
explanatory  account  of  the  actions  of  deluded subjects.  To 
this extent the  Two List Argument does have some force. It 
might be thought that one could make sense of the behaviour 
of a deluded subject by attributing her a second-order belief. 
On this account, a deluded subject believes herself to have an 
object-dependent singular thought, and it is this second-order 
belief which explains her behaviour, which makes her action 
intelligible. Note that the second-order belief cannot itself be 
de re. For a second-order belief to be de re it would have to 
take  as  its  object  a  first-order  belief.  But  if  a  subject  is 
entertaining a “mock” thought, there is no appropriate first-
order belief for the second order belief to take as its object. 
There would then be no second-order belief, rather a further 
mock  thought.  Such  a  second-order  mock  thought  can  be 
invoked in the psychological explanation of a subject’s actions 
no more than the first-order mock thought it was supposed to 
replace.
The  second-order  belief,  in  order  to  do  the  explanatory 
work required, would therefore have to be de dicto. However, 
an  appeal  to  second-order  de  dicto beliefs  as  a  way  to 
rationalise the actions of deluded subjects gives rise to the 
following worry.  It  is  at  least  contentious that second-order 
beliefs  provide  the  appropriate  explanans  for  a  subject’s 
actions. Since second-order beliefs tell us how we conceive of 
our  own  minds,  and  not  how we  conceive  of  the  external 
world, why should a belief that a subject has a de re belief of 
a certain type be sufficient to move her to act?195
which caused the kicking in some non-deviant way. My claim is merely 
that Noonan’s account, as it stands, will not suffice.
195  Note that a version of the Two List Argument could be run here also. 
Once it is conceded that the second-order belief will suffice to explain the 
actions of the deluded subject, it would be claimed, there would be no 
need to invoke any object-dependent thoughts in order to give a rational 
explanation of the non-deluded subject. As we have seen, this argument 
is fallacious.
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The  following  might  be  a  more  plausible  option.  In  the 
absence of a  de re belief,  when a subject is deluded, what 
explains  her  action  is  a  general,  de  dicto belief.  In 
Counterfactual  Ralph's  case,  then,  what  would  explain  his 
lashing out would be something like the general belief that 
there is a cat in front of him: it  would even be possible to 
attribute  Counterfactual  Ralph with  a  de dicto belief  which 
uniquely identifies the cat he believes to be in front of him, on 
the assumption that there is such a cat.
However the SSTT is to account for the actions of deluded 
subjects,  it  will  give  a  distinct  account  of  the  actions  of 
genuine subjects. No unified account will be forthcoming.
5.8 Instance arguments
Having  come  to  an  understanding  of  the  two  opposed 
theories  of  singular  thought,  we  are  now  in  a  position  to 
establish  the  intended  conclusion  of  this  chapter.  Let  us 
consider the dual-component theory first.
According  to  the  dual-component  conception  of  de  re 
thought, the content of a de re thought is an incomplete, de 
dicto proposition. The object the thought concerns, and the 
contextual relation which relates the subject and the object, 
fall  outside the content of  that thought.  (PA),  the claim of 
privileged access, was formalised as follows.
(PA) For all  x, if  x believes that she thinks that  p, then x 
thinks that p.
(PA)  states that for any given thought, a subject can have 
privileged access to the content of that thought only. This will 
hold for privileged access to  de re thoughts also: that is, for 
any given de re thought, introspection can yield knowledge of 
the  content  of  that  thought  only:  it  can  yield  knowledge 
neither  of  the  object  of  the  thought,  nor  of  the  non-
conceptual  relation which relates the subject to the object. 
Consequently, for any given de re thought, introspection and 
conceptual analysis cannot yield non-empirical knowledge of 
the existence of the object of that thought. The non-empirical 
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knowledge which a subject can gain about her environment 
will, on this view, be restricted to knowledge of general facts, 
and  will  not  extend  to  knowledge  of  the  existence  of 
particulars.
As noted above, however, the content of a de re thought is 
itself an incomplete de dicto content. On Burge’s view, this de 
dicto  content  will  be  individuated  externally,  and  will 
necessarily  depend on contingent  facts  about  the subject’s 
environment.  Hence  introspective  knowledge  of  the 
incomplete content of any de re thought can be used as the 
basis from which to infer to non-empirical knowledge of the 
environment in just the same way as any complete  de dicto 
content. Consider once again the following.
(4’’) Br (Ortcutt, <the woman in the alleyway>,  ¢Spy (y), 
Woman (y) & In Alleyway (y)Ü )
On the assumption that Ortcutt has privileged access to the 
content  of  his  thought,  Ortcutt  can  produce  valid  instance 
arguments for any of the three concepts which occur within 
its content. That is, he can validly infer that he is in a spy-
world, a woman-world, and an alleyway-world.
If  the  dual-component  theory  is  correct,  then,  de  re 
thoughts can be used as the basis from which to infer to the 
nature of the external world only in so far as de re thoughts 
have a de dicto content, and not in virtue of the fundamental 
characteristics  which,  according  to  the  dual-component 
theory, determine that they are de re.
Now  let  us  turn  to  the  SSTT.  According  to  this  theory, 
singular thoughts involve object-dependent senses. The cost 
of lifting Russell’s restriction, and allowing that the content of 
a  subject’s  thought  could  depend  upon  objects  about  the 
existence of which that subject could be mistaken, is that,
 ... we open the possibility that a subject may be 
in error about the contents of his own mind: he 
may  think  there  is  a  singular  thought  at,  so  to 
speak,  a  certain  position  in  his  internal 
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organization  although  there  is  really  nothing 
precisely there. (McDowell, 1986 p. 145)
The  important  question  is  how  this  affects  the  privileged 
access  claim,  (PA).  This  question  is  important  since  it  is 
privileged  access  as  characterised  by  (PA) which,  I  have 
argued, allows a subject to generate instance arguments, and 
thereby  come  to  have  non-empirical  knowledge  of  her 
environment.
At  first  sight  it  might  seem  that  the  truth  of  the  SSTT 
actually falsifies  (PA),  since the SSTT allows that a subject 
can think she has a singular thought when in fact she has no 
such  thought.  However,  this  is  not  so;  the  SSTT  does  not 
falsify  (PA).  To see this, we need simply reflect on the fact 
that the  content of the second-order belief corresponding to 
the  antecedent  of  (PA) would  itself  be  object-dependent. 
Ralph could not believe he thought that cat should be kicked 
without thereby thinking that cat should be kicked. That is, it 
would be impossible  for  a subject  to entertain  the second-
order  belief  if  she  were  unable  to  entertain  the  first-order 
object-dependent content. 
A subject has privileged access to the content of her de re 
thoughts in the same way as she has privileged access to the 
content of her general thoughts. Maintaining that a subject 
can  be  mistaken  about  the  existence of  a  thought  is 
consistent  with  maintaining  that  she  cannot  be  mistaken 
about the content of a thought she has.196 (PA) is not refuted 
by the SSTT: a subject has privileged access to the contents 
of all her thoughts. 
So  where  does  this  leave  us  with  respect  to  instance 
arguments? In chapter four I argued that a subject can use 
her  introspective  knowledge  of  the  content  of  a  given 
propositional mental event to gain non-empirical knowledge 
of her environment. If there are propositional mental events 
which  involve  de re  senses,  a  subject  can equally  use her 
introspective knowledge of the content of such propositional 
196 The force of a disjunctive theory such as the SSTT is that it advocates 
direct acquaintance with the world even in the face of possible error.
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mental  events  to  gain  non-empirical  knowledge  of  her 
environment. The crucial symmetry is this. From the fact that 
Susan  has  a  water concept,  Susan  can  gain  non-empirical 
knowledge that she is in a water-world, since if she were not 
in  a  water-world  she  would  not  have  a  water concept: 
likewise,  from  the  fact  that  Ralph  has  a  that-cat concept, 
Ralph can gain non-empirical knowledge that that cat exists, 
since if that cat did not exist Ralph would not have a that-cat 
concept.
5.9 Conclusion
If  the  content  of  a  de  re thought  is  object-dependent,  a 
subject  can  come to  have  non-empirical  knowledge  of  the 
existence of the particular object or objects upon which her 
de re thought depends. If, on the other hand, the content of a 
de  re thought  is  object-independent,  such  non-empirical 
knowledge is unavailable to her. In neither case is the validity 
of instance arguments undermined. Instance arguments allow 
one to infer from introspective knowledge of the content of a 
thought to a fact about one’s environment.
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6.1 Introduction
I  have argued that  semantic  externalism entails  the  prima 
facie absurd  thesis  that  contingent  facts  about  the 
environment can be known on the basis of introspection and 
conceptual  analysis  alone.  Further,  I  have argued  that  this 
consequence is acceptable and unsurprising once one rejects 
fully  the  Cartesian  view  of  the  mind.  The  nature  of  the 
dependence  of  the  contents  of  one’s  propositional  mental 
events  on  one’s  environment  which  defines  semantic 
externalism serves  to  erode  the  once-clear  divide  between 
subject and world. Consequently, if  semantic externalism is 
true, there is a class of valid inferences which can lead one 
from  knowledge  of  the  semantic  contents  “within”  to 
knowledge of the world “without”.
That such knowledge is available non-empirically might be 
thought  to  constitute  a  refutation  of  global  external-world 
scepticism,  such  as  that  captured  by  Descartes’  dreaming 
argument, or the supposition that one is being systematically 
deceived  by  an  evil  demon.  In  short,  it  would  seem  that 
semantic  externalism,  together  with  privileged  access,  can 
reassure  one  that  such  sceptical  hypotheses  are  not  true, 
since  such  sceptical  hypotheses  could  not  in  such 
circumstances be true.
In this chapter I will examine an argument the purpose of 
which is  to  rule out  one such sceptical  hypothesis.  Putnam 
has provided a transcendental argument to demonstrate that, 
on  the  assumption  of  a  certain  weak  causal  constraint  on 
reference  to  which  semantic  externalism is  committed,  the 
proposition  I  am  a  brain-in-a-vat is  self-refuting  and 
necessarily  false.197 In  line  with  my  defence  of  instance 
197 Putnam  (1981)  chapter  one.  Putnam’s  argument  has  provoked  a 
number  of  criticisms  including  the  following.  Smith  (1984),  McIntyre 
(1984), Brueckner (1986), Casati and Dokic (1991), and David (1991). For 
purported defences of Putnam see Dell’Utri (1990), and Warfield (1995). 
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arguments,  I  defend  Putnam’s  argument.  If  semantic 
externalism is true, I maintain, a subject cannot be radically 
mistaken in her beliefs about the nature of her world, since 
interaction with the world provides the only means by which 
that subject could think about that world.198
6.2 Putnam’s argument
The sceptical hypothesis which Putnam is concerned to refute 
is a carefully formulated version of the sceptical hypothesis 
that you are a brain-in-a-vat. According to the standard brain-
in-a-vat hypothesis, you are asked to imagine that your brain 
has been removed from your body by an evil  scientist and 
placed in a vat of nutrients which keep it alive. You are then 
asked to imagine that the scientist, by stimulating the nerve-
endings in your brain,  causes you to have the illusion that 
everything is perfectly normal. It seems to you as if you are 
interacting  with  the  same  world  in  the  same  way  as  you 
always have done. As with all forms of global external-world 
scepticism, the sceptical hypothesis that you are a brain-in-a-
vat characterises a situation which is compatible with all the 
evidence  available  to  you,  and  which  is  nevertheless 
consistent  with  the  world  being  largely  other  than  you 
perceive it to be. The sceptical hypothesis takes its force from 
the fact that it does not seem to you as if you are a brain-in-a-
vat;  rather,  it  seems to you as if  you inhabit  a  world with 
forests, lakes, cities and people.199
A large part of the discussion in this chapter will focus on a formalisation 
of Putnam’s argument presented by Wright (1991), who, as will become 
clear, effectively holds a middle position. 
198 The  weak  causal  constraint  on  reference  employed  in  Putnam’s 
argument is by no means definitive of semantic externalism. However, 
even while  Putnam does  not  relate  his  argument  directly  to  semantic 
externalism, it is specifically the consequences of semantic externalism 
which interest me here; in particular, the relationship between scepticism 
and instance arguments. 
199 In fact, it is hard to understand what would be involved in having a 
sense impression as of being a brain-in-a-vat. It  is not as if  one could 
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Putnam’s hypothesis differs from the standard brain-in-a-
vat hypothesis in three broad ways. First, you are asked to 
suppose not only that you are currently a brain-in-a-vat, but 
that you have  always been a brain-in-a-vat. Thus the vat is, 
as it were, your natural habitat; to whatever extent you can 
be said to have concepts, those concepts were acquired in 
your current environment, and are hence appropriate to it.200 
Second, rather than supposing that you are alone in your vat, 
with an external scientist causing your hallucinations, you are 
asked to suppose that the universe simply consists of a vat 
which  sustains  every  living  subject,  and  that  your 
hallucinations  are  caused  by  automatic  machinery 
programmed for that very purpose. Thus your belief that your 
world is populated by beings similar to yourself is true, even 
though  the  beings  which  share  your  world  are  not  as  you 
perceive them to be. Third, you are asked to suppose that the 
automatic machinery is programmed to generate a coherent, 
collective hallucination. Thus your beliefs about the nature of 
your  environment  largely  cohere  with  those  of  the  other 
subjects who have the misfortune to share your predicament. 
The  significance  and  plausibility  of  each  of  these 
assumptions will be discussed in some detail below. For the 
moment, let us move directly to Putnam’s argument. Putnam 
writes,
when the brain-in-a-vat (in the world where every 
sentient being is and always was a brain-in-a-vat) 
thinks ‘there is a tree in front of me’ his thought 
does not refer to actual trees. On some theories 
... it might refer to trees in the image, or to the 
electronic impulses that cause tree experiences, 
or  to  the  features  of  the  program  that  are 
responsible  for  those  electronic  impulses.  ... 
“look” around and see that one was ensconced in a vat full of nutrients, 
or that one was surrounded by other brains, since one would not have the 
eyes with which to see anything. Perhaps it is possible to imagine being a 
brain-in-a-vat, but it is certainly not possible to imagine it seeming to one 
as if one were a brain-in-a-vat.
200 Remember that we are assuming a causal  constraint  on reference 
such as that embodied in semantic externalism.
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These theories are not ruled out ... for there is a 
close causal connection between the use of  the 
word  ‘tree’  in  vat  English  and  the  presence  of 
trees  in  the image ...  .  By the  same argument, 
‘vat’ refers to vats in the image in vat English, or 
something  related  ...,  but  certainly  not  to  real 
vats, since the use of ‘vat’ in vat English has no 
[relevant]  causal  connection  to  real  vats  ...  .  It 
follows  that  if  [the  brain’s]  ‘possible  world’  is 
really the actual one, and we are really the brains-
in-a-vat,  then  what  we  now  mean  by  ‘we  are 
brains-in-a-vat’  is  that  we are  brains-in-a-vat  in 
the image or something of that kind (if we mean 
anything at  all).  But part  of  the hypothesis  that 
we are brains-in-a-vat is that we aren’t brains-in-
a-vat  in  the  image  (i.e.  that  what  we  are 
‘hallucinating’  isn’t  that  we  are  brains-in-a-vat). 
So,  if  we are  brains-in-a-vat,  then  the  sentence 
‘we are brains-in-a-vat’ says something false (if it 
says anything). In short if we are brains-in-a-vat 
then  ‘we  are  brains-in-a-vat’  is  false.  So  it  is 
necessarily false. (Putnam, 1986 pp. 14-5)
The causal constraint on reference ensures that the sceptical 
hypothesis expressed by the proposition that we are brains-
in-a-vat cannot be true.201
Let  us  return  to  the  promised  discussion  of  the  three 
assumptions explicit in Putnam’s formulation of the sceptical 
hypothesis which sets it apart from the standard brain-in-a-
vat  hypothesis.  According  to  the  first  of  these,  we  have 
always  been  brains-in-a-vat:  hence  our  thoughts  have  the 
same content now as they always did. Of what significance is 
this? In chapter four it was argued that a subject could use 
instance  arguments  to  yield  knowledge  not  of  her  current 
environment, but strictly speaking only of her  recently past 
environment.  Since meaning-conferring  relations  take some 
time,  there is always a possibility that  one run through an 
instance argument having been recently switched from the 
environment to which one’s concepts connect. But Putnam’s 
201 The  proposition that  I  am a  brain-in-a-vat  is  not  necessarily  false, 
since there is a possible world in which I am a brain-in-a-vat. But if I were 
a brain-in-a-vat, my utterance of “I am a brain-in-a-vat” would no longer 
express the proposition that I am a brain-in-a-vat.
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hypothesis rules out this very possibility. It might therefore be 
thought  that  the  conclusion  of  Putnam’s  argument  could 
escape the  qualification:  that  we could  genuinely  conclude 
that we are not brains-in-a-vat. On reflection, however, this is 
not  so.  The  sceptical  hypothesis  against  which  Putnam’s 
argument is directed is the sceptical hypothesis that we have 
always been brains-in-a-vat. The conclusion of the argument 
should therefore be that we have not always been brains-in-
a-vat.202
The second assumption is that  there is no evil  scientist, 
and no “real” world outside the vat;  there is nothing other 
than  us  as  brains-in-a-vat  and  the  automatic  tending 
machinery.  In  this  there  is  a  tangible  advantage,  since  it 
serves to rule out the possibility that, despite our envatted 
predicament, our concepts nevertheless refer to real objects; 
to  objects  outside the vat.  Putnam’s argument depends on 
the  concepts  of  a  brain-in-a-vat  having  a  reference  which 
differs from the reference of a non-envatted subject. In the 
evil  scientist  scenario,  it  would  at  least  be  open  to  the 
proponent of a causal theory of reference to maintain that the 
brain-in-a-vat’s  token  of  “tree”  referred  to  real  trees;  for 
instance if  the evil  scientist  were consistently to cause the 
brain-in-a-vat  to have images which reflected what  he,  the 
evil  scientist,  was  perceiving.  Putnam’s  hypothesis  ensures 
that  the  conceptual  repertoire  of  the  brain-in-a-vat  is  not 
derivative;  derived  that  is  from  sentient  beings  the  direct 
cause of whose perceptions differs from the direct cause of 
the perceptions of the brain-in-a-vat.
The third assumption is that the hallucinations to which we 
are subject largely cohere. Putnam goes on to maintain that 
in  such  a  situation  we  would,  in  effect,  be  able  to 
communicate. He writes,
Let us suppose that the automatic machinery is 
programmed  to  give  us  all  a  collective 
hallucination,  rather  than a  number of  separate 
unrelated  hallucinations.  Thus,  when  I  seem  to 
202 Having noted this qualification, I will for the moment leave it to one 
side.
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myself to be talking to you, you seem to yourself 
to be hearing my words. Of course it  is not the 
case that my words actually reach your ears – for 
you don’t have (real)  ears, nor do I  have a real 
mouth  and  tongue.  Rather,  when I  produce my 
words,  what  happens  is  that  efferent  impulses 
travel from my brain to the computer, which both 
causes me to ‘hear’ my own voice uttering those 
words  and  ‘feel’  my  tongue  moving,  etc.,  and 
causes  you  to  ‘hear’  my  words,  ‘see’  me 
speaking,  etc.  In  this  case  we  are,  in  a  sense, 
actually in communication. ... . ... for you do, after 
all,  really  hear  my words  when  I  speak to  you, 
even if the mechanism isn’t what we suppose it to 
be. (Putnam, 1981 pp. 6-7, original emphasis)
Perhaps Putnam is right about this. After all, it is our mental 
states  which  are  assumed  to  cause,  albeit  indirectly,  our 
collective  hallucinations.  However,  the  claim  is  at  least 
controversial, and it is not clear that it adds anything to the 
force of the argument. In what follows, I will proceed as if the 
conclusion were the singular proposition I am not a brain-in-a-
vat.  That  this  conclusion  can  be  reached  non-empirically 
leaves us with a substantial issue.203
6.3 Some qualifications and a proof
Putnam’s argument could be regarded as a meta-argument. It 
concerns  the  propositions  which  would  be  expressed  by 
subjects whose syntactically identical utterances of “I  am a 
brain-in-a-vat”  differ  semantically.  More  importantly,  it 
concerns  the  arguments such  subjects  could  produce  to 
counter whichever sceptical hypothesis  would be expressed 
by their respective utterances of that sentence syntactically 
individuated.  It  is  important  to  distinguish  clearly  between 
Putnam’s meta-argument and the arguments the subjects he 
considers  could  run  through.  Putnam’s  meta-argument 
203 Putnam’s  sceptical  hypothesis  actually  appears  to  diminish  the 
horrific nature of the original “nightmare”: you are able to communicate, 
and you have a certain degree of control over your “actions”. Would such 
a situation be all that bad?
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consists of philosophical reflection on the arguments of such 
subjects.  Wright  has  formulated  the  common form of  such 
arguments as follows.204
(i) My language disquotes
(ii) In BIVese, “brain-in-a-vat” does not refer to brains-in-
a-vat
(iii) In  my  language  “brain-in-a-vat”  is  a  meaningful 
expression
(iv) In my language “brain-in-a-vat” refers to brains-in-a-
vat (from (i) and (iii))
(v) My language is not BIVese (from (ii) and (iv))
(vi) If I am a brain-in-a-vat, my language, if any, is BIVese 
(definition of BIVese)
(vii) I am not a brain-in-a-vat. QED. (Wright, 1991 p. 74)
Henceforth,  Putnam’s  argument  will  be  referred  to  as  the 
meta-argument; Wright’s argument-form will be referred to as 
The Proof; the argument which a brain-in-a-vat would express 
by running through The Proof will  be referred to as  (ABiv); 
and the argument which a normal subject would express by 
running through The Proof will be referred to as (ANorm). As 
will  become clear, perceived problems with Putnam’s meta-
argument emerge from a failure to distinguish between the 
specific  arguments  (ABiv) and  (ANorm) on  the  one hand, 
and the meta-argument which concerns them on the other.
In his meta-argument, Putnam moves from a claim about 
thought to a claim about language. He moves from the claim 
that “when the brain-in-a-vat ... thinks ‘there is a tree in from 
204 I have chosen to focus on Wright’s formalisation because it is , as far 
as I know, the one which is most true to the letter of Putnam’s argument. 
Other tend to beg central questions, and therefore fail to do justice to the 
force  of  Putnam’s  argument.  For  instance,  in  their  response  to  a 
formalisation by Dell’Utri (1990), Casati and Dokic (1991, p. 91) remark 
that “[t]he reconstruction has the advantage of presenting the argument 
in such a way that it is easy to detect some major flaws in it”. See also 
Brueckner (1986),  who attempts to formulate in English the argument 
available to a brain-in-a-vat, and Warfield (1995). 
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of  me’  his  thought does  not  refer  to  actual  trees”,  to  the 
conclusion that “if we are brains-in-a-vat, then the  sentence 
‘we are brains-in-a-vat’ says something false”205. While there 
may be significant differences between psychological content 
and linguistic content, the move between them is legitimate 
in this context. This can be seen by reflection on the genesis 
of semantic externalism. As will be remembered from chapter 
one,  semantic  externalism  arose  from  the  following 
realisation: any difference in the extensions of  terms which 
occur  in  the  content-clauses  of  propositional  attitude 
attributions  will  reflect  a  difference  in  the  propositional 
attitudes thereby attributed. This means that the content of a 
thought  and  the  content  of  an  utterance  will  be  causally 
constrained,  and  will  vary  accordingly  with  variation  in 
environmental differences.
Wright’s formalisation focuses explicitly on the meaning of 
linguistic utterances, and makes explicit appeal to the notion 
of  a  language.  The  question  as  to  the  nature  and 
individuation  conditions  of  a  language  is  substantial. 
However,  there  is  an  interpretation  of  the  expression  “my 
language” which should be uncontroversial in this context. I 
will take a subject’s language to consist of all the expressions 
in her language which she understands: all those expressions 
which correspond to concepts she possesses.206 
It is worth noting that in neither Putnam’s argument nor 
Wright’s  proof  require  a  specific  form  of  causal  theory  of 
reference. Rather, Putnam and Wright make appeal to a weak 
notion of causal constraint. This means they can avoid prima 
facie worries  such  as  the  one  illustrated  by  the  following 
example.  Doug,  whenever  he  eats  cheese,  suffers  the 
misfortune of hallucinating that he is surrounded by brains-in-
a-vat. Doug, not being particularly bright, eats cheese on a 
frequent basis  without realising the effect  it  has on him. It 
might be thought to be compatible with what Putnam writes 
that Doug’s expression “brain-in-a-vat” refers to brains-in-a-
205 Putnam (1981) pp. 14-5, emphasis added.
206 Again, the understanding involved here can be partial, and there may 
well be vague cases.
154
Six: Scepticism
vat-in-the-image:  “[t]hese  theories  are  not  ruled out  ...  for 
there  is  a  close causal  connection  between the  use of  the 
word [“brain-in-a-vat”] ... and the presence of [brains-in-a-vat-
in-the-image]”207. Yet any theory of reference which has as a 
consequence that Doug’s expression “brain-in-a-vat” refers to 
images  of  brains-in-a-vat  surely  ought  to  be  rejected.  Any 
adequate  theory  of  reference  must  explain  why  his 
expression “brain-in-a-vat” refers to actual brains-in-a-vat and 
not to images of brains-in-a-vat.208 
As noted above, neither Putnam’s argument nor Wright’s 
formalisation are committed to the claim that the tokening of 
a propositional mental event, or linguistic utterance, refers to 
whatever causes it. All that is required is that reference be 
causally constrained: if there is no causal connection between 
“F” and x’s, “F” cannot refer to x’s. Since there is no causal 
connection between “brain-in-a-vat” as thought or uttered by 
brains-in-a-vat,  and  actual  brains-in-a-vat,  “brain-in-a-vat” 
cannot for them refer to brains-in-a-vat.
The premise needed for the argument to go through is the 
weaker, and more plausible premise, that whatever the brain-
in-a-vat  can  do  with  an  utterance  of  “brain-in-a-vat”,  it 
certainly can’t refer to brains-in-a-vat.
This  also  means  that  neither  Putnam  nor  Wright  are 
committed to the claim that a brain-in-a-vat  could think or 
have a language.209
207 Putnam (1981) p. 14.
208 Answers to this problem are particularly forthcoming in naturalistic 
theories  of  content.  For  example  Fodor  (1987)  offers  an  asymmetric-
dependence  theory,  according  to  which  Doug’s  expression  “brain-in-a-
vat” would refer to brains-in-a-vat  and not to images of  brains-in-a-vat 
because of an asymmetric dependence of “brain-in-a-vat” on brains-in-a-
vat, and not on images of brains-in-a-vat. See also Millikan (1984) and 
(1993).
209 This is explicit in premise (ii) of The Proof.
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6.4 Brueckner’s problem
Brueckner  has  argued  that  the  assumptions  of  (ABiv) and 
(ANorm) “engender  a  skepticism  about  knowledge  of 
meaning,  or  propositional  content,  which  undercuts  [their] 
anti-skeptical force”210. Brueckner remarks that,
 ... if I do not know whether S is speaking English 
or  vat-English,  then  I  cannot  apply  a 
disquotational principle ... to S’s utterance of ‘S is 
a BIV’ and conclude that those utterances are true 
iff S is a BIV. (Brueckner, 1986 p. 164)
In  this  he  is  surely  correct.  To  identify  the  referent  of  a 
subject’s expression one first has to know which language the 
subject is speaking. Such knowledge is plausibly comparative 
knowledge;  knowledge  that  the  subject  speaks  English  as 
opposed to BIVese, for instance. But Brueckner continues,
Similarly, if I do not know whether I am speaking 
English  or  vat-English,  then  I  cannot  apply  [a 
disquotational principle] to my own utterances of 
‘I am a BIV’ as a step toward the conclusion that I 
know that I am not a  BIV ...  . (Brueckner, 1986 p. 
164, original emphasis)
The problem he identifies is that if, prior to running through 
The Proof, I do not know whether or not I am a brain-in-a-vat, 
I cannot know the referent of my expression “brain-in-a-vat”, 
and am therefore in no position to identify it by disquotation 
as at line (iv). But in this he is surely mistaken. To identify the 
referent  of  an  expression  in  my  language no  such 
comparative knowledge is necessary. Even on the assumption 
that I do not know that I am speaking English as opposed to 
BIVese, I do know that whatever “brain-in-a-vat” refers to in 
my language I may identify its reference by using that very 
expression.211 Homophonic  disquotation  is  not  rendered 
illegitimate by semantic externalism.
210 Brueckner (1986) p. 148. Brueckner would not express his point like 
this, since he fails to distinguish clearly between the specific arguments, 
which I have called (ABiv) and (ANorm), and the meta-argument.
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Brueckner’s  worry  about  knowledge  of  meaning  exactly 
parallels the worry about knowledge of propositional thought-
content  expressed  by  the  Content  Sceptic’s  Argument 
considered in chapter two. The Content Sceptic’s Argument, it 
will  be  remembered,  seeks  to  undermine  a  subject’s 
knowledge of her propositional thought-content as follows. If 
Susan is  on Earth,  she is  thinking that  water  is  a liquid.  If 
Susan were on Twin Earth, she would be thinking that twater 
is a liquid. The evidence available to Susan is consistent both 
with her currently thinking that water is a liquid and with her 
currently thinking that  twater is a liquid. Hence Susan does 
not know that she is currently thinking that water is a liquid. 
The principle of privileged access, (PA), shows why this line of 
reasoning  is  mistaken;  it  demonstrates  that  knowledge  of 
propositional thought-content is not based on evidence, and 
does  not  require  that  one  rule  out  various  possible  twin 
thoughts.  It  is  consistent  with  semantic  externalism that  a 
subject cannot be mistaken in her self-ascriptive beliefs. 
Similarly,  Brueckner  seeks  to  undermine  knowledge  of 
linguistic meaning as follows. If Susan is a normal subject, her 
expression “brain-in-a-vat” refers to brains-in-a-vat. If Susan 
were  a  brain-in-a-vat,  her  expression “brain-in-a-vat”  would 
refer  to brains-in-a-vat-in-the-image. The evidence available 
to Susan is consistent both with her being a normal subject 
and with her  being a brain-in-a-vat.  Hence Susan does not 
know that her expression “brain-in-a-vat” refers to brains-in-
a-vat. But just as knowledge of propositional thought-content 
is  not  undermined  by  semantic  externalism,  neither  is 
knowledge  of  linguistic  meaning  for  expressions  in  one’s 
language. Knowledge of  linguistic meaning is  not  based on 
evidence,  and  does  not  require  that  one  rule  out  various 
possible twin meanings.212
Note how the problem arises from a failure to distinguish 
clearly  between  (ABiv),  (ANorm),  and  the  meta-argument 
211 I take it that knowledge of which language you are speaking would be 
equally guaranteed by semantic externalism.
212 As noted above, if “X” is an expression in S’s language, then S has the 
concept x.
157
Six: Scepticism
which reflects  upon them. The  Content  Sceptic’s  Argument 
trades on the mistaken idea that there could be one second-
order thought, and yet two possible first-order thoughts, only 
one  of  which  could  be  correctly  attributed.  Similarly, 
Brueckner’s  worry  trades  on  the  mistaken  idea  that  there 
could  be  one  sceptical  hypothesis,  and  yet  two  possible 
arguments, one of which refutes it and one of which does not. 
However, just as a subject could not entertain the very same 
second-order belief  – that she was thinking that  water is a 
liquid  –  on  Earth  and  on  Twin  Earth,  a  subject  could  not 
entertain the very same sceptical hypothesis – that she was a 
brain-in-a-vat – were she a normal subject or a brain-in-a-vat. 
Whatever a brain-in-a-vat can do, it certainly cannot entertain 
that sceptical hypothesis. 
Brueckner’s problem is not legitimate, and Putnam’s meta-
argument works. Both a brain-in-a-vat and a normal subject 
would  establish  the  falsity  of  their  respective  sceptical 
hypotheses by running through The Proof.213
6.5 The remains of scepticism
Putnam’s  argument  yields  a  transcendental  refutation  of 
global  external-world  scepticism.  On  the  assumption  of 
semantic externalism it  is  a  short  step from understanding 
the expression “brain-in-a-vat” to knowing that you are not a 
brain-in-a-vat. To the extent that running through The Proof 
yields non-empirical knowledge of the external world, it is of a 
piece with instance arguments, and is to be defended in the 
same general way.
However, semantic externalism may well leave room for a 
rather strange form of scepticism. Although Wright has been 
concerned  to  defend  the  claim  that  Putnam’s  argument  is 
sound,  he nevertheless  maintains  that  “it  does  not  sustain 
213 Taking  Brueckner’s  problem seriously  in  fact  engenders  a  further 
form of scepticism which undermines the original sceptical hypothesis. If 
I do not know what my expression “brain-in-a-vat” refers to, I presumably 
do not even know which sceptical hypothesis it is that I want to refute.
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the conclusion that, in the way we would like, the nightmare 
is refuted”214. He writes,
... the real spectre to be exorcised concerns the 
idea  of  a  thought  standing  behind our  thought 
that  we are  not  brains-in-a-vat,  in  just  the  way 
that our thought that they  are mere brains-in-a-
vat would stand behind the thought ... of actual 
brains-in-a-vat that ‘We are not brains-in-a-vat’. ... 
.  What  we  should  really  like  would  be  an 
assurance that there is no such true thought: an 
assurance not just that most of what we think is 
actually  true  –  for  semantic  externalism  might 
well deliver that result for the brains-in-a-vat ... . 
(Wright, 1991 p. 93, original emphasis)
I  think  this  is  ultimately  correct.  Instance  arguments  can 
provide  a  subject  with  substantial  knowledge  of  her 
environment,  and  such  knowledge  should  not  be 
underestimated.  But  an  uneasy  feeling  remains.  To 
acknowledge  that  one  is  securely  related  to  one’s 
environment  in  the way  semantic  externalism proscribes  is 
also  to  acknowledge  that  one’s  cognitive  capacities  are 
restricted by that environment. This is manifest in the claim 
that actual subjects and counterfactual subjects cannot have 
the  same  concepts.  Reflection  on  this  becomes  worrying, 
since  it  opens  us  to  the  possibility  that  the  fundamental 
nature of our relation to our environment may be outside our 
cognitive grasp. As Wright says,
But of course, if there were such a true thought, 
standing behind us as it were, it would no more 
be available to us than the thought that they are 
brains-in-a-vat would be available to the envatted 
brains. (Wright, 1991 p. 93)
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have defended Putnam’s argument. Semantic 
externalism does indeed provide a subject with the means to 
refute  such  sceptical  hypotheses  as  that  presented  by 
214 Wright (1991) p. 73.
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Putnam. This is because, if semantic externalism is true, the 
world provides the very means by which we can think about 
it.  This,  however,  turns out to be a double-edged sword.  It 
does  ensure  that  we  cannot  be  radically  mistaken  in  our 
beliefs about the world; but it also ensures that we may not 
be  able,  as  it  were,  to  get  outside  our  cognitive  world  to 
reflect upon the mechanisms which connect us to it.  If  this 
latter thought gives rise to a genuine worry, it is not one of 
which we could easily rid ourselves. 
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